Pokharan II and its Impact on Chinese Strategic Thinking
25 May, 1998 · 95
Jonathan Pollack sees the fall out of the Pokharan tests on China's significant relations
Sino-US Relations
Clinton
's trip to
China
) presents the Chinese with at least a public relations opportunity with the
US
. They could present themselves as the sober, stabilising Asian power, unlike
India
. In addition, the hope in some Indian circles that
India
could serve as a partner of the
US
in balancing
China
is part of the collateral damage (at least in the near term) of the Indian test. So the Chinese can be gratified that one potential option for responding to the growth of their power is off the table, at least for now. It also seems to me that the Chinese are inclined to let others in the international community (especially the Americans) do their heavy lifting for them.
Islamabad
at the moment. I suspect that security guarantees from
Beijing
will look much more persuasive and compelling to the Pakistanis than anything the
US
might do on
Islamabad
's behalf, though
Pakistan
would be only too happy to pocket any economic inducements and renewed security assistance that the
US
might be prepared to proffer. But how fully do the Chinese want to get into the extended deterrence game? And, given the domestic pressures that Nawaz Sharif is experiencing, will external assurances be sufficient for
Pakistan
to refrain from testing, at least in the near term?
New Delhi
, and what may be realistic under the new circumstances. I have to believe that more than a few leaders in
Beijing
remember October 1964, and the international opprobrium that greeted their first nuclear test. Remember Secretary of State Rusk's ominous characterisation of "a billion red Chinese armed with nuclear weapons"? No doubt the Chinese would much prefer if they, and they alone, are
Asia
's only fully credentialed nuclear weapons power. But this is no longer possible. More than this, the Chinese certainly know that
India
, as a sovereign state, is fully within its rights to test, regardless of international reactions. So the Chinese, having been far more obsessive about
Japan
over the years, must now sort through the possibilities of having to deal with a much more assertive Indian state. This may compel them to rethink some favoured assumptions about the emergent character of the Asian strategic system.
It does seem to me that the timing of the tests (i.e., very near to
Sino-Pakistan Relations
But the more interesting question is how the Chinese may be counselling
Sino-Indian Relations
It's also my belief that the Chinese need to think long and hard about what sort of longer term relationship they seek with
This certainly promises to be a challenging time for us all.
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