For generations, Pakistanis have lived with security shaping many aspects of daily life. Now, as internal pressures mount, the grip of securitisation may tighten even more. Pakistan being increasingly governed by the dynamics of internal securitisation will make it harder for ordinary people to find room for open dialogue and civic participation.

The phenomenon of internal securitisation, as Barry Buzan describes, involves labelling a problem as an existential threat to justify extraordinary actions. For Pakistan’s establishment, internal dissent is understood as a threat on par with foreign aggression. This securitisation dynamic forms the rationale for a hybrid civil-military regime in Pakistan. It is also the military’s perpetual engagement in civilian matters that distinguishes the Pakistani case from other democracies: it is unique because the military never really steps back from civilian life.

The 2025 India-Pakistan crisis needs to be understood as an accelerant for this tendency and not as a standalone incident. The latest evidence illustrates how Pakistan continues to intensify internal securitisation, which may provide short-term stability but will compromise long-term cohesion and legitimacy.

Logic of Internal Securitisation

In its essence, internal securitisation permits Pakistan’s hybrid regime to rationalise internal dissent as a form of external aggression. The military’s role goes beyond frontier defence to encompass control of the media discourse, budgetary priorities, civilian governance, and development planning. In this scenario, national security becomes the go-to explanation for everything the government does.

This reasoning is best seen in the way the state acts against dissenting opinion. Calls for equitable allocation of resources and greater provincial autonomy or political representation particularly in restive provinces, are systematically presented as a ‘security’ concern. In Balochistan, demands for rights and development are answered with monitoring and paramilitary crackdowns. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), community grievances are equated with pro-extremist sympathies. The premise is that if dissent can be securitised, it can also be silenced. UN human rights experts have, for example, expressed concerns over extreme measures taken by Pakistan to quell dissent: “Pakistan appears to conflate legitimate human and minority rights advocacy and public demonstrations with terrorism, threatening freedoms of expression, assembly, and association.”

The India-Pakistan Crisis as a Familiar Opportunity

The April 2025 Pahalgam attack and India’s rapid military reaction in Operation Sindoor presented the ideal backdrop to intensify the domestic logic of internal securitisation. After former Prime Minister Imran Khan’s controversial departure from power followed by the ban on his party in 2024, ordinary Pakistanis had once again begun speaking out against the military’s involvement in civilian affairs. However, after the 2025 crisis with India, the regime’s invocation of the idea of an existential threat has muffled these voices. While international attention was on cross-border military action, the actual consolidation was occurring domestically within Pakistan. The crisis has reinforced the military’s primacy.

In a matter of weeks, defence expenditure increased by over 20 per cent in the 2025-26 federal budget, at US$ 9 billion in comparison to the US$ 7.31 billion of the outgoing fiscal year. Meanwhile, government expenditure on health and education stayed under 1 per cent of GDP, underscoring how security still crowds out human development. This fiscal redirection also ignores IMF prescriptions of socially targeted expenditure and sustainability as part of its 25th bailout package.

Top priority is given not just to military readiness at the expense of fiscal prudence or shared growth but also to the assimilation of military and civilian affairs. For instance, several retired and serving military officers have been appointed across civilian sectors in the past few years. As president, General Pervez Musharraf had inducted over 1,000 military officers to civilian posts, far exceeding even the number appointed by General Zia ul Haq in his era. This historical trend that peaked during General Musharraf’s rule reemerged during Imran Khan’s tenure. The recent appointment of Major General Noor Wali Khan to the position of additional secretary in the Ministry of Interior and Narcotics Control is reportedly intended to “to strengthen coordination between civilian security forces and the military” for counter-terrorism. The move is yet another example of the military’s incorporation into civilian affairs for the purpose of securitisation.

Securitising the Peripheries

The impact of internal securitisation is greatest in KPK. The resurgence of violence in the province and the resultant paramilitary crackdowns have turned into a self-reinforcing spiral.

Even with this heavy-handed response, data suggests that the crisis in KPK is still worsening, as 487 attacks occurred in 2024 and 312 in 2023, which were the highest levels since the high point of the insurgency phase from 2007-2011. This surge, coupled with inadequate protective infrastructure and absence of service incentives for law enforcement, shows how securitisation has failed to deliver stability. Instead of addressing structural grievances or building institutional resilience, the state’s militarised focus has locked KPK in a cycle of violence and repression.

Balochistan is Pakistan’s largest province, accounting for 43.6 per cent of its land area. It is abundant in resources such as gold, copper, oil, and natural gas. The province boasts a 770 km coastline and the vital Gwadar Port, an important section of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Yet, it is the country’s poorest province. The population of Balochistan has long been politically and economically marginalised. Together, these factors continuously fuel violent resistance. To illustrate, in May 2025, the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) launched “Operation Herof 2.0,” a second wave of assaults throughout Balochistan. The state’s reaction was quick and expected: heightened military operations, large-scale arrests, and information blackouts.

Informing these measures is the larger trend of governing Balochistan with domination instead of dialogue. Though CPEC is promoted as revolutionary, local communities, particularly in Gwadar, have not experienced much benefit. For instance, due to low literacy rates and limited skilled labour, the better paying jobs are allocated to people from other provinces, or China. Local communities are subject to land displacement, forced disappearances, economic hardships, and intense surveillance. Protests against these realities are frequently met with violence and framed as acts of sedition. CPEC, once dreamed up as a symbol of development, has been transformed into a space of militarised control.

Pakistan’s Greatest Threat

The Pakistani military’s popular comeback amid the recent crisis with India was inevitable. But leaving the analysis misses a bigger point, which is that this comeback buttresses a deeper structural trend in which each external crisis fuels the internal architecture of control. However, the more the state represses dissent, the more it undermines its own legitimacy. The more it rules by fear, the more it demoralises its population. Pakistan’s biggest national security threat, therefore, is not so much external as it is the internal and deliberate hollowing out of its federation. Pakistan’s securitisation approach has become a system that creates the very crises it claims to solve.

Dr. Muneer Ahmed is Senior Researcher with IPCS’ Centre for Internal and Regional Security (IReS).