September 11, 2001 was a day of infamy when the world watched with horror the vivid images of the citadels of the
United States
being subjected to terrorist attacks. The global focus turned towards the locii of Islamic Jehadi terrorism, namely
Afghanistan
and
Pakistan
. The
United States
, as a nation, was grievously wounded and rightly incensed. The logical target of American retribution should have been
Pakistan
. It was
Pakistan
that had created the Taliban under Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and ensured its subjection of
Afghanistan
to medieval Islamic fundamentalist brutalisation. It also facilitated the move of Osama bin Laden into
Afghanistan
from
Sudan
in 1996.
Fortunately for
Pakistan
, geo-political compulsions post-September 2001 have pushed the
United States
into bestowing a “front-line State” status upon it. The
US
strategic blue-print for counter-terrorism could have obviated the use of
Pakistan
. However, it seems that the
United States
wanted a prominent Islamic nation to be the cats paw for American counter-terrorism operations against
Afghanistan
. General Musharraf will continue to sell his decision of siding with the Americans against
Afghanistan
as being in pursuance of
Pakistan
’s national interests. Ironically, however, it has been a day of infamy for
Pakistan
, since it has treacherously turned against an Islamic country – an Islamic country which
Pakistan
had crowned with the scourge of Taliban.
Now
Pakistan
lies as a divided nation, as the brief analysis below illustrates.
Pakistan
’s national polity stands sharply divided into an Islamic fundamentalist Right and an elitist Westernized group, which General Musharraf claims is in majority and supports his decision of siding with the Americans against
Afghanistan
. These claims are baseless. The natural constituencies of
Pakistan
’s Islamic fundamentalist parties are the people below the poverty line (over 40%) and the lower middle class (assessed at around 20-25%).
Pakistan
’s military rulers can in no way claim that they enjoy popular support.
Ironically, till September 11, 2001, General Musharraf and the Pakistan Army were aligned with the Islamic fundamentalist parties for political control of
Pakistan
. But they are now in an adversial position to the military rulers.
The Pakistan Army also is a highly politicized force. Its officer cadre, upto the middle level, and a large number in the military hierarchy are Islamic fundamentalist. This was analysed in an earlier paper “Pakistan Army’s Changing Profile: Analysis” (560) by the author. Following the September 11, 2001 events, General Musharraf was forced to sack three senior Generals of the Pakistan Army, including his ISI chief. The other two Generals had actively managed the military coup bringing General Musharraf into power on October 12, 1999.
The purge of the Islamic fundamentalist Generals would not have come about but for American pressure. This indicates that a divide exists within the Pakistan Army. This cleavage could become more pronounced if American military operations in
Afghanistan
get prolonged. Ominously, this divide in the Pakistan Army could lead to a military coup displacing General Musharraf because of his supporting the Americans against the Taliban.
Pakistan
’s ethnic divide is well known and documented. The events after September 11, 2001, indicate that
Pakistan
’s vulnerability could become more accentuated. Events in
Afghanistan
and
Pakistan
’s collusion with the American bombings will be adversely perceived by the frontier tribals on both sides of the Durand Line in North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and
Baluchistan
. These are also the areas where the Islamic fundamentalist madrassas exist in large numbers providing the Taliban with a large number of recruits. On the other side of the divide we have the predominantly Punjabi Pakistan Army deployed to control turbulence in these frontier regions. This is an explosive situation.
General Musharraf, in his televised address to the
Pakistan
nation on September 17, 2001, described the situation as most critical in
Pakistan
history after the events of 1971. General Musharraf was understating the facts because
Pakistan
now stands divided as a nation state. It has followed the policies of Islamic Jehad as an instrument of state policy for too long. It is difficult to visualize how this divided nation and under whose leadership can reclaim its stake of being a progressive, moderate Muslim nation. No amount of American financial influsion and military aid can ensure this.
Pakistan
has to find the answers itself.
