US President Trump’s state visit to China from 13-15 May, widely viewed as high on symbolism and low on substance, nonetheless had important signals for the world. The visit indicated the beginning of a reset in US–China bilateral ties, though not without challenges. It also marked a milestone in President Xi Jinping’s “home-court” diplomacy, with the visit’s optics, agenda-setting, and public communications largely shaped by Beijing rather than Washington.

The optics were carefully crafted as a meeting between two equals. The US emphasised parity through its idea of a G-2 (a US-China duopoly). While China was publicly silent on the G-2 framing, it ensured a grand reception for the visiting delegation. Upon closer look, however, the meeting took place within an unspoken hierarchy, in which a rising China had the upper hand over an established but declining US. Overall, the signals that emerged from the visit were a net positive from a global perspective, particularly given signs of a possible thaw in the US-China trade war.

An understanding of the dynamics of the visit is better illustrated through the domestic political positions from which both leaders approached it. At the time of meeting, Trump’s overall approval ratings had fallen to around 34 per cent, and to around 27 per cent on economic issues, mainly due to poor macroeconomic conditions linked to the war in Iran. He has also drawn criticism from American business groups on the impact of tariffs. Xi, by contrast, appeared to enter the meeting from a position of relative strength, though with pressures of his own. China’s growth has slowed to one of its weakest rates in decades. The trade war has clearly imposed real costs on both the US and China.

That said, what set Xi apart from Trump wasn’t the absence of domestic strain but of visible domestic accountability. With no credible popularity surveys, no electoral checks, and rivals sidelined, the pressures haven’t become a threat to his authority. As leader of a democracy, Trump’s situation is different. He would have therefore needed a visible win from the visit, which would have enabled Xi an upper hand and ability to set the terms of the visit. These differences in domestic political leverage would have also shaped the optics and conduct of the meeting.

While several important issues were no doubt discussed privately, no decision was consequential enough to make it out to the public domain. The visit was thus high on signalling, with the most prominent signals indicating China’s narrative and agenda-shaping power.

How China Had the Upper Hand

Xi’s ability to shape the narrative and set the agenda emerged clearly across three domains: bilateral, economic, and geopolitical.

On the bilateral front, China was able to shape the narrative by defining the conditions of how its relationship with the US could be managed. Xi invoked the “Thucydides Trap” to implicitly identify China as the rising power and the US as the established superpower. The Thucydides Trap describes a situation in which a rapidly rising power threatens to displace an established one, making war a natural—though not inevitable—outcome of the structural dynamic.

Xi called for a mechanism to avoid the trap of the inevitability of war. He termed such an approach “constructive strategic stability,” a more controlled form of competition that would support both bilateral ties and wider global stability. In practice, China seeks to shape the dynamics within the present global order rather than overturn it, and to do so in consultation with the US rather than through war. Such stability, and the continuity of the liberal global order, benefit China's rise.

By being less about the deals than about who got to describe them, the economic story was also in China’s control. This gap itself was an important signal. The US claimed that China would buy 200 Boeing aircraft and 450 engines from General Electric, purchase at least US$ 17 billion worth of US agriculture goods a year until 2028, and that both sides would set up a "board of trade" and a "board of investment." Beijing confirmed only a small part of this projection. It acknowledged the deal and some engines purchase arrangements. China also only spoke of "promoting" agricultural trade, and made no reference to the US$ 17 billion figure. It said that a trade council between two countries would work as a forum to discuss issues such as tariff reductions on selected products, without offering further details.

The sharpest signal was geopolitical, and it emerged after Trump’s departure. President Putin of Russia arrived in Beijing soon after, followed by Russia and China announcing several agreements. The signal was that China is perfectly capable of sustaining equal relations with Russia and the US. Notably, the US wasn’t able to manage the same line on Taiwan. Beijing hardened its stance, calling Taiwan a red line in the China-US relationship, and left the US unable to separate its Taiwan policy from its China policy. This signal was reinforced by the timing of the two back-to-back presidential visits to China. The difference shows who sets the agenda.

The comparison between the two cases has its limits, but it remains important for geopolitical signalling. China–Russia relations are about the management of bilateral ties between two sovereign states. In contrast, the other case concerns the US commitment to Taiwan, which has limited international recognition as a sovereign state. However, abandoning the US’s commitment to Taiwan could weaken confidence in its security commitments across the Indo-Pacific region. It would also give China more room to exercise dominance.

Conclusion

For the first time, China was able to demonstrate a position of advantage over the US to the world. China confirmed almost nothing of what Washington announced. It also hardened its position on Taiwan, whereas the US couldn’t take a similar hard stand on Russia. Trump’s state visit exposed the limits of US foreign policy towards China and highlighted China’s growing ability to pressure other countries, including the US, on issues it values most, such as economic deals and Taiwan.    

Tapan Bharadwaj is Senior Researcher with IPCS’ China Research Programme (CRP).