The Indian state's vulnerability to terrorist strikes has now been demonstrated regularly and with impunity. The series of attacks this year, from Jaipur, Ahmedabad and Surat and now to Delhi, all possibly by an indigenous terror outfit calling itself the Indian Mujahideen, has exposed the state's utter inability to counter them. While such acts have not affected national resolve, the state's failure is bound to extract high political costs. If nothing else, this factor alone should be cause enough for serious introspection and developing effective, sustainable and long-term counter measures.

Before suggesting such measures, it is first necessary to identify the nature of the problem. Terrorism and insurgency are two sides of societal malaise. A small elite group exploits this malaise, mobilizing grievances and directing it towards indiscriminate violence. But the commonality ends here and measures to counter them too must differ widely. Naxalist insurgencies in India are mobilized on the basis of sociopolitical discontents exploiting the neglect of the state and absence of governance to achieve their 'cause.' Its leadership is indigenous and support local, grievances are over identity and neglect and hence related intensely to the immediate environment. Response to this threat has to be primarily socioeconomic and in the form of good and responsive governance.

Terrorism, however, is distinct and different. Whatever be its motives, it has an international character - it obtains support from across borders - is often motivated purely by revenge and in today's world is based on a misinterpretation and distortion of religion. The violence terrorists generate is likely to be indiscriminate. Recent developments in India have provided incentives for their mobilization across the nation with sleeper cells spread over the land.

State response to both these forms of violence, therefore, needs to be distinct and separate. Naxalism has to be countered in the form of counterinsurgency, whose doctrine and strategy are clearly laid out and in which the Indian state has enormous competence. It is a complex response of winning hearts and minds, strict adherence to human rights and the rule of law, necessitating measured counter violence only in the initial stage. Ham-handed use of indiscriminate force will only worsen the situation, and may even make it possible for such movements to achieve their goals. The affected Indian provinces will need to address this form of violence on their own, with centralized legal provisions, effective coordination at Delhi for inter-state operations and the support of a responsive central intelligence organization, which is adequately provided by the Intelligence Bureau.

Countering terrorism of the 21st century variety requires a much greater and focused attention and a distinctly separate approach. This must not be confused or equated with law and order because its analogy is closer to war, and thus entails a central response with all that it connotes for intelligence and executive functions. It is highly desirable that this organization be put under a National Security Adviser under the Prime Minister; in fact, India should revert to the earlier mechanism of two separate advisors for internal and external security.

The highest priority has to be accorded to intelligence, which should cover both internal and external. All central intelligence organizations currently dealing with counter-terrorism will need to be grouped under this organization. Electronics surveillance and monitoring will be critical to its functioning and this is likely to be a very delicate issue. The nature and functions of this organization are likely to be so sensitive and intrusive, that its mandate and structure, including its oversight arrangements will have to be carefully thought out. This is another reason why it will be highly desirable not to mix it up with other intelligence organizations.

While the organization must be centralized, its deployment will have to be decentralized under several critical states. Personnel will need to be specialized, capable of penetrating terrorist organizations, run and manage a complex system of sources and agents and be able to respond with speed. A whole range of new specializations will have to be incorporated, such as psychologists, explosives and electronics experts, surveillance specialists, media experts and others. A highly effective research organization must provide the necessary analytical back-up.

The methods and the functioning of the organization have to be carefully monitored. While the nature of its tasks will require greater autonomy, recent experiences with 'encounter specialists' among provincial police forces have not been encouraging and needs to be avoided. The organization will have to liaise and function closely with other organizations of the Ministry of Home Affairs. This in itself could result in rather unpleasant turf battles, but there is no option but to face this squarely. This might be facilitated through a careful restructuring of the police forces of the nation. The last review was necessitated by the Kargil war. India today faces a totally different and a very insidious new war, to which the nation needs to fundamentally restructure its response. The half-hearted and inadequate response of the present administration will cost it dear in the next elections, but whichever administration follows can no longer avoid the hard options.