SK Singh

   To appreciate the importance of the upcoming elections in Pakistan for India, Mr. Singh stressed the need for revisiting the historical context in which the Pakistani State was positioned. The primacy of the military and its dominance over the civilian government, whenever there is one to speak of, reflects its political system. Its democratic process at best is inchoate. If the unending cycle of military and guided civilian regimes are any indication, these elections mean zero to the Pakistani people, and less than zero for Indians. They would have some validity only for the proponents of democracy, primarily the international community, but this democratic verbiage cannot mislead anyone familiar with the political system and historical experience of Pakistan. 

Lt Gen AM Vohra 

   Gen.Vohra provided a historical context to military rule in Pakistan, whereby the army has repeatedly entered the political arena, using the venality and inefficiency of the elected governments to justify its own ambitions. Pakistan’s early experience showed the ease with which the generals conferred power on themselves by dissolving Parliament and declaring martial law within the country. For instance, in 1958, General Ayub Khan overthrew Iskander Mirza, dissolved the government, and declared martial law in Pakistan. Thereafter, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was overthrown by Zia-ul-Haq. The real turn in recent Pakistani military history emerged when the army began to feel disturbed by the political mess created by incompetent civilian governments in the early 1990s. This explains Nawaz Sharif taking part in the Lahore summit in February 1999 whilst Gen. Pervez Musharraf was planning his Kargil infiltrations. 

   The Army in Pakistan is fully convinced of receiving popular support, and is aware that it has a coherent strategy as compared to the political parties. Given the current scheme of things, there is unlikely to be any decline in the self-conferred role donned by the Pakistani Army of supervising the elected governments in power. 

Kalim Bahadur

   At the outset, Kalim Bahadur stated that the notion of legality has never been of any significance in Pakistan. The amendments to the Constitution made by Gen Musharraf are in a way reminiscent of those attempted by Ayub Khan in the 1960s. Bahadur underscored the fact that the framers of the Constitution in Pakistan suffered from a lack of foresight and statesmanship. It was deemed ‘‘an eternal constitution’’ one day, but amendments would be attempted the next day. 

   Bahadur reminded the audience of the events on 12 October 1999 when, on returning to Karachi from Sri Lanka, Gen. Musharraf had Nawaz Sharif arrested, and announced autocratically, ‘There’s no government, everyone is dismissed.’ Thus he dismissed a government that had won a 2/3rd majority. The following day, he issued a Provisional Constitution Order, although the constitution framed in 1973 explicitly states that any attempt to abrogate it would be an act of treason. 

   Furthermore, out of the 110 judges of the High Court and Supreme Court combined, 10 were not asked to take a new oath of office to support the Provisional Constitution Order, since their views were known to be adverse. A few weeks later, the wife of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, revealed to the Pakistani Press that on the day the oath of office was to be administered, Army officials prevented the Chief Justice from attending Court. The judiciary in Pakistan has been browbeaten and blackmailed by the Army to justify its coup. Thus, Pakistan’s institutions are frailer than those in India. 

   The Legal Framework Order (LFO) issued by Gen. Musharraf suggests that he is still not sure of the elections going in his favour, despite the fact that he is loading the dice heavily in his favour. There is evidence that provincial governors (mostly generals) are blatantly interfering by asking the local branches of political parties to nominate candidates who would be convenient to Gen. Musharraf. The LFO states that the Constitution will be revised after the elections, but Musharraf will only undertake its partial revision, as he wants to arrogate complete power to himself. Hence, the legality of Musharraf’s moves is a misnomer, since his entire system is illegal. The impending elections mean very little, therefore, for the people in the country.

Suba Chandran  

   Dwelling on popular participation in the forthcoming elections Suba Chandran pointed out that people in Pakistan had welcomed the military coup, but were now disillusioned, as their hopes had been belied. The jihadis were unhappy with Musharraf’s post 9/11 policies. His referendum was universally criticized as being rigged in his favour.

   Would the upcoming polls be free and fair? Pre-poll rigging was already in progress. Laws especially designed to prevent their taking part in the elections eliminated Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto. Nazims are being allowed to enter the election fray despite being government servants, and public funds were being placed at their disposal to influence the elections. The Chief Election Commissioner had passed several orders to ensure that the elections would be free and fair, but there was no follow-up action on them. Shahbaz Sharif, Nawaz Sharif’s brother, who was the current head of the PML (N), had his nomination rejected after it had been accepted. Still the PML (N) had grassroots support in the Punjab, but politicians at the state level had fickle loyalties and would join the winning side.

   However the MQM and SDA remained intact in Sindh and could come into power there. Overall the line-up had a King’s party - the Grand National Alliance- the Chief Election Commissioner and the military regime pitted against the PPP and the PML (N), less their most charismatic leaders. It was an unequal contest. 

Discussions

   The issues raised in the discussion were:

• Economy: The economic situation in Pakistan had deteriorated over the last few years. A year ago, the Pakistani forex reserves stood at US $ 1 billion. The situation has not improved, and there are no mentionable FDI flows to the country. However, some institutional finance (ADB, IMF) has trickled in. Industrial activity in Pakistan remains stagnant, whilst agricultural production has witnessed a decline. The wide income disparity between the rich and the poor has widened in the aftermath of America’s war against terror. This, coupled with rising inflation, high petrol prices and limited job opportunities is driving the elite away from the country. NRP remittances have practically halted exacerbating the already low foreign exchange reserves. But Musharraf’s enormous popularity in the pre-referendum period with the West has enabled the inflow of ODA, albeit slowly, something which was lacking during the earlier civilian and military regimes. The tourism industry (post – September 11) has greatly deteriorated, but select pockets of the economy have performed better, like the gun factories in Peshawar. The economic situation would affect the voting behaviour of the electorate. 

• Musharraf’s declining popularity: The starting point of the decline of General Musharraf is traceable to the referendum he held to legitimize his rule on 30 April 2002. His popularity is now being questioned in Pakistan and abroad. 

• Political Parties:  Pakistan has a fractured political class; leaders of political parties do not believe in manifestoes, and therefore lack a clear political agenda. As most of the issues in debate are parochial, or indicative of vested interests, this is reflected in the views of senior leaders at the national and provincial level. While the political parties appear to be splintered, the army is a cohesive and organized body. Rather than empowering the popularly elected political parties and submitting to their writ, the army decides the fate of the elected leaders. The five previous general elections in Pakistan only reinforce this argument. The previous Prime Ministers, Mohammed Khan Junejo, Benazir Bhutto, and Nawaz Sharif were allowed to use this honorific title only as long as the military let them stay in office. Looking at its past record, Pakistan’s political future looks bleak. 

• Drug money, while playing a significant part in Pakistani party politics, given the enormous political clout that the drug barons (Afridi tribe in particular) possess in Northwest Pakistan, continues to be a grey area in the Pakistani economy. Has the role of drug money changed? The money generated by the Afghan opium trade continues to flow into Pakistan, and has steadily increased over the past year, especially after September 11. It is unlikely that this money would be deposited in Pakistani banks in the aftermath of the war on terror; therefore, most of it remains unaccounted.