As the Clinton Administration plans to field a National Missile Defence, the debate has focussed primarily on these criteria-

·                     The nuances of the failed test

·                     The readiness of the technology

·                     The cost of the system

·                     The impact of the deployment on arms control and US security

·                     The threat perceptions 

Much of the debate within the US has focussed on the failure of the recent test. Leading missile scientists contend that the present defensive system being tested by the Pentagon will not be able to distinguish between nuclear warheads and decoys, especially if both are released by a missile in mid-flight. The assumption is that the technology may not have reached the required maturity now, it may be reached in future tests. The US has sanctioned the money required and there seems to be no rollback of the present programme. The other pressures could be from scientific-bureaucratic momentum and the domestic constituency. Neither the Democrats nor the Republicans want to be seen as weak on issues of national security in the Presidential election year. Some debate has focussed on the threat perception. There is a view that if the threat emanates from a state that has a government it can be deterred. If the threat were from a North Korean Tae-po-dong then would North Korea risk complete annihilation? The impact of its deployment has focussed mainly on the future of the ABM Treaty, US-Russian relations and Sino-US relations. There are two outcomes possible regarding the ABM treaty-either Russia agrees to its modification or the US withdraws from the treaty. Whatever the outcome, Russia and China are likely to increase spending on warhead and force modernisation.  Many believe deterrence is still reliable and engagement with a potential adversary is a more economical way than a weapon system with such huge costs.

NMD deployment by the US would lead to several simultaneous arms races. One of these would certainly be in Southern Asia. Given the contours of the debate there seems to be little interest on how a US National Missile Defence will affect South Asia. This can no longer be ignored. China officially maintains a no-first-use policy, the NMD would render a second strike capability problematical. China is likely to accelerate its modernisation plans to qualitative improve its arsenal. This would impact on India, which has also declared a no-first-use posture. Chinese liquid-fueled missiles are understood to be in a de-mated status and this provides for considerable preparation time. If Chinese nuclear forces have to modify their deployment posture from a small, de-mated force to a nuclear force on high alert with war fighting capability this would have a ‘trickle down’ effect on the Indian nuclear deterrent posture. A qualitative and quantitative improvement of Chinese nuclear forces would lead to an increased threat perception in New Delhi. An expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal could also alter India’s and Pakistan’s strategic calculus. Right wing hard-liners in both countries will favour qualitative and quantitative improvement in their nuclear arsenals. This could accelerate an arms race between them. 

To increase the credibility of their deterrent, India, Pakistan or China may renew the testing of nuclear weapons. This may lead to breakdown of deterrence as it has been operating in Southern Asia. After the CTBT’s rejection in the US Senate, this may be the last thing the international arms control community may want. Once improved weapons have been tested, a natural corollary would be to acquire better delivery systems. Given the pressure of domestic constituencies no political leaders would want to appear weak on national security issues. While India would continue to develop delivery system indigenously, Pakistan maybe compelled to rely on its ‘strategic ally’ China for new missiles. There were concerns of MTCR violations in the early 1990s when China transferred M-11’s to Pakistan. More missile transfers will further damage the MTCR.  While Pakistan might be content with acquiring a strategic equilibrium with India, Indian ambitions may compel it to project a regional power image, thus adding an impetus toa regional arms race.

Thus an NMD for the US has the potential to become a tool for damaging the precariously balanced arms control regimes, initiate many new arms races, including one in South Asia, and weaken the notion of deterrence as it exists today.