Report of IPCS Seminar held on 8 February 2008

Speaker:
Prof TV Paul, Professor of International Relations, McGill University

South Asia is composed of eight states of different sizes and capabilities, characterized by high levels of interstate, intrastate and human security problems. There is definitely a high level of structural violence in the South Asian subsystem. Most of these states emerged in the 1940s. The region has great difficulty settling internal or external conflicts and is at present confronting both traditional and non traditional security problems.

Three pillars of peace can be identified: democracy, economic interdependence, and institutional mechanism to mitigate conflict. In South Asia, these three are not strong. Democracy is confined to India. The rest, "illiberal democracies," may hold elections every now and then, but do not have other characteristics of democracy. There is no economic interdependence between South Asian countries, unlike in Southeast Asia.

Why is South Asia chronically insecure? Because of two critical factors: the presence of weak states, and the presence of weak cooperative norms. State capacity therefore is an independent variable, as well as an intervening variable because state capacity can be caused by something else. In 2006 and 2007, five of the South Asian states entered the top 25 of Foreign Policy magazine's index of failed states: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Nepal. Interestingly, South Asian countries are extremely sensitive to the norm of sovereignty, even when they do not really believe in respecting the sovereignty of their neighbours. That may be because they are new arrivals in the international system.

A weak state has deficiencies in three areas: security deficiency (security forces, both military and police are unable to provide basic security), participation deficiency (for example, absence of fair or impartial elections), infrastructure deficiency (poor physical infrastructure, literacy and health not accorded national priority). In other words, in modern times, the capacity of the state is judged on its ability to provide public goods (welfare, internal security) to resolve internal conflicts without resorting to violence (maintaining of the rule of law, fair political and judicial processes). However, a weak state does not necessarily need all of these. In fact, some weak states may be strong in some areas for instance (Pakistan, for instance). India is an interesting case, considered a strong/weak state. India contains many characteristics of a weak state.

Foreign Policy magazine lists 12 social, political and economic indicators for failed states: mounting demographic pressures, massive movements of refugees, legacy of vengeance seeking groups, chronic and sustained human plight, uneven economic development along group lines, sharp economic decline, criminalization-delegitimization of the state, progressive deterioration of public services, suspension or arbitrary application of the rule of law, widespread violations of human rights, non state security apparatuses operating within the state, rise of patronalized elites, intervention of other states or external actors. The list is long but quite descriptive. The term "failed state" is too severe, as it implies that there is no hope for improvement. There is always a possibility of change; a state can come out of its predicament. Therefore, the expression, "weak state" is more appropriate.

In South Asia, there are difficulties with state construction and consolidation. India is the strongest of all but faces numerous issues. Bangladesh and Nepal are all weak states rather problematic in many areas. These small states affect India's security in a considerable way. Pakistan needs some conceptual or theoretical understanding. Charles Tilly said about European history that "war made the state." States engaged in war over a period of time could get stronger. The European states did it over a 300-400 year period. In a global context of rapid change, Pakistan did it over a period of 60 years. Therefore, the argument that Pakistan is a young nation is wrong. Pakistan resorted to war a certain number of times, generated continuous military rule, destroyed chances for democracy, hampered its economic growth despite considerable foreign aid, and created a garrison state. Pakistan did not manage to build a cohesive state; it witnesses large international conflict and has become the hotbed of international terrorism.

What accounts for this Pakistani predicament? First, the preexisting cleavages have been accentuated by the military's focus on external threats. External security concerns have exacerbated internal conflicts. Second, the military's desire to maintain a semi-feudal system has turned the army into an aristocratic class with very little will to bring socio-economic change. If democracy is reinstated, the army will lose its role in the economy, as well as the rent it draws from external actors (US, Saudi Arabia) for Pakistan's external security. The elites have constantly made use of the fact that the US and Saudi Arabia consider Pakistan as a crucial security element and therefore flowed in huge amounts of money. Since Mohammad Ali Jinnah, there has been very little leadership for societal changes. Some of Pakistan's external threats are assumed, some are real, but they are all a source of legitimacy for the ruling military. Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif had the military behind them. This results in a temptation to get involved in conflict.

Why is the European experience not replicable in the South Asian context? One should probably argue that it is because since World War II, war making is not the best way to build a state, but rather the inclusion in the international political and economic system. It is now difficult to engage in external violence as a source of internal legitimacy. In addition, Pakistan's society, composed of different ethnic groups, is more complex than that of the European states. Excessive focus on security and military can actually even destroy the state, as it happened with the Soviet Union. Pakistan is partly victim of its engagement in this hyper realpolitik.

One of Pakistan's biggest challenges was its ambition to be an equal to India, after centuries of Muslim rule on the subcontinent. This idea is now yielding to the realization that Pakistan cannot compete on par with India. On the other hand, because India is surrounded by weak states, some of their problems are spreading to India, such as Nepal's Maoists connection with Naxalites in India. Bangladesh is also spreading its problems to India. Chronic problems are not addressed at the regional level as SAARC does not want to deal with security. ASEAN has made much more inroads in terms of creating a sort of a security community. That strong sense of unity does not exist in South Asia. India's looking beyond the region makes sense in a globalized world, however in the case of small states, they have a big problem with India regarding their sovereignty and security. In response, India does not have a coherent policy for its border states.

What can be done to transform the region? South Asian states need to learn from ASEAN and from the African Union, by first accepting colonial borders as they are, a pledge Southeast Asian countries took in the 1960s. Territorial integrity should be respected so that more new states are not created in South Asia and borders should be opened. For that, India has to be magnanimous despite all the trouble that its smaller neighbours create. A comprehensive strategy to integrate these states is to choose sub-clusters. For example, India has a lot to benefit from Nepal's hydropower, the way it does with Bhutan. That should transform some of the Nepali antagonism. Sri Lanka's trade balance with India is beneficial and India does not worry much about Tamil secessionism. There has to be a better understanding of these small states' security.

Therefore it is imperative to focus on the three liberal pillars as mentioned: democracy, economic interdependence, and institutional mechanism. Focusing just on one or two of them is enough to transform the region. The security dilemma that South Asia faces will continue until states become more effective, more legitimate, and are able to provide public goods. They also need to accept certain norms of interstate behaviour, mainly the principle of non-intervention and respecting territorial sovereignty.