BRICS, an intergovernmental grouping of eleven emerging markets and developing countries, concluded its 18th Leaders’ Summit in New Delhi on 13 September. BRICS represents nearly half the world’s population, about 40 per cent of global GDP, and roughly a quarter of global trade, but still faces questions of relevance. Ultimately, BRICS matters to its members less for what it produces and more for the options it can offer to pursue strategic autonomy, the capacity to act independently on issues that impact vital interests, and multi-alignment, or the freedom to work with multiple partners simultaneously on different issues. However, the consensus model that keeps these options available limits what BRICS can produce.

What BRICS offers its members

BRICS offers its member countries four things: High-level political access annually to a meeting which includes four of the top ten global economies; a platform to amplify individual voices collectively on global multilateral reform; the possibility of bilateral sidelines meetings to discuss contentious issues; and agreed text that records the member countries’ collective positions.

First, the annual participation of leaders and ministers across several sectoral tracks gives each member state regular access to its counterparts. During India's chairship alone, over four hundred meetings were held in thirty Indian cities at the level of ministers, business, and civil society. For example, the agriculture ministers’ meeting in Indore led to the launch of a Global Forum on Farmers' Rights in Seed Systems. These meetings also build working relationships between high to mid-level officials who hardly meet otherwise, helping absorb political shocks without help from an external country or agency. For example, Iran and the UAE were able to meet across different tracks despite being in adversarial positions since the US-Israel-Iran war broke out in May.

Second, BRICS provides a platform for member states to agree on common positions for negotiations in multilateral bodies. In New Delhi, BRICS members agreed on a common line for WTO agriculture negotiations, which would be difficult to defend alone during WTO negotiation rounds. This also facilitates a stronger, collective objection to rules that BRICS members find hard to influence alone, such as the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). Further, it helps raise the voices of those members facing unilateral economic sanctions or those that are affected by them to condemn coercive measures together.

Third, BRICS offers a venue for bilateral meetings on the sidelines that may not otherwise be politically feasible independently. Indian Prime Minister Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping met at Kazan on the sidelines of the 2024 BRICS Summit, which helped the two sides manage the thaw in their relations. At New Delhi, the Iranian and UAE leaders held their first high-level bilateral meeting since the war began in May. In this way, BRICS summits are also becoming a ‘multilateral of bilaterals’.

Fourth, the consensus-based annual non-binding declaration, while limited in scope, serves an important purpose. It records where members currently stand on global issues, and shifts in its language demonstrate accommodation of member countries' concerns. The 2016 Goa BRICS declaration, adopted soon after the Uri attack—carried out by the Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammed—didn’t name the group. A year later, the Xiamen declaration named them explicitly, including China’s sign-off, despite its close relationship with Pakistan. Later, both the Rio and New Delhi declarations condemned the 2025 Pahalgam attack in the strongest terms, though without naming any terrorist organisation. The foreign ministers’ meeting in May this year failed to produce a joint statement on West Asia, but the leaders reached agreement four months later by saying less. It mentioned only “respective national positions” on the war and didn’t name any involved parties, which represents accommodation.

Where BRICS falls short

BRICS faces three limitations: the gap between word and action; ie what members agree to in the declaration and their national positions; the slow pace of building institutions beyond the New Development Bank (NDB); and the outsized influence of its heavyweight members, China and Russia. Each limitation is facilitated by the requirement of consensus decision-making, which conversely also keeps its options open, as explained earlier.

First, a declaration records the lowest common denominator of agreement, and not necessarily what members will do independently while pursuing their foreign policies. China signed the Xiamen Declaration naming the LeT and JeM in 2017. Yet, it placed technical holds on India’s proposal at the UN 1267 Committee to designate LeT and JeM leaders as terrorists in 2022 and 2023. Additionally, any collective BRICS voice on UNSC reform or at the WTO has produced little in practice. For example, UNSC reform hasn’t moved an inch, and the WTO dispute resolution mechanism remains defunct.

Second, more than a decade has passed since the creation of the NDB and Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA). CRA has never been tested in practice. Other ideas launched at the Kazan Summit such as the BRICS Grain Exchange, New Investment Platform, and payment initiatives still sit in working groups. On payments initiatives, for example, the New Delhi declaration only asked the task force to explore “pragmatic solutions” with “no one-size-fits-all approach.”

Third, on the Russia-Ukraine war, the Beijing and Johannesburg declarations only recalled “national positions,” and the New Delhi text dropped the conflict altogether. A grouping that cannot describe a conflict involving its own members could struggle at large to speak for the Global South on peace and security in the way that it claims to do. China’s economic weight, which accounts for the largest share of BRICS’ output and trade, is difficult to contain as it continues to gain disproportionately more than any other member country.

Conclusion

Taken together, BRICS offers its members more options than what it delivers as a bloc. The necessity of consensus decision-making both enables and limits these options. That said, as long as members can use BRICS to speak collectively, meet adversaries on neutral platforms, and record positions without binding commitments, it will stay relevant to them—even if it delivers little.

Tapan Bharadwaj is Senior Researcher with IPCS’ China Research Programme (CRP).