The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), in its latest Afghanistan Opium Poppy Survey 2008 has stated that opium cultivation in Afghanistan has fallen by 19 per cent "to 157,000 hectares, compared to the historic high-water mark of 193,000 hectares in 2007." Owing to higher yields however, the reduction in actual poppy production has not been as pronounced, with only a 6 per cent dip since 2007. Additionally, of a total of 34 provinces in Afghanistan, the number of opium-free provinces went up from 13 in 2007 to 18 this year, including Nangarhar, which in 2007 was the second-highest opium producing province.

The report attributes this 'success' to two basic factors - good leadership and hostile weather conditions. It cites the examples of the Badakhshan, Balakh and Nangarhar provinces, whose respective governors, it claims, have done much to discourage farmers from growing poppy, through public campaigns against opium cultivation and the promotion of rural development. The drought-affected areas in north and north-west Afghanistan, where irrigation is largely rain-fed, have also contributed to a reduction in the overall opium production. In addition, about 5,480 ha of Afghanistan's poppy fields were destroyed during 2008 by poppy eradication teams.

The survey also shows a geographical overlap between areas under poppy cultivation and insurgent strongholds, thereby underlining American concerns that opium trade and the Taliban-led insurgency are deeply intertwined. According to the survey's estimates, 98 per cent of the country's opium cultivation is largely concentrated in seven south-western provinces; namely, Hilmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Farah, Nimroz, Daykundi and Zabul, which incidentally, also have permanent Taliban settlements.

The NATO and US are now gearing to embark on a programme of forced poppy eradication, carried out by ground teams using manual eradication techniques. Although the US has fervently argued for the aerial eradication of opium crops, as in the case of 'Plan Colombia'; the proposal has not found any takers. In 2004, the Karzai government rejected an American proposal to spray poppies with chemical herbicides on account of health and environmental concerns.

America's 'zero-tolerance' narcotics strategy has come in for sharp criticism from several quarters including the World Bank which has consistently argued that counter-narcotics efforts which merely target opium cultivation without a concomitant plan to invest in community-based development projects to assist rural businesses, agriculturists and entrepreneurs is likely to achieve very little. On the contrary, America's current policies that target poor poppy growers are likely to backfire, and perhaps may already have.

For nearly 500,000 poor families, largely dependent on poppy cultivation for their survival, crop eradication programmes have meant a downward spiral into abject poverty. Most of the poppy farmers take loans from drug lords and local traffickers, promising to repay the loan in the form of opium produce. With the eradication drives however, not only are they defaulting on their loans, but are now being forced to sell their land, livestock and even daughters to repay their debt. Not surprisingly therefore, in the face of the farmers' growing despair and anger, the Taliban's influence and legitimacy among the locals has grown substantially. This is especially true of the provinces across southern Afghanistan, where the Taliban is the strongest. Here, the farmers and insurgents share a mutually-reinforcing relationship, wherein the latter protect the poppy farms of the former and in return for the 'service' rendered, levy a 10 per cent 'tax' on the farm gate value of the opium produce.

Despite its blatant failure to stem record levels of opium production in Afghanistan, the US continues to swear by its policy of 'forced, non-negotiated, targeted poppy eradication.' The reasons for America's zero-tolerance to narcotics and the militarization of the means for countering the same are obvious. In conflating the twin banners of the 'war on terror' and 'war against narcotics' and adopting a militarized 'solution' to both these, the US has found for itself compelling justification for its continued presence in the country, despite its failure to achieve any of its stated objectives for the war.

Countries across the globe are rapidly losing faith and denouncing this moralist, prohibitionist approach as ineffectual. There is now increasing talk of legalizing Afghanistan's opium production as is the case in India and Turkey which regulate their opium production through licensing systems. The US however, has categorically opposed such a move. This contradicts its own policy in the 1970s, with respect to Turkey, when it supported Poppy for Medicine projects to bring the country's illicit poppy production under control without having to adopt forced crop eradication measures.

In the absence of alternative sources of livelihood, America's counter-narcotics policy in Afghanistan threatens to set off a humanitarian crisis in one of the world's poorest and most fragile states. There is urgent need therefore, to ensure that drug control efforts do not lead to more poverty and hunger, as is presently the case. For this, the creation of alternative livelihoods should become the top-most priority of international reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts in the country.