Australia’s Force 2030 and India
02 Jun, 2009 · 2881
Rahul Mishra analyses the implications of Canberra’s defence white paper for India
Australia’s defence White Paper released in early May and titled “Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century: Force 2030,” heralds a whole new range of discussions among the countries of the Asia-Pacific. While it has sparked off a debate among strategic thinkers within Australia, it carries a multitude of messages for India as well.
First, Australia’s perception of Asian security is based on how well the countries of the Asia-Pacific region are connected with the US. The paper notes, “The government's judgment is that strategic stability in the region is best underpinned by the continued presence of the United States through its network of alliances and security partnerships, including with Japan, the republic of Korea, India and Australia...” Thus, it is clear that Australia considers the US as an important factor in bringing the two democracies together. With the Manmohan Singh-led UPA coming back to power, one may hope that India-USA ties will be boosted further, thereby bringing India closer to US allies including Australia.
Second, India’s power projections have been positively accepted Down Under. Emphasizing shared democratic values, the ongoing fight against terrorism and a rule-based global security order, the paper envisions the idea of greater engagement with India. It says, “As India extends its reach and influence into areas of shared strategic interest, we will need to strengthen our defence relationship and our understanding of Indian strategic thinking. In the near term, we are looking for opportunities to expand high-level defence dialogue, building upon annual talks between the chief of the defence force and his Indian counterpart.... We should also increase practical cooperation in areas such as defence information sharing, counter-terrorism and peacekeeping...”
The message here is both positive and negative - India’s defence relations with Australia is insignificant as compared to those with the US, Russia, Vietnam, Singapore and Israel but this also means that there is a lot of potential to be tapped in terms of bilateral defence cooperation with Australia.
Third, China has been cited as the primary factor in Australia’s future defence plans. It is evident from the paper that Australia is not happy with an increasingly assertive China. Intriguingly, citing China as the reason for military modernization goes against Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s earlier actions and statements. This in turn, if it continues further, indicates that if China decides to take armed action on issues like Taiwan, the Spratlys and Paracel Islands, Australia will prefer to be on the American side rather than taking the ‘middle path.’ This seems to be a ‘good omen’ for India which is quite jittery of China’s ‘string of pearls’ strategy. If Australia goes more vocal on its China concerns, it will help India address its security challenges on a common multilateral platform. Here again, the opportunity for India is in ‘overalls.’
Fourth, the White Paper’s concern about possible India- Pakistan conflicts which indicates that India’s much debated ‘de-hyphenation’ theory regarding Pakistan has failed. There is no denying the fact that Pakistan is a big factor in India’s foreign policy, but China is perhaps more important. India has to concentrate on China if it wants to deal effectively with the questions of national security and territorial sovereignty.
Fifth, the paper has rightly pointed out that the Indian Ocean will have greater significance by 2030; not only because it is one of busiest trade routes through which oil and gas is supplied across the globe, but also because it carries many potential issues of inter-state and intra-state conflicts. Issues of maritime piracy and drug-trafficking will also be more prominent in the years to come. This is where India-Australia interests intersect. Collective maritime strategy involving India, Australia and other ‘likeminded’ countries could be an option, if India wants to hedge against the age of uncertainty.
Overall, there is a marked shift in Australia’s image of India as is reflected in its White Paper. This hypothesis is backed by many encouraging trends such as the rise in bilateral trade by 40 per cent in recent years and Australia’s support to the Indo-US deal at the NSG and IAEA meets (This was despite the fact that it denied uranium to India in 2008). However, with the end of Australia’s ‘Three Mines Policy,’ India might get the yellowcake, provided it activates diplomatic channels on the issue of nuclear commerce.
Both India and Australia have many stakes in the Asia-Pacific and want the region to be peaceful and tranquil. However, India has no comprehensive policy to deal with countries of the Southwest Pacific, in general and Australia, in particular. India has to look Down Under not only to secure its politico-economic and military interests but also to ensure a peaceful Asian century. The time is now for India to grasp the signals coming from the White Paper and act the way a ‘Rising Power’ like India should.
First, Australia’s perception of Asian security is based on how well the countries of the Asia-Pacific region are connected with the US. The paper notes, “The government's judgment is that strategic stability in the region is best underpinned by the continued presence of the United States through its network of alliances and security partnerships, including with Japan, the republic of Korea, India and Australia...” Thus, it is clear that Australia considers the US as an important factor in bringing the two democracies together. With the Manmohan Singh-led UPA coming back to power, one may hope that India-USA ties will be boosted further, thereby bringing India closer to US allies including Australia.
Second, India’s power projections have been positively accepted Down Under. Emphasizing shared democratic values, the ongoing fight against terrorism and a rule-based global security order, the paper envisions the idea of greater engagement with India. It says, “As India extends its reach and influence into areas of shared strategic interest, we will need to strengthen our defence relationship and our understanding of Indian strategic thinking. In the near term, we are looking for opportunities to expand high-level defence dialogue, building upon annual talks between the chief of the defence force and his Indian counterpart.... We should also increase practical cooperation in areas such as defence information sharing, counter-terrorism and peacekeeping...”
The message here is both positive and negative - India’s defence relations with Australia is insignificant as compared to those with the US, Russia, Vietnam, Singapore and Israel but this also means that there is a lot of potential to be tapped in terms of bilateral defence cooperation with Australia.
Third, China has been cited as the primary factor in Australia’s future defence plans. It is evident from the paper that Australia is not happy with an increasingly assertive China. Intriguingly, citing China as the reason for military modernization goes against Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s earlier actions and statements. This in turn, if it continues further, indicates that if China decides to take armed action on issues like Taiwan, the Spratlys and Paracel Islands, Australia will prefer to be on the American side rather than taking the ‘middle path.’ This seems to be a ‘good omen’ for India which is quite jittery of China’s ‘string of pearls’ strategy. If Australia goes more vocal on its China concerns, it will help India address its security challenges on a common multilateral platform. Here again, the opportunity for India is in ‘overalls.’
Fourth, the White Paper’s concern about possible India- Pakistan conflicts which indicates that India’s much debated ‘de-hyphenation’ theory regarding Pakistan has failed. There is no denying the fact that Pakistan is a big factor in India’s foreign policy, but China is perhaps more important. India has to concentrate on China if it wants to deal effectively with the questions of national security and territorial sovereignty.
Fifth, the paper has rightly pointed out that the Indian Ocean will have greater significance by 2030; not only because it is one of busiest trade routes through which oil and gas is supplied across the globe, but also because it carries many potential issues of inter-state and intra-state conflicts. Issues of maritime piracy and drug-trafficking will also be more prominent in the years to come. This is where India-Australia interests intersect. Collective maritime strategy involving India, Australia and other ‘likeminded’ countries could be an option, if India wants to hedge against the age of uncertainty.
Overall, there is a marked shift in Australia’s image of India as is reflected in its White Paper. This hypothesis is backed by many encouraging trends such as the rise in bilateral trade by 40 per cent in recent years and Australia’s support to the Indo-US deal at the NSG and IAEA meets (This was despite the fact that it denied uranium to India in 2008). However, with the end of Australia’s ‘Three Mines Policy,’ India might get the yellowcake, provided it activates diplomatic channels on the issue of nuclear commerce.
Both India and Australia have many stakes in the Asia-Pacific and want the region to be peaceful and tranquil. However, India has no comprehensive policy to deal with countries of the Southwest Pacific, in general and Australia, in particular. India has to look Down Under not only to secure its politico-economic and military interests but also to ensure a peaceful Asian century. The time is now for India to grasp the signals coming from the White Paper and act the way a ‘Rising Power’ like India should.
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