Northeastern Insurgents in Bhutan: Time for a Pro-active Action
28 Aug, 2001 · 556
Bibhu Prasad Routray argues that it is imperative that Bhutan and India join hands in their fight against the ULFA
It is a classic case of protracted insurgency overflowing into the
territory
of
India
's neighbour. The July 31, 2001 attack on a truck carrying Bhutanese forest officials by unidentified terrorists, apart from evoking sympathy for the victims, must to be utilized for stocktaking by
India
and
Bhutan
.
Bhutan's tryst with the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and the Bodo terrorists, by the government providing a safe haven to the insurgents, beginning in 1991, in return for their promise to drive out the Nepalese Ngolop refugees from
Bhutan
, is a story of utility degenerating into a liability. The insurgents, on the run following the Indian army operations Operation Rhino and Operation Bajrang, could not have asked for a better sanctuary. But, they started using the Nepalese refugees as porters and guides for their operations in the relatively unknown terrain.
Bhutan
; the southern district of Sandrup Jongkhar, which borders
Assam
's Nalbari district, provides them with sanctuary. The surrender of 300 ULFA insurgents in November 2000 revealed another angle to the story. After the surrender, Lohit Deuri, former G-2 of the outfit, revealed that he personally took delivery of one consignment of 143 rifles and 235 revolvers from
China
in one of the four camps in
Bhutan
on April 11, 1999 [The Hindustan Times, 15 August 2000 ]. Whereas Chinese assistance to the northeastern insurgents is an open secret, the use of Bhutanese territory for anti-Indian activity is a matter of grave concern.
Bhutan's cordial relations with
India
and the complexities involved, the options before the
Royal
Kingdom
are limited, but worth serious consideration. It can either chose to take the outfits head on or continue its negotiations with them hoping they would chose to behave.
Bhutan
. Given their strategic location in
Bhutan
, severing its links with the concerned districts would not be a difficult matter for the insurgents. The option of border fencing is also not available as more than fifty percent of the Bhutanese population live in the eastern and south eastern region, their main operational areas, and receive their supplies from
Assam
. The Bhutanese are also required to travel to
Assam
regularly. Following reports that Bhutan was about to launch a military operation against the insurgents in May 2000, ULFA commander-in-chief, Paresh Baruah, threatened the King of Bhutan with dire consequences if military action was taken against his men.
India
and
Bhutan
. According to the Indian Home Ministry,
New Delhi
has trained around 3000 RBA troops in counter-insurgency operations. Besides, the Indian government has also supplied them with weapons like AK automatic rifles, mortars and rocket launchers worth several million rupees [The Times of India, 22 September 2000 ]. For over 40 years,
India
has maintained a full-fledged training centre in
Bhutan
, known as the Indian Military Training Team, located in Ha.
The presence of the insurgent outfits has affected the country's developmental activities in the southern districts. Apart from these plans getting affected, the intrusion of insurgents in the region has led to destabilising developments with government officials found colluding with the terrorists. In July 2000, the Bhutanese government admitted that the ULFA was transferring funds abroad thorough its diplomatic baggage [www.rediff.com/news/2000/jul/06ne.htm].
ULFA now runs as many as 36 camps in
Given
Clearly, taking on the insurgent outfits on its own is not a viable option for
The recent jubilation in the Bhutanese National Assembly, on the ULFA's decision to close four of its camps in the country appears to be premature and not in keeping with reality. Even if the outfit honours its commitment and closes down these camps by December 2001, with as many as 32 remaining camps, ending insurgency has still a long way to go in the kingdom. One also needs to keep the compulsions (read advantages) to the insurgents of operating from a foreign territory in mind whilst evaluating their sincerity in honouring their commitments. Apart from providing them a safe haven from the Indian security forces, they have the advantage: of free movements and training facilities.
Thus, it is naive to hope that the insurgents would forego all these advantages unless they are compelled to do so by a joint cooperative action by
The time has come for a policy that proceeds beyond the cooperation and planning stage to incorporate hard action. Their mutual compulsions must drive both countries to cooperate in driving the insurgents out of Bhutanese territory. More delay is not likely to augur well for both countries.
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