Need to Secure Sea Lanes within the Indian Ocean Rim

30 Nov, 1999    ·   295

Wg. Cdr. N. K. Pant feels that in the context of the nuclear submarine and the invisible deterrence that it provides, the ATV project presently moving at a snail’s pace needs to be speeded up. All this will need a much higher level of budgeting for the ‘silent service’ in order to justify its existence as a strong deterring force in the Indian Ocean littoral


The seizure of a hijacked cargo vessel on November 16, 1999 in the Arabian Sea more than 450 miles off the Goa coast after a hot pursuit by the Indian navy and coast guard was indeed a commendable job well received internationally. The pirated ship bound for Saudi Arabia with die-hard pirates on board and a cargo of metal ingots was intercepted on the high seas outside India ’s exclusive economic zone under the UN Convention on Law of the Seas. With the increasing economic liberalisation and enhancement of trade, the need to keep bustling international trading corridors passing through the sprawling waters of the Indian Ocean cannot be just wished away. There is a need of an effective security umbrella over the Indian Ocean .

 

 

Does any country in the region possess the requisite capabilities to ensure the free flow of commercial cargoes through the vital trade arteries criss-crossing these high seas presently devoid of effective policing? The heavy responsibility of policing the trade routes on which more than 300 ships are estimated to traverse each day would fall on India ’s shoulders in the coming century. The international community has no alternative but to acknowledge India ’s emergence as the most dominant power of the Indian Ocean , by virtue of its strategic location and resources capable of sustaining a potent three dimensional naval force capable of operating on the watery surface, deep underneath as well as in the air above to achieve the requisite task.

 

 

Strangely the Indian navy has all along received a step motherly treatment from the union government in the allotment of funds. Its share of the budgetary allocation has never crossed 14 per cent of the total defence budget during the last half a century. Obviously, there is something myopic with India ’s strategic philosophy that has all along shown utter lack of seaward orientation. Hence, it is not surprising that navy’s present strength has not seen any upward revision and remains same as was sanctioned as far back as 1964. Most of the systems that have been inducted by the navy were either obsolete at the time of entering the service or became obsolete soon thereafter. The construction of strategic and prestigious Seabird naval base off the Karwar coast is hanging fire and may take a couple of years before it is completed. The naval academy project too is victim of similar sheer neglect. Moreover, the navy’s important combat projects such as building an indigenous air defence ship (ADS) and advanced technology vessel (ATV), a euphemism for the nuclear powered submarine have not been accorded the priority they deserved for funding.

 

 

The capital and technology intensive naval projects have a considerably long gestation period. On account of earlier neglect, a stage has come when on the one hand, more vessels have become obsolete awaiting decommissioning, while on the other a much smaller number will fall due for induction into the service. No denying, in the recent past some laudable efforts have gone into to fill up the deficiencies of combat vessels like induction of indigenously built guided missile destroyers INS Delhi and INS Mysore. The government has also sanctioned the construction of three next generation Type17 frigates, two project 75 submarines in addition to ADS and ATV. The ADS will eventually replace the already ageing aircraft carrier INS Viraat which is reportedly undergoing two year long refit and modernisation at the Kochi shipyard.

 

 

Moreover the naval planners have projected the requirement of three aircraft carriers. There is also a move to acquire 40,000 tonne Russian aircraft carrier "Admiral Gorshkov" but its refitting as per Indian navy’s specifications may cost nearly a billion dollars. The navy must essentially depend more on fast moving surface and sub surface conventional warships that ensure stealth and high levels of survivability and if at all the need is felt for the carrier based force for power projection in the international waters, it may opt for smaller and affordable aircraft carriers constructed by our own shipyards.

 

 

Since the proposed credible minimum deterrence as espoused by the draft nuclear doctrine is to be founded on a triad of land based missiles, aircraft and not the least the sea based mobile assets, a fleet of missile equipped nuclear powered submarine will be an ideal principal strike force and not the slow moving, bulky and exorbitantly expensive carrier based task force. The nuclear submarine happens to be the invisible deterrent faster under water than any surface ship over it. Its long submerged endurance and speed are great assets that significantly add to the navy’s blue water capabilities in the high seas. In this context the ATV project presently moving at a snail’s pace assumes prime importance and needs to be speeded up. All this will need a much higher level of budgeting for the ‘silent service’ in order to justify its existence as a strong deterring force in the Indian Ocean littoral.

 

 

 

 

 

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