March 2005 was significant for the issue of biological weapons for two reasons. The largest assembly of Interpol's senior officials and experts from 155 countries met in France in the first week of March to discuss the major threat faced by the world from bio-terrorism. And, on 26th March, the biological and toxic weapons convention (BTWC or BWC) completed thirty years of its existence.

The BWC came into being because it was felt necessary to have an international regime to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons. However, today, when the threat has become very real, the BWC still remains a 'treaty without teeth' without any verification arrangements, even after thirty years of its existence. This treaty entered into force on 26 March 1975 with 43 member countries including the US and erstwhile USSR joining it. Currently, 153 States have entered the Convention. During the last thirty years, five Review Conferences and many Ad Hoc Group and Expert Committee meetings have taken place to strengthen this convention. But it remains distant from its stated goal of disarmament, which is of major concern in the post 9/11 era, when the threat from non-state actors has greatly increased.

Since the beginning it was clear that the BWC would not be a strong barrier against proliferation because it was negotiated without any effective verification provisions. The failure of BWC arises from the fact that various states disagree on the modalities to check and verify the activities of their biotechnological industries.

The heart of the BWC lies in Article 1, wherein each party pledges not to develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire or retain biological/toxin agents and weapons designed to use such agents for "hostile purposes or in armed conflict". However, it provides no guidance on what is "hostile purpose". Unlike the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) it does not have a list of banned agents. There is a lack also of effective verification means; hence various states, including treaty signatories, have frequently violated its provisions.

The first BWC review conference was held during March 1980, which reaffirmed its faith in Article 1 of the BWC. At the second review conference held in 1986, the States Parties sought to strengthen the treaty by adopting a set of confidence building measures (CBMs) that were politically binding. These measures included the exchange of information on research centers equipped with high-containment facilities, and unusual outbreaks of disease and similar occurrences caused by toxins. The third BWC review conference in 1991 adopted additional transparency measures like including the declaration of vaccine manufacturing plants, the description of past activities related to biological warfare, and exchange of information on biodefence programmes.

In September 1993, a panel of government scientific and technical experts known as verification experts group (VEREX) was established to assess the feasibility of verifying the BWC. An Ad Hoc Group of States Parties to the BWC was set up in 1994 by a Special Conference to develop a legally binding instrument or Protocol to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the BTWC. The Ad Hoc Group was active over a decade and held a large number of sessions. But, despite enormous hard work, it failed to negotiate a protocol acceptable to all. The last Review Conference concluded in November 2002 with the demand for a fresh approach to combat the proliferation and use of bioweapons. However, all these years of negotiations failed to promote any common understanding to take effective action on a range of critical issues.

The depository states to the BWC and major global powers like China and France could be held responsible for the failure of this convention. For different reasons, the US and Russia have opposed the suggestion for on site inspections on national territories: the US because it wants to protect the interests of its civilian industry and its military; Russia because it has inherited an offensive biological weapons programme and is not interested in disclosing its doings.

The next Review Conference is due in 2006. This conference should attempt to increase the level of participation by States in the CBMs recommended. There is a need for enhancing international capabilities for responding to the alleged use of bioweapons or suspicious outbreak of disease; and in formulating codes of conduct for scientists. Only a legally binding procedure would be effective to ensure compliance with the BWC.