After living under virtual house arrest for four years, Pakistani nuclear scientist AQ Khan has shocked the world by recanting his earlier confessions on television that he was 'solely' responsible for the sale of nuclear technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea. Khan, in his recent interviews, has said that he is innocent and should be freed. He has accused Pakistan President, Pervez Musharraf, of being responsible for proliferation activities and that these activities could not have occurred without his consent and supervision. In an interview to The Guardian on 30 May 2008, he also stated that he was forced into making his confession four years ago by Musharraf.

The International Herald Tribune (4 July 2008) reported that "since a new civilian government took power after February elections, eclipsing Musharraf, the scientist has increasingly spoken out in the media." Khan has also credited Nawaz Sharif with taking the decision to test nuclear weapons in 1998. Given the prevailing enmity between Sharif and Musharraf, it is possible that Khan is being encouraged by Sharif as a tactic to force Musharraf to step down. Musharraf has countered that he would not be stepping down as the President as desired by sections within the civilian government because he believed that he still has a "valuable role to play." Therefore, the new administration may be encouraging Khan to make such 'revelations' which would dent Musharraf's image further within and outside Pakistan [primarily in the US] and help the new civilian government.

Furthermore, Khan was quick to rubbish the claims of David Albright, a former UN inspector with the IAEA, who in his report, "Swiss Smugglers Had Advanced Nuclear Weapons Design," had claimed that the proliferation network was still active and digital blueprints of a compact and deadly nuclear device were obtained in Switzerland. Khan said that Albright's claims were a "pack of lies" meant to put pressure on Pakistan, a tactic which he thinks has been used by the West effectively against the previous Pakistani government headed by President Musharraf. The scientist, thus, implied that the Musharraf government had compromised on Pakistan's national interests and sovereignty by giving in to US demands in regard to the "War on Terror".

Regarding Khan's involvement, there is probably some truth in what Khan says about not being "solely" responsible for nuclear transfers to Iran, Libya and NK; but how much of the "collaborative" nature (if any) of the proliferation network will ever become known is difficult to predict. Conversely, some are of the opinion that if the US really wants, it can discover the extent of the proliferation network, even if that exposes "the past mistakes of its policy of supporting and pampering Pakistan" (Outlook, 6 July 2008). However, given America's preoccupation with its "War on Terror" and the important role played by Pakistan in the same, it is unlikely that the US would take steps that may further jeopardize US-Pakistan relations and risk its interests in Afghanistan.

Given Pakistan's use of clandestine networks during the 1970s to procure nuclear equipment for its own nuclear program, it is likely that members of the Pakistani scientific community and the government were aware of and participated in this network. Additionally, David Albright's claims also show that the proliferation network is not dependent on AQ Khan alone and involves many more players than earlier known. (Institute of Science and International Security, 16 June 2008).

This brings up the question whether AQ Khan still has relevance to the network(s) that exist now (if they still exist)? This question does not have a concrete answer. Given his long association with the network, it is likely that Khan does possess important information about it. While his relevance to the network's existence may not be as important as it once was, it is possible that he still possesses important information regarding the network. However, he may not have any relevance to the network as its nature may have changed following Khan's exposure in 2003. However, Khan is relevant as a crucial resource if one wishes to unearth the role of other Pakistani 'elements' in the proliferation network. All these reasons possibly contribute to why the Pakistani government has kept him in isolation without allowing anyone to interrogate him.

In conclusion, by implicating President Musharraf and the Pakistan Army, Khan has, by default, implicated the state of Pakistan as being guilty of proliferation. While Khan's claims may have some truth, his 'revelations' seem to be aimed at the domestic political establishment. Khan seems to be using the prevailing animosity against Musharraf in Pakistan's political system to serve his own personal interests, which focuses around his release from house arrest.