China's purported "unhappiness" at the landing in late May of a AN-32 transport craft of Indian Air Force (IAF) at Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO), is quite perplexing. During the flight the crews had adhered to all canons of operating on international borders. There was nothing new in this action as the IAF has periodically visited the place, even if only in helicopters. They had to because, it is Indian territory and there are members of an Indo-Tibetan Border Police team manning the location, who had to be looked after. An earthquake in 1966 had rendered the airfield unusable and operations needed to be revived. The event essentially, becomes a landmark, because a full-fledged medium transport aircraft has landed with a substantially higher payload and with top level commanders, after a gap of 43 years at the outpost on the disputed border.

One would compare this to the famous landing in a IAF Jet Pod assisted C-119 Packet aircraft on 23 July 1962 with now Air Marshal (Retd.) CKS Raje, in command of the flight, along with the then Commander of the Western Air Command on board. The difference is that the 1962 landing was amidst duress, misgivings and a total absence of abilities for operating transport aircraft for ultra-high altitude landings. The IAF has, since then, built up a formidable capability including the capacity to carry battle tanks to high altitude bases.

The catalyst common to both the events however, set apart by more than four decades of geopolitics, was the Chinese activities in the Aksai Chin region, which forced the Indian government to take precautionary steps. The decision to reactivate this advance landing ground in the Aksai Chin was announced in the third week of April 2008 and the government proposes to refurbish forward bases at Fukche and Chushul, as well.

A 50-strong contingent of Chinese soldiers had been spotted building a road in the vicinity of DBO, back in 1999. There have been reports since that "China made 24 attempts to take hold of the DBO air base during the last India-Pakistan conflict in Kargil." They were thwarted, albeit, through persuasion. Analysts have painstakingly recorded that China is pursuing 13 different projects to build infrastructure in the region with a view to enable speedy movement of military wherewithal to the area. This has been going on for a very long time on the Chinese side but the Indian side has woken up "very late," according ton one experienced analyst.

The Indian government has scrupulously refrained from a public discussion of contentious developments, in view of the border talks between the India and China. However, on the ground it would not be desirable to ignore, the stepped up cross-border incursions by Chinese troops in recent years and most essentially, China's massive build-up of military infrastructure along the 4,057-km Line of Actual Control (LAC) in all the sectors. This calls for preparedness on the Indian side and would entail a much longer gestation period. Some efforts are already on with respect to Aksai Chin, with a 608-km road network project conceived along the LAC road links to J&K, Himachal, and Uttarakhand. The construction of a road linking Leh ultimately with DBO is a part of these plans to service far-flung outposts manned by security personnel.

However, forward air bases cannot be wished away specially in view of reports that the Chinese have built new forward bases, in proximity to Nepalese and Indian borders. Also, the highly mountainous terrain is very prone to roadblocks caused by snow avalanches and landslides, particularly in the Indian portions of the Aksai Chin. The territory under Chinese control is a plateau in comparison and much less vulnerable to vagaries of weather and terrain. Therefore, a well-developed capability for air maintenance and aerial transport support for troop and equipment movement must be in place. The IAF would do well to aim at an all weather capacity to be able to deal with difficult weather conditions and to monitor all activity on the borders. Without flouting international norms and rules of air, such a venture is quite feasible and within the realm of India's air power. India's declaration of a strategic interest in the Central Asian region makes it all the more necessary to build capabilities and potential for several ingress routes into the northern regions.