Report of the IPCS Seminar held on 2 February 2009

Chair: PR Chari, Research Professor, IPCS 
Speaker: Amb. Teresita Schaffer, Director, South Asia Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies  

Ambassador Teresita Schaffer

India and the US have done a remarkable job in building up their bilateral relationship but very little in terms of having serious discussions on the world beyond the subcontinent. It is time that India and the US began to focus on some of the global problems that affect both countries including climate change and the world economy especially after the global economic meltdown. In addition, the Greater Middle East (starting from Afghanistan to the countries extending on its west) is of immense significance because both India and the US have vital interests in this region that run parallel to each other interests as well as intersect. 

The Middle East poses two significant challenges to the new government in Washington. The challenge of peace between Israel and Palestine, after the recent Israel-Hamas conflict in the Gaza Strip, is of highest priority to the Obama administration and the President wasted no time in appointing George Mitchell as special envoy for the Middle East peace process. 

Iraq is the next big priority to the Obama administration, which wants withdrawal of US troops from Iraq. The US will be careful getting out of Iraq as it was careless getting in. Obama has said that he wants US troops out of Iraq in 16 months and the administration is also serious about exiting Iraq “responsibly.” As far as India is concerned, it has had traditional relations with Iraq but steered clear of any involvement after the US invasion in 2003. India, nevertheless, has a stake in what kind of shape Iraq is left in after the US withdrawal. Still, the US’ policies on Iraq are unlikely to figure significantly in India-US relations. 

The three most important issues concerning India and the US in the Greater Middle East are: the Persian Gulf, Iran and Afghanistan 

Persian Gulf

There is a growing convergence of Indian and American interests in the Persian Gulf. Both the countries depend on the international energy market. India is the world’s second fastest growing energy buyer and has almost 4.5 million workers in the Gulf, sending home one-fourth of India’s remittance earnings. The Gulf countries provide two-thirds of India’s imported oil and all its imported LNG. Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean security is critical for both countries. On the security of energy lanes in the Indian Ocean US and Indian analysts are agree that it is a matter crucial to their national security. Communication on issues of piracy and maritime security is paramount for both countries. 

India and the US also share concerns about terrorism and radical extremism in the Middle East; however, they differ on how to deal with these especially with India’s uneasiness to be associated too closely with US policies, which are highly controversial in the region. Even though there cannot be common action, common interests must be recognized. 

Iran

India and the US have disagreements on how to deal with the Islamic Republic. India’s interests in Iran are primarily concerned with securing energy and land access to Afghanistan and Central Asia. For the US, terrorism and Iran’s nuclear programme are primary concerns. Iran has acquired high symbolic value in Indo-US relations and there is an intense level of rhetoric on both sides. Any kind of US pressure on how to deal with Iran is seen as horribly intrusive in India. 

Afghanistan

Afghanistan is the one issue where both India and the US have fairly large commonality of interests. Both seek the emergence of a stable Afghanistan but work with different tools towards this end. For the US, the military option was the primary tool after the fall of the Taliban and it had very little interest in economic and strategic investments. India, on the other hand, has contributed towards economic development and reconstruction. However, the biggest complication in dealing with Afghanistan is Pakistan. There is a strong belief in the US that Afghanistan cannot be stabilized unless Pakistan is not a part of the solution. This view is not appreciated in India and Pakistan is paranoid about India’s involvement in Afghanistan. So how does one reconcile all of these leads? 

Regional Approach 

India will not be a part of the regional approach if it works from the point of view of Pakistan. The main problem is to prevent Afghanistan’s neighbours from using it as a ground to fight their wars and thereby further destabilize the country. The obstacle to a regional approach has always been political and bad relations between the regional players and among the Afghans themselves. Russia and China share similar interests as India, Iran and the US in Afghanistan especially on terrorism, although it is not clear as to what specific role they can play in Afghanistan.

DISCUSSION

Questions/Comments

• Does the US perceive its interests to match with that of Pakistan in Afghanistan? Is the US foreign policy centered on its interests alone?
• The solution to Afghanistan cannot be seen only in military terms. The US policy in Afghanistan has been flawed; very little interest has been shown in economic development of Afghanistan. The massive collapse that will occur once external support is withdrawn is not being addressed. Moreover, mere indulgence in Pakistan bashing will not solve Afghanistan.
• The US policy on Iran does not necessarily has anything to do with what is happening on ground (in reality). The US’ support to Israel is seen as the main reason for its hostility with Iran.
• Given the current economic meltdown, will there be any defence cut with regard to operations in Afghanistan?
• While Pakistan has strong interests in Afghanistan, nobody will provide Pakistan a free hand in Afghanistan. And Afghanistan cannot be stabilized unless India has a role to play; therefore, a regional approach without India is analogous to barking to a wrong tree. India needs land access to Afghanistan and Pakistan has ruptured the traditional India-Afghanistan trade links. Therefore, unless Afghanistan reconnects to India, it cannot be stabilized. This requires for India and Pakistan to cooperate and work together in Afghanistan and the US should take a lead in this direction.
• What is the current thinking in the Obama administration about Pakistan? How would the US square circle between seeing Pakistan as the problem and the solution? How can the US interact with the Pakistan army and work at the same time to stabilize the civilian government?
• Pakistan has deceived throughout in countering terrorism; yet, the US has persisted on keeping Pakistan on its side. Except for Asif Ali Zardari, everyone in Pakistan is anti- US. One is not sure about the extent of Islamization of the Pakistan army. This combined with extremists political parties and Pakistan-Taliban connections, how does the US expect to deal with Pakistan?
• Will the Obama government approach India for the proposed military surge in Afghanistan?
• Iran’s interest in Afghanistan is similar to that of the US. Iran is anti-Taliban; therefore how feasible is it to work through Iran? If the US can with Pakistan irrespective of the AQ Khan nuclear network, then why is it hesitant to work with Iran? Can India help bridge differences between Iran and the US?
• While it is accepted that Afghanistan cannot be stabilized unless India has a role to play; however, this is not possible unless New Delhi also can bring itself to discuss Kashmir with Pakistan because this is how the Pakistan army perceives things to be. Is the US administration therefore, making a mistake by taking its foot off the pedal on Kashmir? Is it perhaps necessary to put Kashmir back on the table?

Reponses

• The biggest question right now is whether the Pakistan Army has decided to get the Taliban and other local terrorists groups under control or put them out of business. The main disconnect between Pakistan and the US in dealing with Afghanistan is that the US is focused on the Pak-Afghan border whereas Pakistan sees it as an internal problem.
• Most nations care mostly of their interests only and the US is no exception to this. Having said that, the US requires the help of India and other neighbours to stabilize Afghanistan.
• The US cannot view Pakistan and Afghanistan in purely military terms; however, the real problem is political. The Karzai government is extremely weak and has not played a leadership role in Afghanistan. However, there is no alternative to this government either, which can essay a more decisive role on Afghanistan.
• At present, the defence budget with respect to Afghanistan will not be affected. There is a possibility of this happening in Iraq. For about two years, the Democrats have been positioning themselves that Afghanistan in the good war and they want it to succeed. They will not change that position and the defence budget is not ‘instead of’ but ‘in addition’ to the domestic economic solution.
• Nobody wants any outside power to have a free hand in Afghanistan. The idea is to strike an agreement among the neighbours to stop anyone or themselves exerting influence in Afghanistan. While India’s economic role in Afghanistan in important, it does not necessarily convince Pakistan on what else India is doing in Afghanistan.
• Pakistan is part of the problem as well the solution. The US has been supporting Pakistan in their counter terrorism operations. On one hand, the US cannot dictate the Pakistan army in its operations and on the other hand, the US thinks that it is working with a very weak institution. The civilian government is also weak and one is not sure about its equation with the army. The army ideally would want to retreat from politics, but not forever. Its failure was very public – the operations in FATA, escalating suicide bombings etc. The US has very limited role to encourage the civilian government to take charge now.
• The Obama government will not ask India’s help for a military surge in Afghanistan.
• The US can involve Iran in an effective way if the latter is willing to. Yet, the Obama administration will be cautious regarding Iran and will not make any grandiose public statements.
• Pakistan is trying to distance itself from the US because of extreme domestic pressures and is concerned about further destabilization in Balochistan and NWFP. Interestingly, Pakistan is not pressing for the recognition of Durand Line.
• The US is interested in a Kashmir settlement; however, it will not come up with the idea on its own. It is willing to play a role if both India and Pakistan wants it to and taking into account the aspiration of the people of Kashmir. President Obama did raise the point of US playing a role in settling Kashmir during his campaign. He was of the view that this would help Pakistan focus on its western border. Nevertheless, the administration is likely to be more cautious now. It will nudge India and Pakistan to work on Kashmir and remain in touch with both governments on the issue. It may eventually look for opportunities for a greater role but for now, the US expects India and Pakistan to resume the composite dialogue. The Obama administration believes that as long as there is a weak government in Pakistan, it will be difficult to see how India and Pakistan can proceed on Kashmir.