US Senator and presidential hopeful Barack Obama recently delivered remarks concerning emerging threats in the 21st century, including nuclear, biological, and cyber threats. Senator Obama stressed that "in a new world of threats, we are no longer protected by the size of oceans or solely by our military power," a statement that is particularly significant to biological security. This is because globalization has enhanced the ease with which pathogens can spread across borders and has made biological defense a greater national security priority. The Democratic candidate's call in his speech for a "comprehensive effort to tackle bioterror" underscores the latest reports regarding the disarrayed state of the Bush administration's costly bio-defence efforts.

On 16 July 2008 the US House Committee on Homeland Security held a hearing on the status of the implementation of the bio-surveillance requirements of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, which include the BioWatch program and the National Bio-surveillance Integration Center (NBIC). The BioWatch program is managed by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and is an early warning system which is supposed to detect deadly pathogens in the air. DHS is working now to strengthen and update BioWatch technologies in order to reduce the detection and response time to a biological outbreak. This program is the first line of detection of a bio-terrorist plot or attack. The NBIC is a center that provides a forum for senior leaders and federal agencies to acquire and exchange information and disseminate knowledge concerning biological threats. It consists of experts in the field and maintains products integral to bio-surveillance in its operating center.

A bio-surveillance system is an integral component of bio-defence and the most critical mechanism for mitigating the potential consequences of a bio-terrorist attack. The testimonies given at the hearing indicate that both the NBIC and BioWatch programs are behind schedule and facing various setbacks before their anticipated inceptions in September 2008 and April 2009, respectively. The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) completed a study and found that while DHS is making progress in its efforts to have NBIC running and fully operational by September and improving the detection capability of BioWatch, there are still rudimentary details that have yet to be defined and formalized.

In regards to the NBIC, William O Jenkins, Jr. Director Homeland Security and Justice Issues, made the statement that it is still "unclear what operations the center will be capable of carrying out" by September 2008, despite having the facility and the staff ready for the intended launch. According to Jenkins, there is no explicit definition in the 9/11 Commission Act of what constitutes a fully operational facility and what their capabilities should be, therefore causing NBIC officials to rush to draft those details now.

In terms of the BioWatch program, formal agreements concerning information exchange with partnering federal agencies have yet to be finalized. The DHS is cooperating with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), among other agencies, in the detection of airborne pathogens which consists of complex sampling, monitoring and analysis structures. One possible explanation for the prolonged process is the difficulty in deciding what data should and can be shared between agencies. Furthermore, officials say that the new technology planned for BioWatch, the "Generation 3.0" detection technology, is time-consuming and costly to make, but could reduce the detection time significantly and identify a greater spectrum of biological agents. The research and development is taking longer than anticipated due to "revised functional requirements" given to DHS a few months prior to the scheduled completion.

What is particularly disconcerting is the statement by Dr. Frances Pouch Downes, director of the bureau of laboratories in Michigan, one of the labs chosen to host the BioWatch program. Her list of grievances includes but is not limited to; the lack of legal authority or regulation between DHS and the BioWatch contractor which means there is no policy concerning laboratory safety or standard practices and procedures, the high laboratory costs which have not been reimbursed by DHS, the lack of provision of performance data to the laboratories and open communication between BioWatch and the host lab, and other actions which Downes says "undermine [local public health laboratory] infrastructure with determinations on the internal operations of these laboratories."

Not only are the bio-defence programs becoming more costly due to their obstructed progress, they are also affecting local and state public health laboratories by compromising their safety standards and impairing the work they do. At the very least it can be said that the US is actively investing in bio-surveillance programs and bio-defence, despite the hitches in the current programs. This heavy investment is not the case for every nation because other threats are regarded as more imminent. It is also encouraging that bio-defence will remain a security priority for the next administration, and if DHS and the US take the observations from last week's hearing seriously then it is possible that the BioWatch and NBIC programs can be improved and adequately address biological security concerns.