In April 2026, Myanmar’s junta chief-turned-President, Min Aung Hlaing invited oppositional armed groups to join peace talks by 31 July. Now that it is well-past the deadline, one could say that this peace proposal, which was rebuffed by some Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) within mere days of its announcement, has been unfruitful.

Min Aung Hlaing took charge of the country after successfully orchestrating a military coup in 2021 and plunging the country into its ongoing civil war which has claimed over 100,000 lives and displaced around 5.2 million people. The anti-military resistance that started post-coup includes the resistance of ethnic nationalities who have been demanding self-determination and autonomy for decades now. They oppose the military assuming power without democratic consent and the excessive centralisation of power that comes with it.

The offer to join peace talks is one of the first few tasks undertaken by Aung Hlaing in his presidential tenure. However, no key stakeholder perceived this as a genuine offer of dialogue. The collapse of these peace talks, even before they could begin, highlights the lack of trust that the EAOs have in the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Defence Services) and hence the military-backed regime. In this light this piece analyses why any peace proposal from this regime might not be a viable route to peace in Myanmar.

Separation of powers

A longstanding bone of contention between the centre and ethnic groups has been that of distributing powers in a federal set-up. National ethnic groups have been historically dissatisfied with the non-fulfillment of the 1947 Panglong Agreement which promised complete internal freedom to frontier states. Their experience with overwhelming concentration of power at the centre during the many decades of military rule prompts their call for clear separation of powers between the military and the civilian government.

The central civil-military group however argues for major power and control to rest with the centre but within a more decentralised set-up. Even within the centre, the Tatmadaw has been particularly insistent on this formulation which has deadlocked past peace processes. For example, the third Union Accord, signed between the civilian government, the Tatmadaw, and EAOs in 2020, failed to secure agreement on the military’s demand for a ‘non-secession’ clause and their obstinance on denying signatory EAOs the right to retain internal armies. The EAOs were left discontented as both these demands were included in the ‘Panglong promises’ that General Aung San had essentially agreed to in principle while negotiating the Agreement of 1947.

This fundamental divergence is enough to derail any peace process. To add to this, Min Aung Hlaing has openly accused the EAOs of protracting the peace process and being dishonest stakeholders. Even in his post-coup outreach, the president has asked the EAOs to be “realistic” and steer clear of “impossible” demands.

However, the prolonged civil war has made these “impossible” demands a lived reality, with many EAOs setting up parallel governments and functioning as autonomous governing units. This includes the Arakan Army in Rakhine and the United Wa State Army in areas of Shan State. This not only exacerbates the insecurities of the military-backed regime but also widens the gap between viable realities for either side.

Distrust of the military

The military and the EAOs share a history of distrust which have flustered previous peace processes as well.

Myanmar has had a long tryst with internal unrest, especially over the issues of autonomy and power sharing with ethnic groups. In order to address these disagreements and resolve the decades-long violence, Aung San Suu Kyi, the then State Counsellor, initiated the 21st Century Panglong Conference in 2016. The conference was encumbered by dual messaging from the centre: the Suu Kyi-led civilian government which was aiming for peaceful negotiations, and conversely, the Tatmadaw, which was arm-twisting non-signatory parties. The Tatmadaw launched brutal offensives involving airstrikes and heavy artillery attacks targeting civilians as well. This effectively eroded the trust between the parties and fanned preexisting insecurities. It also made the ethnic groups skeptical of the civilian government because of their lack of control over the military.

The distrust also stems from the military’s historical use of religion as a tool to legitimise their actions and appease the majority. Such majoritarian appeasement by the regime contradicts ethnic nationalities’ fundamental ask of equal rights. Min Aung Hlaing, much like his predecessors, has also used religion as a crutch to legitimise his authority. He has regularly associated with prominent monks to make it seem like he and his regime have religious backing. These include several Buddhist nationalist hardliners like Sitagu Sayadaw who notoriously defended the killings of non-Buddhists by implying that they “are not humans,” and Ashin Wirathu, who was once sentenced to 25 years in prison for inciting anti-Muslim riots. These overtures by the military bolsters the skepticism of the ethnic minorities and have also backfired in the past. Many EAOs, like the Kachin Independence Army, came into being as a reaction to Buddhism being granted the status of state religion in 1961. The move was reversed in 1962.

The trust deficit has continued with the coup and resultant violence violating the 2015 National Ceasefire Agreement. Post 2021, the junta regime proposed peace talks multiple times. However, centre-initiated clashes and offensives raged on, making any dialogue unfeasible. These misgivings continue with the current ‘democratic’ regime engaging in military offensives while it proposes an open door for peace. In May 2026 alone, regime action killed 71 civilians across the country. The regime has incarcerated thousands of political prisoners including ethnic and local leaders.

Is there a way out?

An attempt at sustainable peace is long due in Myanmar. However, due to persistent and deep-seated differences, an unmediated dialogue between a military-led and military-backed regime and the EAOs is a far cry.

This unsuccessful attempt at peace talks clarifies what will not work in Myanmar and begs the consideration of alternate routes. Perhaps it is time for regional organisations like the ASEAN to intervene in Myanmar’s conflict in an actionable way with quantifiable goalposts. ASEAN’s current strategy of non-interaction has not yielded desirable results. It leaves room for member countries to bilaterally engage with the regime that grants it international legitimacy and complicates the conflict further.

There is a need for calculated mediation that builds trust between parties and has enough power to hold the sides accountable.

Fiona Raval is Researcher with IPCS’ South East Asia Research Programme (SEARP).