KRC: Government’s Sucess, but Intelligence Failure!
22 Jul, 2000 · 392
Ramkumar highlights the loopholes of the findings of the Kargil Review Committee report vis-a-vis intelligence.
The Kargil Review Committee(KRC) report attracted a lot of critical attention; it was severely blamed for not pinpointing the dramatis personae at the bureaucratic and political levels responsible for the failure of intelligence. It also attracted adverse attention for indicting the RAW (Research & Analysis Wing), whilst absolving the army in general and DGMI (Director-General Military intelligence) in particular. The KRC’s limitations were clear from the non-statutory nature of the inquiry, and the fact that it was a government move to ward off embarrassing questions from the opposition before the parliamentary elections in Sept-Oct 99.
By claiming that Kargil was a military & diplomatic triumph that led to the isolation of Pakistan in the international arena and uncritically toeing the establishment line, the KRC ignored several salient facts. If Kargil had been averted, the financial burden of creating a new army corps based in Leh might have been avoided apart from the loss of over 500 lives. The Kargil episode highlighted the failure of the Indian security apparatus, apart from the NSC (National Security Council) and NSAB (National Security Advisory Board) to envisage the possibility of Pakistani intrusions in a largely unmanned area. From the information provided in the KRC, it appears that information available was either not properly analysed nor assessed by the NSCS (National Security Council Secretariat - earlier Joint Intelligence Committee) By assuming that Pakistani actions were infiltration oriented, their activities in the Kargil sector since 1993 were ignored.
To quote Robert Wohlstetter on Pearl Harbour, it resulted from a lopsided ratio of noise to signals that could only be disentangled after the fact. Pakistani actions in the Kargil sector since 1997 should have received attention not only in terms of the civil-military equation in that country, but also at the macro level i.e. Indo-Pakistan military and diplomatic postures in the post Pokhran-Chagai period.
While the KRC could be faulted on various grounds, its point that the intelligence agencies have not reviewed their role in the post-nuclear era, reveals a serious lacunae. A nuclear power like India, faced with two nuclear adversaries, Pakistan and China, with instances of covert co-operation between them must appreciate that intelligence is of critical importance. It would be worth pondering whether India has the indigenous capabilities to verify the information regarding Sino-Pakistan nuclear and missile co-operation that appear in the US media. The KRC recommended that India requires satellites with half meter resolution and a recent report in a national daily states that one meter resolution spy satellites may be launched by year end, which is a step in the right direction.
The KRC states that JIC reports were downgraded and neither the DGMI nor the intelligence agencies paid any attention to them. In the aftermath of KRC, a task force on intelligence has been appointed by the government, headed by a former head of R&AW (governor of J&K) who has been asked to submit its report in three months. The task force has a short time frame; it might end up as yet another effort to avoid to avoid long term solutions. Intelligence agencies have a specific responsibility to provide actionable intelligence to the consumers, apart from serving the nation’s security interests. To quote a former CIA Chief, “Intelligence is the first line of defence in a nation’s security”.
It is the government of the day which sets priorities and ensures that national objectives are achieved. Intelligence agencies are not islands that exist outside executive control. The usefulness and the quality of intelligence is only as good as the government of the day requires. Any serious reforms in the field of intelligence needs an understanding of the precise role of intelligence agencies in serving the nation’s security interests. Intelligence heads on their part must clearly explain their strengths and limitations to the political bosses. Making the intelligence agencies a favourite whipping boy can only serve short sighted interests.