Speaker: Vivek Katju
Pakistan was far removed from the vision of Mohamed Ali Jinnah who had visualised a quasi-Islamic policy in which Muslims and others could practice their faith. Now secularism was a bad word in
Pakistan . Gen. Musharraf had retreated from his admiration of Kemal Attaturk and a minor amendment of the blasphemy laws to reiterating the Islamic provisions of the Constitution—the progression has been from Islam to promoting jehad becoming state policy. Sectarianism and associated violence was likely to grow and was creeping into the economic and financial spheres—levy of interest, for instance, was deemed contrary to Islamic tenets.
Pakistan were on ethnic and communal lines and very different from the discourse in
India ; hence the situation in
Pakistan was very different from the Indian sociological condition. Modernist, liberal approaches were only there on the fringes in
Pakistan . The majority still thought of
India as being Hindu, bania and unable to fight.
India ’s successes in past conflicts were explained away to the people by projecting 1965 as a victory, 1971 as because caused by political reasons and 1999 as due to Nawaz Sharif succumbing to American pressure. The kernel of the Pakistani national consciousness therefore was non-Indianness; it had just not evolved.
Pakistan was always dominant, especially on policy relating to
India ,
Kashmir , Nuclear issues,
Afghanistan , and
China . In the post-Zia and post-1997 Nawaz Sharif period it was believed that the Army’s role had attenuated. The Kargil episode did reveal fissures in the Pak Army, but Nawaz Sharif’s hasty action in dismissing Gen. Musharraf precipitated the Army coup. Now the Army had established a monitoring mechanism to control the working of all civil Departments in the government.
Pakistan , and promised seven-fold reforms to improve the law and order situation, depoliticize institutions, delegate powers, ensure accountability, rebuild national confidence and achieve greater cohesiveness. The speaker said nothing concrete had emerged on any of these promises.
Pakistan . Feudalism and the power of the landed classes would continue.
Pakistan ’s economic future was equally bleak. Its population was increasing by 2.8% each year; domestic savings were down to 12-14%; debt servicing liabilities and defence expenditure exceeded revenues; the important textile sector was not modernizing; no foreign direct investment had come in for the last three years, and there was hardly any progress or research activity to improve agricultural production. Dependence on aid was high and there were high hopes of the Paris Club baling out
Pakistan at their next meeting in end-December.
Pakistan was in deep trouble; yet no rational thinking was visible in its elite. In future we were likely to see a jehadi
Pakistan ; indeed, its thinking was steadily getting Talibanized.
Punjab and the Army were likely to continue to be in the driver’s seat.
Pakistan should not be ignored. This was countered by the argument that on basic issues like
India and
Kashmir there was a collective sense obtaining in
Pakistan , and people were under tremendous pressure to conform. There was little hope of their being able to influence State policy.
Pakistan was also emphasizing its non-Western-ness; Islam was filling this negative ideological vacuum. The country was incapable of meeting the challenges of the 21st century with such intellectual moorings. There was intense anxiety among its thinking people in this regard, especially with the economic situation, and with the trained jehadis, not used up in
Kashmir , turning against
Pakistan itself. A certain schizophrenia in
Pakistan has to be accepted.
Kashmir , like the current initiative for peace talks by the Hizb, was purely tactical. He cannot give up the two-nation theory on which
Pakistan ’s existence is founded. Can he afford the price for continuing to play the
Kashmir card?
Pakistan . They had proved no better than the other leaders, so far as
India was concerned.
Pakistan were sui generis and could not be compared to
India ’s relations with other countries. There was an immense baggage left by history, but it would be mistaken to believe that
Pakistan was, in effect, an extension of undivided
India ’s communal problem. A content analysis of
Pakistan ’s newspapers—both English and Urdu—showed that there was little change in them over the years. True, there were liberal writings and contrary impulses, but these were voices in the wilderness, and they could suffer the fate of John the Baptist at any time. In any case, its elite decided
Pakistan ’s strategic policy, and they were not liberals.
Pakistan policy—proactive or otherwise—was noted by many. There was no alternative to a ‘strong’ policy being pursued. But it was also noted that there was no coherent policy on
Kashmir either, which had been exploited by
Pakistan . It was suggested that, considering
Pakistan ’s unpredictability, a game theoretical approach should be pursued.
Pakistan ’s policies towards
Kashmir seemed to be taking place; hence it was necessary to strengthen people’s organizations like the traders and Track II elements. Currently, however, the mood in
India was distinctly hostile; Kargil was seen as a great betrayal, and Parliament did not favour talks with
Pakistan . For once,
India , too, was reaping the benefits of unpredictability.
United States and
Soviet Union during the Cold War years. These beliefs were fanned and utilised by ruling establishments.
South Asia was no exception, and was riven by ethnic and cultural prejudices.
Pakistan was witnessing the phenomenon of State encouragement of such beliefs, and that had become the reason for its steady downward progression.
India should strengthen its economy, increase self-reliance, but also make clear to
Pakistan that it was not a bania country.
Joint Secretary (Pak) MEA
In his initial statement the speaker noted that present-day
Thinking processes in
The role of the Army in
There were great hopes that the Army would clear up the mess left by Nawaz Sharif. In his earliest speech the Chief Executive had admitted to a dismal situation obtaining in
Coming to Pakistan’s immediate political future, it seemed Gen. Musharraf was in no present danger; he was unlikely to give up his position as Chief of Army Staff when he retires in October 2001; and he was likely to restore civilian rule by October 2002, as ruled by the Supreme Court, but only after he had established an institutional role for the Army. On the social front it seemed that madrassas would increase in future; their products belong to a different age, their primary objective is jehad. The jehadi groups were openly competing and advertising for recruits and funds.
Undoubtedly, the Chief Executive makes a distinction between jehad and terrorism, but it is fictitious. No great creative impulses were coming out of
In essence,
Discussions
1. Some 80% of the population do not go to mosques and was therefore not subject to the hostile propaganda of the mullahs; hence the silent majority in
2. By stressing its non-Indianness,
3. Gen. Musharraf’s moves on
4. A fear was expressed of the jehadis becoming nuclear-capable in time. Nobody had an answer to this possibility. But it was noted that the West had time and time again bought the argument that Bhutto, then Nawaz Sharif, and now Gen Musharraf were the best hope for
5. Relations with
6. The lack of a
7. The contrary view was that a re-evaluation of
8. It was noted, however, that extraordinary beliefs could be sustained over long periods of time by nations, as obtained in the case of the
POPULAR COMMENTARIES
