The Future of Nuclear Arms Control

22 Jul, 2000    ·   391

Report of the IPCS Seminar held on 21 July 2000
Speaker: Rakesh Sood

 

 

JS, DISA Division, Ministry of External Affairs

 

 

Mr Sood noticed that the subject of the seminar was speculative; it was necessary to look at the past to gaze into the future. He felt the general optimism about nuclear arms control ended in the sixties with the PTBT, NPT and, later, SALT-I and the ABM Treaty being negotiated. No radical technological improvements have since taken place in warheads or delivery systems, except that accuracy over long ranges has increased. Medium NWS wanted the superpowers to reduce their arsenals before joining these nuclear arms reduction measures. Hotlines, nuclear risk reduction centres, the INF, START-I and START-II agreements were put in place. START-III negotiations might commence. 

 

 

These processes have run their course; so has the NPT.  Its indefinite extension has frozen the nuclear regime at 5 NWS, a large number of NNWS, which includes Cuba , but leaves out the three threshold states. India and Pakistan have come out of the closet with their nuclear tests and declared they are nuclear weapon states. They are unlikely to rollback. This NPT regime is unlikely to change in future; but, theoretically, Pakistan could disintegrate and create problems for the regime. 

 

 

The end of the Cold War ended the Sino-American entente to checkmate the Soviet Union -the Europeans had been encouraged then to pursue a parallel policy towards China . Now, equations have changed indicating a new ballgame. On the technological front, the radically new factor is missile defence. Its efficacy raises serious doubts; nevertheless large investments in NMD and TMD are visualised by the United States ; they would affect future nuclear arms control negotiations. 

 

 

Coming to the state of nuclear arms control negotiations the focus has shifted to the FMCT after the CTBT, but an impasse has developed over amending the ABM Treaty. India will defend its small nuclear force (SNF) status, whilst promoting nuclear disarmament. The NWS know that India must be accorded some kind of nuclear status for coming to the negotiating table. Bilateral negotiations are proceeding between the United States and Russia/China and between India and China/Pakistan. Besides negotiations to reduce nuclear arms, CBMs, especially transparency measures, are within the negotiation process. Outer space will be the future area of contention and negotiation; hopefully, some rules of the road will emerge in areas like satellite immunity.

 

 

The future would be conditioned by the reality that no truly bipolar system exists, nor has a true multipolar system developed. However, technology remains the joker in the pack. Nuclear proliferation, rather the ability to possess a crude device, will become easier with the passage of time. But the clandestine route to nuclear capability will become more difficult with the 93+2 enhanced safeguards system in place. Costs, however, would remain prohibitive. India has slow marched to nuclear capacity, so has Pakistan ; the "rogue states" or "countries of concern" syndrome is just hype. The global nuclear regime would be restricted to 8 states.

 

 

Discussion

 

 

There was great interest in why the US was doggedly pursuing the NMD option despite knowing its technological inadequacies. Apparently, US politicians were responding to their constituents' belief that American scientists could find a solution to any problem (including missile defence); and if the technology was available it should be exploited. Of course, there were several other explanations possible. But, opposition to the NMD was steadily reducing in the US , and some notion of missile defence was generally accepted; the debate had shifted to the optimal system for emplacement and costs. The interesting point made was that no real evidence obtained about " suitcase bombs" being around, but a radical technological break-through like the development of "stealth" missiles could destroy the viability of missile defence systems. The European position on NMD was adjudged ambiguous. They were worried about its implications for "extended deterrence" by the United States , but appreciative of its industry benefits. Following the NMD's deployment, however, an unraveling of the CTBT/ FMCT negotiations, and even the NPT, would make it easier for India to reprocess its spent fuel, and weaponize/deploy its nuclear arsenal. 

 

 

It was appreciated that declaratory statements and actions need not be in synch. Witness the example set by the NWS of making "unequivocal" declarations to eliminate their nuclear weapons but proceeding steadily to sophisticate them. The contrary view was that countries should not sacrifice the moral dimension of foreign policy by such deliberate cynical behaviour. It was also noted that nuclear arms controls were largely cosmetic devices; the absence of a CTBT or FMCT would not affect the intrinsic structure of the nuclear regime. 

 

 

Some peripheral issues came up viz. India 's policy towards the CTBT and the need to test. Setting up laboratories like the National Ignition Facility would be prohibitively costly, although cheaper versions could be developed. The argument for signing the CTBT was based on the reality that India needed to respond to the sensitivities of important countries like Russia , France and Japan , besides the United States . A viable solution would be to sign but not ratify until the US , Russia and China ratify or, not inconceivably, test again. The other issue that came up was India 's obduracy in not resuming the dialogue with Pakistan . This made sense immediately after Kargil, but no longer. Currently, there was a great deal of Track-II activity, but little visible on the official front. This was in stark contrast to American-Soviet interactions during the Cold War when NGO activity was minimal, but the officials of the two States were engaged. Although envisaged in the Lahore Declaration, there were no nuclear CBMs in place to govern the Indo-Pak standoff. For that matter, the Sino-Indian security dialogue was not addressing nuclear CBMs; this too was imperative.

 

 

Finally, the end of the Cold War had not realized the fond hope that nuclear arms control would rapidly progress, although the process had not unraveled. Still, arms control agreements like the Ottawa Treaty on Anti-Personnel Landmines had been possible; something might shortly be possible in regard to small arms proliferation. Internal security issues, anyway, were gaining salience. Domestic pressures were also becoming more important to influence arms control processes. 

 

 

 

 

 

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