The Israeli Air Force claimed that it had dropped over 12,000 bombs in 8,500 strikes on Iranian targets in the first 18 days of the ongoing war. Another three weeks have passed since then, with a lot more damage. The US used advanced ‘bunker buster’ ordnance to hit hardened Iranian nuclear and missile infrastructure. The collective ordnance dropped on Iran is known to have destroyed its military assets and political leaders, damaged the country’s energy infrastructure and gas fields, and severely impacted its economy, besides killing nearly 1,500 and injuring nearly 18,000. Projectiles have also been reported to have struck near Bushehr, the operational nuclear power plant, though no damage was reportedly caused to the reactor.

While the material damage being caused by the strikes is openly visible, what remains unclear is the likely impact of these developments on Iran’s future nuclear ambitions and on non-proliferation in general. As regards the former, the answer will emerge in time, based on what kind of political dispensation finally emerges at the end of the hostilities to take charge in Iran. Would it comprise of moderates or hardliners? What would be the condition and role of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its thinking within the establishment? What kind of relationships will the country establish with its neighbours, and with the US and Israel? On what terms does the war end? How these issues are settled will determine whether Iran’s nuclear ambitions are quashed or revived.

With regard to the impact on non-proliferation in general, the situation likely to emerge could be unsettling owing to two recent developments. The first of these came to pass in 2022 when Russia launched its special military operation against Ukraine. Through this, Moscow steamrolled its own assurances made to Ukraine as part of the Budapest Memorandum  in the early 1990s, when it was securing its nuclear arsenal from the states that had become independent with the disintegration of the USSR. The attack on Ukraine led many to argue that Kyiv might have fared better if it had nuclear weapons. Of course, the weapons that Russia took away were never Ukraine’s own to keep. There is, however, no denying that nuclear weapons have gained in currency and led to the perception that countries that have nuclear weapons are less likely to face threats to their territorial sovereignty.

This view has only been strengthened in the wake of the fate that has befallen Iran. In this case, a non-nuclear weapon state and member of the NPT, who was never clearly declared by IAEA to be in violation of its commitments of the JCPOA (when in force) or of the NPT, was attacked by an NPT nuclear weapon state jointly with a nuclear-armed, NPT non-member. The optics of this certainly don’t look good from the perspective of non-proliferation. Rather, the optics are further sullied by the fact that negotiations that were underway to address the allegations against the Iranian nuclear programme were ostensibly progressing well, with Tehran showing willingness to accept restrictions on its nuclear programme. Yet, the country has been subjected to relentless bombing. In taking this action, Washington might have obliterated the nuclear facilities in Iran, but it could have ignited nuclear ambitions in countries that have security concerns with other nuclear-armed states.

Interestingly, future nuclear-armed states—if any emerge—will be today’s non-nuclear weapon states within the NPT. The treaty enjoys remarkable universality. Only four states are outside its ambit, and these are known to possess nuclear weapons. So, a future nuclear-armed state would have to emerge from within the NPT. Two factors may drive this development. The first would be a reconsideration of the role and relevance of the NPT. As things stand, the last two NPT Review Conferences (RevCon) already exhibited fissures amongst the States parties on many issues. Much will depend on what happens at the upcoming RevCon in April-May 2026. Will the treaty be able to achieve a firm endorsement to the commitment to non-proliferation by all States parties? The prospects don’t look promising.

A second important development to monitor is the growing perception of the fraying of US extended deterrence commitments. To recall, these were crafted to stem interest in proliferation among other countries. President Trump, however, has cast a shadow on these commitments by demanding that US allies increase their national defence spending to build capability for their own security. While acceding to this call, allies in Northeast Asia and Europe are also beginning to rethink whether they need to build their own nuclear deterrence options against their nuclear-armed adversaries. With confidence in the American nuclear umbrella dwindling, national security requirements may drive possible future nuclear proliferators towards acquiring nuclear weapons. Of course, this wouldn’t be easy or quick. But inter-state insecurities could evoke desperate measures. And, if a state decides to move in this direction, the lesson it may learn from the treatment meted to Iran is that it would be better off quickly building the weapons. Like Iran, following the path of slow process hinged on ambiguity could only make them vulnerable to counter-proliferation attacks. It is evident that the norms around non-attack of civilian nuclear facilities have eroded. In the 1980s when such attacks were first mounted in West Asia, these were against still-under-construction, non-operational nuclear reactors. Since then, the world seems to have moved on to accept attacks around operational nuclear facilities. Fortunately, no attack has yet led to a radiation leak. States, however, appear to be playing with fire.

Alarmingly enough, little is being done to address these concerns. Instead, two trends are exacerbating them. The first relates to a breakdown of the global consensus against use of force between sovereign states. Contemporary global conditions appear to be more tolerant of use of force as the rules-based order succumbs to the pressures of military muscle flexing. The second unfortunate reality is that no major nuclear or non-nuclear country, or group of countries, is willing to take leadership or ownership of the non-proliferation regime. Consequently, worrisome developments around non-proliferation appear adrift.

If these developments are to be stemmed, countries keen to maintain past positive gains will need to step up to make a concerted and collective effort to hold on to the treaties and norms that have been painstakingly nurtured over several decades. Otherwise, the world might end up discovering that the craters that US-Israel bombings were meant to cause in Iran have erupted in other places too. Time will tell how and where these surface.

Dr. Manpreet Sethi is Distinguished Fellow, CAPSS, and Senior Research Advisor, APLN.