Discussants: Mira Sinha Bhattacharjea (Institute of Chinese Studies)
                    Srikant Kondapalli (Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses)

Chair: C V Ranganathan (Former Indian Ambassador to China)

C V Ranganathan

Opening the proceedings of the seminar, the chair said that it was a good time to discuss India-China relations with the visit of Chinese Premier Wen Jibao in the background. He expressed happiness that many of the participants were ambassadors, academicians and military officers who refused to subscribe to the prevalent notion of the Chinese as enemies and rivals.

Srikant Kondapalli

Srikant Kondapalli presented a brief overview of Chinese military modernization and dealt with its impact on India-China relations. Referring to the annual reports of the Ministry of External Affairs and the Ministry of Defence for the data, he said the Chinese missile deployment areas are a major area of concern for India. He pointed out that the SSBN-0194 missiles, a version being developed, would give China a second-strike capability. The new version is solid-propelled whereas the current one is liquid-propelled.

Kondapalli saw the Chinese military activities in and around South Asia as inseparable from its modernization drive. In this context, he referred to China's transfers of nuclear technology and material to Pakistan, which he termed as widespread. He said the Chinese were seen at Fatehganj in Pakistan helping Pakistan develop its missile programme. The role of China, according to him, is particularly significant in the context of the border disputes that are still unresolved in South Asia.

China's increasing weight in South Asia can be gauged through an examination of the defence ties it is establishing with countries in the region, e.g. it has institutionalized its defence ties with Bangladesh. In the context of India-China relations, he called the 25 January 2005 strategic dialogue as a departure from the trend hitherto available.

Srikant pointed out that the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Relations justifies its increasing defence expenditure in the context of Japan-rise, India-rise, etc. and the strategic dialogue was important in that extent. He said that there are about two lakh troops under modernization in the category of Rapid Response Units (RRU) and there are about 22 RRUs in the Chengdu Military Region. The Kunming Military Region is also of much strategic significance to India. The current capability is that the RRUs can be mobilized in 24 hours. There are about 50 - 60 missiles located in areas in Tibet which are crucial from India's point of view.

In the larger context of military modernization, Chinese efforts at border consolidation are significant for both India and China. China is building major hydro-electric projects in the area bordering Arunachal Pradesh despite the fact that Tibet has surplus power. Thirty million yuan has been sanctioned for building a 118-km long tract in the region bordering Ladakh. Of the two major roads, one from Beijing to Lhasa and the second from Chengdu to Lhasa, the former is more significant for India, Srikant opined. There is a 955-km long bus service being planned from Lhasa to Kathmandu. Besides, there is a rail line being proposed from Chengdu to Lhasa to Kathmandu. It was pointed out that in 1986-87, Nepal bought small arms worth Rs. 288 million from China and India could lose to China its position as  the sole supplier of arms to Nepal. The rapid development of infrastructure in the border region assume importance if one recalls that the British thought of Tibet as a buffer zone.

In the air sector, Srikant pointed out that 15 new airports are crucial from India's point of view and the major ones are located in the Kunming military region. Su-27 fighter aircrafts have been deployed in the Chengdu military area, which is also developing aircrafts designed by Israel. The XZ-1 has a long range of 1600 kms.

Srikant concluded his presentation stressing the need to study the implications of the Chinese military modernization for all three countries i.e. China, India, and Pakistan

Mira Sinha Bhattacharjea

Mira commended the previous speaker for an extensive and detailed documentation of defence capabilities. The greater challenge was how to interpret the same. She pointed out that the seminar assumed importance in the background of the anniversary of exchange of relations between China and India in the month of April 1954. Whereas India had extended recognition to the Chinese republic in the month of January, reciprocation was delayed due to the Chinese insistence on India's position on Taiwan.

She maintained that the meeting of the Joint Working Group taking place in Beijing was an attempt to look at the politics rather than the hardware of China-India relations.

It is important to recall, Mira said, that on 1 January 2005, China decided that they would have a whole new self-image. China no longer considers itself weak, victimized and complaining. A new self-image is to be interpreted, according to Mira, as the will to behave according to how great powers are expected to, not necessarily like the U S but with responsibility, on the basis of  Panchsheel.

She contended that China had always walked on two legs: a belief that whatever rights are available to others should be available to China and the principle of good neighbouring countries. It is noteworthy as regards the latter that it has had to deal with five new borders with countries of the former Soviet Union. China understood the need for a peaceful environment in the new dispensation. The Sanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), covering a huge landmass from the western borders of China to the eastern borders of Russia, is to be seen in the context of various connectivities that China is building up.

Mira opined that Wen Jibao's visit to India should be an occasion to think beyond bilateral trade. She mentioned a few areas of importance. First is the need to appreciate the strategic consequences of the fall of the Soviet Union, which gave rise to sole superpower. But, 9/11 has strengthened Chinese status in South Asia and its influence extends from Southeast Asia to Central Asia. Second, India is significant for China as it is the largest country is South Asia. It is noteworthy that China is moving to settle its sea boundaries. Third, amidst economic modernization and emergence of large economic units as an engine of relations, it is important to assert politics as the driver. Fourth, there should not be any announcement on Sikkim. The lesson for India has been that territorial issues have been fundamental in this relation, and that only after settling this, India would be able to gain from China diplomatically and economically. India should have a proactive role rather than its traditional reactive role.

Credit should go to the Chinese, Mira said, for the passion they have displayed for territorial settlement. They recognize that the magic is in numbers. It is important to visualize that in an era of large economic units, India-China-Japan will emerge as an influential block. At a lesser level, apart from the territorial issue, the Chinese would like to see India as a vital economic power.

During the upcoming visit, it is likely that there will be Free Trade Agreements and agreements on more connectivity by road and air and more joint ventures might come up for discussion. Politically, she said that relationship will be at strategic levels and underscored that 'strategic' should not be interpreted in military ways but rather, in political ways of long term relations. It should also mean working together for multipolarity in the UN. An agenda for resolution of Kashmir and Taiwan should be included.

As regards the boundary, Mira said, 1954 created a de-facto boundary and it was brought into existence in 2003 during Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit. She suggested that the following may be expected if it is restored: the boundary cannot be settled sectorally; it has to be taken as a whole. Only then, certain exchanges are possible. Having accepted the Panchsheel, we are, according to Mira, in a better position now to make settlements. The factors of population and connectivity will become significant when maps do not coincide.

Mira concluded with the note that there are more possibilities than challenges. If we see them as possibilities, we will get out of the box. She underscored the importance of separating territorial issues from political relations.

Discussion

• The Chinese missile and troop deployment and transfers of technology to Pakistan should be kept in mind. China has always seen South China Sea as if it was theirs. What are its ramifications? How to build up cooperation and joint ventures in this context? A balance theory has been doing the rounds, a scenario in which the US is interested in India while China is interested in being an autonomous power. Why should not India ask for concessions if India has served the Chinese cause? The nuclear issue is generally avoided in any talks with China. The fact is that India is a declared no-first user. China has a similar doctrine.

• On the issue of borders, there was some progress in 1995-96. It was the recognition of reality. That has to be translated into steps on the ground. Such a settlement is also a requirement for any strategic partnership. We must have a bottom line consensus of what we want. The build up of military power depends on the attitudes of the countries.

• The principle followed in the Peace and Tranquility understanding of 4 November 1993 was that we have a problem but let us go on from here.

• The Chinese have developed extensive logistics capabilities in its outer regions e.g. in Tibet

• As for missile deployment, there are agreements in 1996 on de-targeting and another one on non-targeting signed during Clinton's visit. Strategic dialogue component should rather be de-targeting.

• India held a military exercise in the South China Sea and China was not a participant in it.

• There is already a soft balance between China, India and the US. China has 3 programmes of countering the US: 1) the UN Charter 2) the Panchsheel and promotion of multipolarity 3) India and Russia in terms of good neighborliness. As regards the Asian strategic partnership, there is a disjuncture in Beijing between the Ministry of National Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Relations. The PLA's position is stronger than that of the Foreign Ministry and hence, the Defence Ministry's influence on South Asia is greater.

• Unless we are more critical of the building blocks, our relations will not improve much. It is to the advantage of the Chinese, as long as they can defer the problem whether it is the issue of Taiwan or South China Sea. Indian policy makers should pin down China to ground realities. China is projecting itself as following a cooperative approach but the question remains as to how we are going to deal with its nuclear proliferation.

• Nobody wants to share power. If it is accepted, we must be clear of our national objectives and study theirs. The key issue is that their infrastructure is better in Myanmar and Nepal. But Chinese war postures have changed since 1983. China has recognized this whereas the Indian leadership is yet to realize this. In Tawang, people's sentiments have to be accommodated; there are cross-border ethnic ties but the sentiments are attached to India.

• The sixth Dalai Lama hails from Tawang. The Chinese claim is because of that and is  from a religious aspect. Tawang will also be financially important for Tibet as it is estimated that it can sustain one-third of Tibet.

• On the Brahmaputra river, the exchange of data has been satisfactory. Dams on the Tibetan side might have an impact on the Indian side. The other area of concern is that the Chinese are using nuclear devices to divert rivers.

• We can play the game according to balance theory only if we are clear of our national objectives. It may be recalled that India had said no to the offer of a Security Council seat.

• We could have a vertical area of issues on the problem of non-proliferation. The Chinese refusal to accord formal recognition to India's nuclear status was the key issue to non-proliferation.

• An important issue in India-China relations is that in Bandung Chou -en-Lai suggested the maintenance of status quo. We changed the maps and took the issue up with China. Which map are we talking about, historical or the maps on the ground? An important example to remember in this regard is that in the case of Burma and China, there was a removal of troops prior to the exchange of maps.

• An interesting aspect of the Indian strategic visioning is that nowhere in the archives, a discussion of its frontiers is found. The "Nehru Doctrine" on the Himalayas is that the McMohan Line is our boundary, frontier, map or no map.

The chair concluded the seminar with the remark that a good starting point in India-China relations would be India's examination of its past positions. China is undertaking a Western development programme infrastructurally. India should not take it as aimed against her, it is their effort at reducing regional disparities.