Afghanistan - Watching from the Sidelines
02 Feb, 2010 · 3055
Raghav Sharma evaluates India’s diplomatic efforts with regard to Afghanistan
"There should be no distinction between a good Taliban and a bad Taliban."
The above postulation made by Foreign Minister SM Krishna during his pre-conference parleys with British Foreign Secretary David Miliband, is a reflection of the failure of the Indian policy establishment to eschew the changing political dynamics that have been underway in Afghanistan. Krishna’s relegation to the second of the three rows of seats, this despite India being the largest regional and fifth largest international donor, was deeply symbolic of the peripheral role that India is likely to play in shaping the future of Afghanistan.
There are three other key indicators that have reiterated the slow but steady relegation of India to the periphery in Afghan affairs. First, the decision at the London Conference to create a US$500 million trust fund to buy out the Taliban and thus in effect buy an exit strategy for the West from Afghanistan, showed that India’s position of not making any distinction in the degrees of Talibanism had no takers. Second, following the conclusion of the conference Krishna’s statement that India was willing to give a try to the ‘good Taliban’ reflected a marked departure from New Delhi’s traditional stance. It was if anything a grudging acceptance by New Delhi of the writing on the wall that had long been evident, but which New Delhi chose not to read. Finally, Turkey’s decision to shut the door on New Delhi at the security conference on Afghanistan, which it hosted in Istanbul, has only reiterated India’s position as becoming an increasingly inconsequential player in Afghanistan. These developments also ring hollow President Obama’s much touted “regional approach” to resolving the Afghan crisis.
A walk down the streets of any major city or small village in Afghanistan is testimony to the immense goodwill that India enjoys in Afghanistan. This can also be attested to by empirical evidence through successive opinion polls conducted in Afghanistan, consider for instance the poll by the BBC, ABC and ARD National survey of Afghanistan in January 2009 which showed that 74 per cent of Afghans perceived India in favourable terms, thus putting it much ahead of any other foreign country. Ironically Pakistan, which is the least favoured amongst all nations by the Afghans, seems poised to play, once again, a major role in shaping the political contours in Kabul. Thus it is clear that Indian diplomacy has failed to effectively capitalize either on India’s much appreciated and effective presence in the civilian sphere, or on its soft power potential in Afghanistan.
India certainly has legitimate security concerns in the region, especially in light of past experiences be they in Kashmir or the hijacking of IC 814. India most certainly would not wish to see Afghanistan revert to Taliban influence and once again emerge as an epicentre of extremism and drug trafficking. However, having cultivated little substantive ties with Pashtun figures outside the rank and file of the Kabul government and with changes having occurred in the composition of the Northern Alliance, which was once patronized by India, over the last decade New Delhi’s options in Afghanistan appear to be increasingly limited. Furthermore, India’s inability to convert its constituencies of immense popular goodwill into effective political and diplomatic leverages as also its sluggishness in coming to terms with the political alignments and re-alignments that have been underway in Afghanistan for quite a while now are a major diplomatic faux pax.
Ironically, for the first time in decades New Delhi’s vision of a stable, moderate and democratic order take root in Afghanistan finds congruence with that of Washington’s. However Washington continues being fixated on a Pakistani centric approach to resolving the Afghan problem, even though Islamabad’s strategic vision in Afghanistan has more often than not has been at cross purposes with that of the US. The onus now lies on Indian diplomacy and political leadership to display far greater dexterity in addressing the new set of challenges it faces in securing its interests in the immediate neighbourhood.
A strategy to cultivate some elements from the Taliban should not be completely alien to New Delhi, which has often deployed both the carrot and the stick to engage non-state actors from Kashmir to the Northeast and this approach has met with varying degrees of success. Thus, in this regard it might be useful for New Delhi to draw upon lessons from some its own experiences, of course bearing in mind a crucial difference that in Afghanistan the nascent Afghan state and the international community at large will be bargaining with the Taliban from a position of weakness. If India aspires for a place at the global high table, it must also demonstrate its ability to rise to and effectively address some of the challenges it faces in its immediate neighbourhood. A failure to do so will ensure that India will remain no more than a mute spectator, forced to watch from the sidelines, as some of the seminal events that unfold now and will shape the future of South Asia in the years ahead.
The above postulation made by Foreign Minister SM Krishna during his pre-conference parleys with British Foreign Secretary David Miliband, is a reflection of the failure of the Indian policy establishment to eschew the changing political dynamics that have been underway in Afghanistan. Krishna’s relegation to the second of the three rows of seats, this despite India being the largest regional and fifth largest international donor, was deeply symbolic of the peripheral role that India is likely to play in shaping the future of Afghanistan.
There are three other key indicators that have reiterated the slow but steady relegation of India to the periphery in Afghan affairs. First, the decision at the London Conference to create a US$500 million trust fund to buy out the Taliban and thus in effect buy an exit strategy for the West from Afghanistan, showed that India’s position of not making any distinction in the degrees of Talibanism had no takers. Second, following the conclusion of the conference Krishna’s statement that India was willing to give a try to the ‘good Taliban’ reflected a marked departure from New Delhi’s traditional stance. It was if anything a grudging acceptance by New Delhi of the writing on the wall that had long been evident, but which New Delhi chose not to read. Finally, Turkey’s decision to shut the door on New Delhi at the security conference on Afghanistan, which it hosted in Istanbul, has only reiterated India’s position as becoming an increasingly inconsequential player in Afghanistan. These developments also ring hollow President Obama’s much touted “regional approach” to resolving the Afghan crisis.
A walk down the streets of any major city or small village in Afghanistan is testimony to the immense goodwill that India enjoys in Afghanistan. This can also be attested to by empirical evidence through successive opinion polls conducted in Afghanistan, consider for instance the poll by the BBC, ABC and ARD National survey of Afghanistan in January 2009 which showed that 74 per cent of Afghans perceived India in favourable terms, thus putting it much ahead of any other foreign country. Ironically Pakistan, which is the least favoured amongst all nations by the Afghans, seems poised to play, once again, a major role in shaping the political contours in Kabul. Thus it is clear that Indian diplomacy has failed to effectively capitalize either on India’s much appreciated and effective presence in the civilian sphere, or on its soft power potential in Afghanistan.
India certainly has legitimate security concerns in the region, especially in light of past experiences be they in Kashmir or the hijacking of IC 814. India most certainly would not wish to see Afghanistan revert to Taliban influence and once again emerge as an epicentre of extremism and drug trafficking. However, having cultivated little substantive ties with Pashtun figures outside the rank and file of the Kabul government and with changes having occurred in the composition of the Northern Alliance, which was once patronized by India, over the last decade New Delhi’s options in Afghanistan appear to be increasingly limited. Furthermore, India’s inability to convert its constituencies of immense popular goodwill into effective political and diplomatic leverages as also its sluggishness in coming to terms with the political alignments and re-alignments that have been underway in Afghanistan for quite a while now are a major diplomatic faux pax.
Ironically, for the first time in decades New Delhi’s vision of a stable, moderate and democratic order take root in Afghanistan finds congruence with that of Washington’s. However Washington continues being fixated on a Pakistani centric approach to resolving the Afghan problem, even though Islamabad’s strategic vision in Afghanistan has more often than not has been at cross purposes with that of the US. The onus now lies on Indian diplomacy and political leadership to display far greater dexterity in addressing the new set of challenges it faces in securing its interests in the immediate neighbourhood.
A strategy to cultivate some elements from the Taliban should not be completely alien to New Delhi, which has often deployed both the carrot and the stick to engage non-state actors from Kashmir to the Northeast and this approach has met with varying degrees of success. Thus, in this regard it might be useful for New Delhi to draw upon lessons from some its own experiences, of course bearing in mind a crucial difference that in Afghanistan the nascent Afghan state and the international community at large will be bargaining with the Taliban from a position of weakness. If India aspires for a place at the global high table, it must also demonstrate its ability to rise to and effectively address some of the challenges it faces in its immediate neighbourhood. A failure to do so will ensure that India will remain no more than a mute spectator, forced to watch from the sidelines, as some of the seminal events that unfold now and will shape the future of South Asia in the years ahead.
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