The 1999 Indo-Pak Nuclear Crisis

25 Jun, 2002    ·   769

Arpit Rajain concludes that the stakes involved in the failure of deterrence are enormous and there is need for crisis stability
Arpit Rajain
Bruce Riedel, the President’s Special Assistant for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs in the National Security Council of the Clinton Administration, has reported that during the Kargil crisis the US intelligence had information “that the Pakistanis were preparing their nuclear arsenal for possible deployment”, in a paper prepared for the Centre for the Advanced Study of India at the University of Pennsylvania.  The 1999 Kargil crisis differed from other classical Cold War bilateral crises in several ways. It involved domestic political instability, armed militant groups, and an interventionist-minded superpower.

 

 

This is not the first time that the issue of a ‘nuclear crisis’ has been raised. In the 1950s, Josef Korbel, who had worked on Kashmir under UN auspices, claimed that Kashmir could lead to a catalytic war that could draw the two superpowers into this confrontation. In one of the most important accounts of the 1990 Indo-Pak crisis, Seymour Hersh, in a widely discussed article in the New Yorker, viewed this crisis almost entirely in nuclear terms. He suggested that India and Pakistan were on the brink of a nuclear war, and that it was only averted by the timely intervention of the United States . 

 

 

An intelligence source in the decision making process during the Kargil conflict confided that India knew Pakistan had shifted seven F-16s from a peacetime location to battle ready deployment. Out of these four were escorts and three were wired for a nuclear weapons delivery. He added that Pakistan was ready for nuclear conflict, and so was India . When this question was raised in the Indian Parliament, the Government responded by saying that it was not aware of any such move. Obviously, either the government did not want the adversary to know that it knew about the movement of the F-16s, or India did not want to make this information public. Whilst this intelligence report was being processed, India activated three types of nuclear delivery vehicles and kept them in what is known as Readiness State 3, meaning that nuclear bombs were ready to be mated with delivery vehicles at short notice. The Air Force was asked to keep its Mirage fighters on standby and DRDO scientists headed to where Prithvi missiles were deployed. At least four of them were readied for a possible nuclear strike. The Agni missile was moved to a western Indian state and kept in a state of readiness. A trajectory was worked out so that the two stages that get detached did not fall on Indian territory and hurt anyone. 

 

 

The Washington Post, citing another former official involved in the Kargil crisis during the Clinton Administration, said the US had learnt that Pakistan was moving its intermediate range Ghauri missile, intended to carry nuclear warheads, out of storage to new locations. He said the movement might have been offensive in nature or might have been intended to protect the missiles by dispersing them in case of a pre-emptive Indian strike. It is possible that the American satellites had become aware of the movement of trucks that carried the missiles from their bases in Sargodha . Bruce Riedal describes how an ‘exhausted’ Nawaz Sharif, in his July 4 meeting with President Clinton, ‘denied he had ordered the preparation and said he was against that.’

 

 

The attack on the very symbol of India ’s democracy on  December 13 followed by the attack on Raghunath temple in Jammu and the recent attack on an army camp in Jammu , has increased calls by the hardliners in India demanding that the government must take decisive action. There has been a 30 per cent increase in infiltration over the corresponding period last year. Pakistan has done little to rein in these elements.  The US had sent out Assistant Secretary of State, Christina Rocca, and Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, in an effort to diffuse the situation. The two US government representatives have asked India to reduce the pressure on Pakistan , after the January 12 speech of General Musharraf promising to take decisive action against the jehadis.

 

 

The timing of Bruce Reidal’s paper leaves one wondering if the US wants to convey to India and Pakistan that any misperception on either side could lead to grievous consequences. Faith in the rationality of the Indo-Pak leadership in the matter of nuclear weapons seems somewhat naïve, to say the least. The stakes involved in the failure of deterrence are so enormous as to occasion greater thought being given to stabilize the fragile Indo-Pak nuclear standoff. 

 

 

 

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