The leaders of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) will meet in Gyeongju, South Korea, in late October 2025 to deliberate on “Building a Sustainable Tomorrow.” As per speculations, trade, innovation, sustainability, and digital transformation, among other pressing issues, will be part of the agenda. The big question however is whether there should be any expectation of substantial conversations and big breakthroughs in the shadow of the US administration’s chaotic conduct, along with other disrupters, in trying to dismantle the liberal international order.

In the past thirty six years of its journey, APEC has never seen such uncertainty and pessimism in the region as a fallout of global tumult. Though APEC consists of 21 member economies, the host country, South Korea, is concerned about whether the top leaders of the US, China, Russia, and other important countries are even going to show up. Because of this, there is little expectation from the APEC joint statement, though one remains hopeful that at least a few important bilateral meetings of some consequence will nevertheless take place.

The US under Trump 2.0 has created huge uncertainty within already existing regional rivalries. Its unilateral tariff measures have created concerns among both US friends and foes about their future as well as the future of the region. In fact the US’ allies and friends are perhaps even more uncomfortable than its rivals due to these extreme measures. Japan is one such example. Despite being one of its closest allies in the region, the US imposed a 15 per cent tariff on it, in addition to asking for investments of US$ 550 billion in the US. The Japanese leadership, which has been going through a transition, is trying its best to meet these stipulations, such as by setting up an investment facility as announced by the Japanese Finance Ministry.

The US has also imposed a 15 per cent tariff on South Korea and asked for investments worth US$ 350 billion. These aren’t easy targets. As South Korean President Lee Jae-myung explained to US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent in New York on the sidelines of the UNGA, “…a $350 billion investment is 85 percent of Korea’s Forex reserves ($411 billion) and it is not a feasible target.” Further, South Korea thought that the US$350 billion investment would be in the form of loans, guarantees, and partial investments, but the US has instead demanded ‘cash payments’. Further still, US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick said that 90 per cent of the profits from South Korea’s investments would go to the US. In addition to these complications, the manner in which South Korean workers in the Georgia Hyundai plant were treated and deported has created huge anxiety in the country. Other pressures include the US demanding US$10 billion for its troops stationed in South Korea, and handing over ownership of the land that US bases are on (they are leased).

Taiwan, which is the US’ seventh largest trading partner, has also been at the receiving end of these harsh measures, with Trump imposing 20 per cent tariffs on it. Further, he has recently announced that roughly US$ 400 million in military assistance to Taiwan will be withheld. The US has also of course imposed 50 per cent tariffs on India, one of its strategic partners and a member of the Quad, which is collectively working to curb China’s revisionist tendencies in the region. Other measures targeting allies and partners include an increase in H1B visa fees to US$ 100,000. Notably, H1B visas are largely held by skilled labour from India (74 per cent), China (16 per cent), Canada (3 per cent), Taiwan (1.3 per cent), and South Korea (1.3 per cent). Meanwhile, 100 per cent tariffs have been announced on foreign pharmaceutical products. For context, the US imports around US$ 50 billion pharmaceuticals from Ireland, US$ 19 billion from Switzerland, US$ 15 billion from Singapore, US$ 17 billion from Germany, US$ 12 billion from Belgium, US$ 4 billion from South Korea, and US$ 12 billion from India.

Clearly the US is targeting its own friends most aggressively. Against this background, Trump’s conciliatory approach to the Chinese social media platform, TikTok, becomes even more significant. Trump has also rejected proposals of new sanctions on Russia. While he may be sending these signals in the interest of a trade deal with China, it is clear that US rivals have far less to fear than its allies and partners. It is no wonder then that these actors are all seeking to diversify their options beyond the US, whether covertly or overtly. What this means is that contrary to the US’ intent of isolating China and Russia, there is in fact more traction now for China as a viable partner, as evident from the meetings of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS. Over these past few months, long-established consensus between the US and its friends—on free trade, multilateralism, security alliances and alignments, and other such ideas that underpin the liberal international order—have all been severely affected. In such a scenario, any expectation of a breakthrough even from regional meetings would be exceedingly naïve.

Dr. Sandip Kumar Mishra is Professor at the Centre for East Asian Studies in SIS, JNU, and Distinguished Fellow, IPCS.