Though hailed as the “implementation COP,” COP30 in Brazil this year, like its earlier iterations, concluded without any clear plans for future action. Weak climate leadership and poor implementation have become a clear pattern at annual COP meetings. While the pattern challenges the relevance of these annual meetings, it also creates space for Global South leadership, primarily through minilateral collaboration and issue-based initiatives. Against this background, could sub-regional institutions—such as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC)—play a greater role in representing regional climate action needs on global platforms? Could such efforts infuse fresh energy into climate multilateralism?

Challenges: Climate Leadership and Implementation

A lack of leadership is one big challenge. The US withdrew from the Paris Agreement for a second time in 2025. It didn’t send an official delegation to COP30, marking its first absence in three decades, and signalling a clear retreat of US climate leadership. European leadership, while rhetorically committed to climate obligations, continues to weaken at a broader level. The Russia-Ukraine war, strained transatlantic ties, and the rise of the political right is shifting Europe’s focus away from climate action. Meanwhile, leadership from developed countries is also declining as they too are retreating from their earlier commitments. Actors such as India and China aren’t able to fill this gap. India faces specific limits. An example is that its climate finance to developing countries, while on the rise, continues to be low as domestic demands are high. China is hesitant to lead on climate issues as it prioritises economic interests through energy security and clean technology dominance. At COP30, Chinese pressure led to the removal of references to critical minerals governance as this could have potentially challenged its dominance in the sector.

In addition to leadership decline, implementation of climate commitments confronts its own set of challenges. While there have been some improvements on reporting and transparency since the Paris Agreement, implementation and delivery of targets are weak. The state of global climate leadership has worsened this gap. For example, the Loss and Damage Fund announced at COP27 lacks clear operational rules and governance which impacts its implementation. Similarly, COP29 announced the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance (NQCG) but it lacks a plan for implementation. Initiatives announced at COP30, such as the Tropical Forests Forever Facility and the pledge to triple adaptation finance by 2035, is similarly quiet on delivery plans.

Climate Multilateralism: Minilaterals and Issue-based Collaboration

Climate multilateralism, supported by strong leadership from developed countries and participation from the Global South, has helped advance low-carbon development. The principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC) is a successful example of climate multilateralism. However, unmet promises and weak leadership now undermine climate cooperation and weaken earlier gains. In such a crisis situation, minilaterals such as BASIC and the High Ambition Coalition, and party groupings such as the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and Climate Vulnerable Forum (CVF), are becoming increasingly prominent at COP meetings.

Minilaterals and party groupings are thus driving climate change negotiations and serve as key instruments of Global South leadership. Minilaterals have smaller memberships and shape agendas and mobilise resources more efficiently. Party groups attract larger memberships and improve representation and coordination. They play an important role in climate negotiations and coordinate national and group statements at COP meetings. Both minilaterals and party groups act as bottom-up drivers and influence agenda-setting through issue-based demands. Their demand continues to grow as they provide leadership for the Global South in an increasingly turbulent geopolitical environment.

Sub-regional Blocs at Global Platforms: BIMSTEC as an Example

The Bay of Bengal (BoB) region is home to about 1.7 billion people, and includes Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. It is among the most climate vulnerable regions in the world and is critical not only to littoral countries but to the wider world. It lies close to the Malacca Strait, a major global chokepoint that carries nearly a quarter of global trade. The region constitutes a part of the global common good, and requires special attention. As a result of climate change, inland areas suffer from riverine and flash floods, and coastal areas from unprecedented cyclones and sea-level rise. Climate-induced disasters are raising overall annual losses in the region and worsening the impact on the livelihoods of local communities. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) capabilities also vary across the region, as seen recently during the cyclonic storm, Ditwah.

Against this background, and as a multilateral platform raised precisely for the BoB, BIMSTEC presents excellent potential for regional climate representation on the global stage. In fact, it already identifies environment, climate change, and disaster management as priority areas. BIMSTEC seeks to improve regional HA/DR capacity, but multiple factors, including limited climate finance and declining support, act as key barriers to its efforts. These circumstances should be sufficient for national governments across the BoB to push for a BIMSTEC bloc at COP meetings. In such a bloc configuration, countries of the region could focus on disaster risk reduction, climate security, climate resilience, energy security, and reliable funding for mitigation and adaptation. BIMSTEC members also belong to varied party groups at COP meetings, including the CVF, G77, and Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC). In this context, a formal BIMSTEC bloc acting as a minilateral, with informal coordination within these wider party groups, could strengthen the region’s collective voice at annual COP meetings.

The benefit of advancing sub-regional organisations for climate leadership on international platforms is that they already have the necessary institutional infrastructure. In BIMSTEC’s case, its Secretariat could set up a working group to form a small but influential climate negotiating bloc at COP meetings. This approach offers a regional model based on collective action through sub-regional institutions, rather than templates set in the Global North and applied to the Global South. Such an effort would help shift climate action from negotiation to implementation at a sub-regional level.

Tapan Bharadwaj is Senior Researcher with IPCS’ China Research Programme (CRP).