The Philippine government is currently being led by President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., the son of the unpopular former President Ferdinand Marcos Sr., and Vice President Sara Duterte, daughter of the controversial former President Rodrigo Duterte. They joined hands and were brought into power in 2022 but their fragile alliance is now in shambles and going through a very public breakup.

The situation reached boiling point in November 2024, when Duterte made death threats against Marcos, the First Lady, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, adding that arrangements had been made to kill them in the event of her assassination. The outcome of this fracas is likely to have stark domestic implications. It will also affect the country’s foreign policy, including its relationship with India, in 2025.

Election predictions

The collapse of this alliance comes ahead of the 2025 midterm elections in which all 317 seats in the House and 12 of the 24 seats in the Senate will be contested. Both dynasties are fighting to create a favourable situation for themselves in preparation for the 2028 presidential elections.

Marcos has proposed extending presidential term limits beyond the current six years, but to do so, he must retain control of the House. In November 2023, he released former Senator Leila De Lima, who was Rodrigo Duterte’s fiercest political opponent. She was widely believed to have been imprisoned due to her vocal criticism of his administration and his brutal war on drugs. Her release well ahead of the midterm elections in 2025, where her vocal opposition to the Dutertes could help Marcos consolidate power in the House, is strategic. Meanwhile, the Duterte family is working to gain electoral ground in the House and set up favourable odds for Sara Duterte’s presidential campaign in 2028. The family has nominated Senate candidates that are not part of the ruling coalition party and many independent candidates who are known Duterte allies. Rodrigo Duterte is also preparing to run for mayor of Davao City, a position he held prior to becoming president in 2016.

Following Sara Duterte’s statements and death threats and the corruption charges against her, the House has filed for her impeachment. This investigation led Rodrigo Duterte to describe Congress as a “rotten institution.” The Dutertes are aiming to shift the balance of power to avoid Sara Duterte’s impeachment while Marcos needs to ensure that impeachment happens so that he can extend the presidential term limit and prevent Duterte from becoming president in 2028.

Foreign policy differences

As president, Marcos has deviated significantly from Rodrigo Duterte on foreign policy. While Duterte was known for his pro-Beijing position, Marcos’ actions in the past year indicate a clear pro-Washington stance. Unlike the former president, who continued to appease Chinese territorial claims and military exercises in the West Philippine Sea (even after winning an arbitration case in 2016), the current president has gone on a diplomatic and even security offensive. Duterte assumed an anti-US position despite Chinese maritime aggression. In 2021, however, he finally reversed his decision to end the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) that allowed US access to military bases in the Philippines.

Although the agreement was reinstated, trust between Washington and Manila remained low until Marcos’ victory in 2022. In April 2023 Marcos granted the US access to four additional Philippine military bases in an expansion of the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) that was signed in 2014. Marcos has claimed that this measure was taken primarily to boost disaster relief in the area in addition to defending its coastline on the South China Sea. Bilateral ties between the US and the Philippines have made great strides in Marcos’ tenure. The countries have jointly issued new bilateral defence guidelines that updated the 1951 Mutual Defence Agreement between the two. These new guidelines have resulted in greater defence cooperation, foreign military funding, expansion of military bases, and an increase in military equipment supplies. In 2024, when the Spratly Islands dispute boiled to open confrontations between China and the Philippines, Marcos doubled down on Manila’s claims, strengthening its ties with Washington.

Implications for India

Marcos’ position on China, unlike that of Duterte, has been better for New Delhi. Since 2022, trade relations between India and the Philippines have steadily improved with the total value crossing US$ 3 billion. The two countries have also made great strides in defence cooperation, resulting in the sale of the BrahMos missile system to the Philippines worth US$ 375 million. During the fifth India–Philippines Joint Defence Cooperation Committee meeting held in Manila on 10 September 2024, India’s Defence Secretary Giridhar Aramane encouraged the defence partnership between the nations and advocated for the joint development of military equipment.

Marcos’ foreign policy has bolstered defence against China’s expansion in the South China Sea, which aligns with both the US and India’s strategic agenda for the region, making way for greater bilateral and trilateral security cooperation. Outreach to the Philippines also provides India with an opportunity to showcase its reliability and power to others in the ASEAN region. This was the theme of the 20th India-ASEAN summit held in Jakarta in 2023, which aimed to boost maritime cooperation. Increased defence cooperation with the Philippines signifies the end of India’s reluctance to supply weapons to ASEAN in fear of China’s response. As New Delhi seeks to become a leader in defence exports and position itself as a strategic partner, its ties with Manila must continue to grow for the success of its future foreign policy in Southeast Asia. The current political climate combined with shared strategic interests and the positive relationship between Trump and Modi have created favourable conditions for stronger India-Philippines ties in 2025.

Future dynamics

While these opportunities exist, Donald Trump’s election as president raises certain questions. The Marcos administration has received support from the US in deterring China thus far, however, the newly elected Trump administration could decrease military spending abroad and adopt an anti-interventionist stance, which would leave the Philippines in a vulnerable position. The upcoming midterm elections are likely to rebalance power between the Marcos and Duterte families. With potentially greater influence in the House and Senate, the Dutertes could advocate for a return to more pro-China policies and make it difficult for the US to continue joint military operations and access military bases in the Philippines. This would also undermine New Delhi’s influence in the region and hinder growing military cooperation with Manila. The Dutertes would also be better positioned to oppose Marcos’s proposal to extend the presidential term limit, making Sara Duterte a favourite for the 2028 presidential elections. If this were to happen, it would greatly hurt both New Delhi and Washington’s foreign policy interests in the region for the better part of a decade.

Pradeep Nadig is enrolled in the Graduate Certificate in Public Policy (GCCP): Defence and Foreign Affairs programme at Takshashila Institution. He is a graduate of the Rollins-Jindal dual degree program with majors in Economics and Philosophy.