China and the Politics of UN Peacekeeping
13 Mar, 2009 · 2831
Bhartendu Kumar Singh is critical of China’s poor contributions to peacekeeping operations
First, it was the White Paper on China’s national defence in 2008 published on 20 January 2009 that spoke very high of its peacekeeping operations under UN. Now, a SIPRI policy brief (by Bates Gill and Chin-Hao Huang, February 2009) has waxed eloquent in appreciation of China’s peacekeeping efforts as commensurate with its ‘responsible great power’ status. Thus, a hypothesis is being propagated that China is fast emerging as a ‘messiah’ of peacekeeping operations under the UN. While China’s approach towards UN peacekeeping has been positive in recent times and it has also expanded its participation in various missions, its overall contribution however, is at best ‘symbolic’ and short of expectations.
An irony about UN peacekeeping operations is that all the P-5 countries are reluctant participants and China is no exception. While the White Paper on defence mentions that “China has consistently supported and actively participated in the peacekeeping operations consonant with the spirit of the UN Charter,” the facts speak otherwise. In fact, China’s serious engagement with UN peacekeeping began only in the new century. The policy change came largely to meet its own foreign policy objectives such as diminishing the influence of Taiwan among smaller countries of Africa and Latin America, exploring business opportunities, securing energy sources, and above all, expanding China’s influence as a regional and global player.
China’s approach towards UN peacekeeping is characterised by a ‘mini-max’ strategy. Despite having 2.3 million troops, modernised through 30 years of reform and development and pampered with liberal budgets (US$70 billion as per Chinese declarations for 2009-10 but quite more otherwise), China has made a filtered contribution of troops. Presently, China has 1,950 military personnel in different missions accounting for less than 2 per cent of 110,000 military personnel in UN missions and is placed at the 13th position; the lead positions are occupied by Pakistan, Bangladesh and India.
China’s financial contribution has also not been encouraging and it contributes less than three per cent of the UN peacekeeping budget, against 25 per cent by the US and 17 per cent by Japan. While many small and middle level economies have voluntarily upgraded their contribution levels to the UN coffer; China, placed in top level (level A) along with other P-5 countries, has often dithered on payments. Also, China extracts the maximum financial gains from its peacekeeping role. It sends its own planes to ferry the troops to the mission areas and seeks optimum reimbursements under the MoUs with the UN. China sends more civilians than any other countries as part of military personnel (such as geologists, scientists, political analysts and so on) who study the local business opportunities. China has not only often received rewards in the form of arms contracts, it has also been indirectly responsible for escalation and perpetuation of civil wars within affected states. Sudan is one such example.
Moreover, China prefers to position its troops mostly in non-combat positions. It has around 1,315 engineering troops, 340 transport troops, and 200 medical troops while the rest are military observers and staff officers spread in different missions. Clearly, China does not want to risk its soldiers for combat duties. Despite requests by the UN, China is yet to provide a force reserve battalion to the UN for emergencies. In part, this could be due to China’s lack of capacity for operational leadership for a hazardous mission, an expertise limited to few countries including India. Little wonder then that China has lost only nine soldiers so far in UN peacekeeping operations. On the other hand, troops from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh are mostly in combat positions with maximum number of fatalities (128, 99 and 92 respectively).
Chinese justifications for not being overtly active in terms of numbers of PLA troops and their positioning in combat positions are not convincing. Respect for ‘sovereignty’ in international relations and a concurrent desire to avoid negative fallout of ‘China threat’ theories in Western academic debates are cited as reasons for limited Chinese involvement in UN peacekeeping. But everywhere, peacekeeping missions are commissioned either on the request of the affected states or based on their consent. Also, when countries like France or India have participated in peacekeeping activities, their intentions have not been doubted. Further, debates on ‘China threat’ are anyway on decline and were being raised in a different context without being ever linked to China’s peacekeeping activities.
Overall, China’s participation in UN peacekeeping functions is immature, self-serving and meant largely for image-building. As a responsible great power, China has to show more flexibility in sending its troops and relax its present “case-to-case” approach. The number of troops has to be increased to a reasonable level and combat duties taken up in order to show real concern for peace and security. Finally, China needs to open up its purse and raise its contributions to UN peacekeeping. Only then can China be considered as a major player in UN peacekeeping.
Note: The author is on deputation to the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). The views expressed herein are those of the author.
An irony about UN peacekeeping operations is that all the P-5 countries are reluctant participants and China is no exception. While the White Paper on defence mentions that “China has consistently supported and actively participated in the peacekeeping operations consonant with the spirit of the UN Charter,” the facts speak otherwise. In fact, China’s serious engagement with UN peacekeeping began only in the new century. The policy change came largely to meet its own foreign policy objectives such as diminishing the influence of Taiwan among smaller countries of Africa and Latin America, exploring business opportunities, securing energy sources, and above all, expanding China’s influence as a regional and global player.
China’s approach towards UN peacekeeping is characterised by a ‘mini-max’ strategy. Despite having 2.3 million troops, modernised through 30 years of reform and development and pampered with liberal budgets (US$70 billion as per Chinese declarations for 2009-10 but quite more otherwise), China has made a filtered contribution of troops. Presently, China has 1,950 military personnel in different missions accounting for less than 2 per cent of 110,000 military personnel in UN missions and is placed at the 13th position; the lead positions are occupied by Pakistan, Bangladesh and India.
China’s financial contribution has also not been encouraging and it contributes less than three per cent of the UN peacekeeping budget, against 25 per cent by the US and 17 per cent by Japan. While many small and middle level economies have voluntarily upgraded their contribution levels to the UN coffer; China, placed in top level (level A) along with other P-5 countries, has often dithered on payments. Also, China extracts the maximum financial gains from its peacekeeping role. It sends its own planes to ferry the troops to the mission areas and seeks optimum reimbursements under the MoUs with the UN. China sends more civilians than any other countries as part of military personnel (such as geologists, scientists, political analysts and so on) who study the local business opportunities. China has not only often received rewards in the form of arms contracts, it has also been indirectly responsible for escalation and perpetuation of civil wars within affected states. Sudan is one such example.
Moreover, China prefers to position its troops mostly in non-combat positions. It has around 1,315 engineering troops, 340 transport troops, and 200 medical troops while the rest are military observers and staff officers spread in different missions. Clearly, China does not want to risk its soldiers for combat duties. Despite requests by the UN, China is yet to provide a force reserve battalion to the UN for emergencies. In part, this could be due to China’s lack of capacity for operational leadership for a hazardous mission, an expertise limited to few countries including India. Little wonder then that China has lost only nine soldiers so far in UN peacekeeping operations. On the other hand, troops from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh are mostly in combat positions with maximum number of fatalities (128, 99 and 92 respectively).
Chinese justifications for not being overtly active in terms of numbers of PLA troops and their positioning in combat positions are not convincing. Respect for ‘sovereignty’ in international relations and a concurrent desire to avoid negative fallout of ‘China threat’ theories in Western academic debates are cited as reasons for limited Chinese involvement in UN peacekeeping. But everywhere, peacekeeping missions are commissioned either on the request of the affected states or based on their consent. Also, when countries like France or India have participated in peacekeeping activities, their intentions have not been doubted. Further, debates on ‘China threat’ are anyway on decline and were being raised in a different context without being ever linked to China’s peacekeeping activities.
Overall, China’s participation in UN peacekeeping functions is immature, self-serving and meant largely for image-building. As a responsible great power, China has to show more flexibility in sending its troops and relax its present “case-to-case” approach. The number of troops has to be increased to a reasonable level and combat duties taken up in order to show real concern for peace and security. Finally, China needs to open up its purse and raise its contributions to UN peacekeeping. Only then can China be considered as a major player in UN peacekeeping.
Note: The author is on deputation to the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). The views expressed herein are those of the author.
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