If international relations are all about balancing and bandwagoning, Australia has proved itself a good practitioner. Its recent decision to pull out of the US-Japan-Australia-India quadrilateral initiative has not only given a balance of power prism to a hitherto 'clean initiative,' it also demonstrates the diplomatic immaturity and decisional conflict Australia faces in dealing with rising countries like China and India. While the incident itself may not be a significant jolt, it does have ramifications for evolving international relations in the Asia-Pacific region.

It was only last year that the quadrilateral initiative came into existence based on an informal understanding among major democratic powers in the Asia-Pacific region. That China would have serious reservations should have been anticipated. The initiative was never an exercise in balance of power against China. However, from the beginning itself, China perceived the dialogue as an 'understanding' if not an alliance against it. China not only demarched all the four countries, but also opposed the maritime exercises between them and Singapore in the Bay of Bengal in September. Around the same time, during President Hu Jintao's visit to Australia, China asked Australia to desist being part of any arrangement that did not include the former. The then Howard Government was pragmatic enough to resist China's demands.

However, the coming to power of the Labour Government led by Kevin Rudd has had significant implications for Australia's foreign policy, including Indo-Australian bilateral relations. The policy paper on defence, brought out by the Labour Party just before the elections, had talked about maintaining a 'sustainable strategic balance' among the great powers of Asia. Concerned about the rise of new powers (read India), the Labour Party emphasized the re-evaluation of Australia's foreign and defence policy to cope with the changing strategic circumstances. On coming to power, Kevin Rudd reversed the erstwhile Howard Government's decision to sell uranium to India. The fact that Australia shares special relations with the other three countries of the quad, implies that the decision to pull out was aimed at neutralizing India's influence in the Asia-Pacific region.

Australia's decision has come concurrent with its first strategic dialogue with China. The opportunity helped the two countries reach a consensus on various issues, including their policy towards India. The Australian Foreign Minister Stephen Smith assured his Chinese counterpart Yang Jiechi that Australia had no intentions of permanently bringing India into long-standing trilateral discussions between Australia, the US, and Japan. China was apparently unhappy with the previous Australian regime's simultaneous flirting with China's rival Asian power. Stephen Smith was logically under pressure to bring India down in his foreign policy priorities.

The decision to pull out from the quad also reflects Australia's attempts to recast itself as a power capable of playing its geopolitical cards well. It is already in a tie-up with the US under the ANZUS Treaty of 1951. By sweetening up relations with Beijing, the Mandarin-speaking Kevin Rudd, who had earlier served as a diplomat in China, hopes to keep the biggies in good humour and expand Australia's influence in the region. It is not clear, however, if he enjoys the support of the opposition parties for his new initiatives.

The quad, after Australia's departure, must not become a triad. There are other significant countries that could join the group, Indonesia being one of them. At the same time, expanding the basket of agendas from political and military exercises to other issues of regional importance will further strengthen its sustainability and relevance. After all, apart from the 'ASEAN plus' initiatives, there are hardly any other groupings that carry weight in the region. Australia's unabashed tilt towards China, despite not going down well with New Delhi, is unlikely to change the prevailing balance of power or dilute India's influence in the region. At the same time, it would be imprudent to rubbish the event as a 'storm in a tea cup' by the South Block mandarins. New Delhi would do well to study Australia's balance of power strategy and take corrective measures. It could consider enhancing its economic and political relations with Australia to increase the stakes for both countries. Additionally, India could look for new partners amongst the fraternity of nations, especially in its vicinity. Such measures could probably neutralize the 'off and on' overtures of countries like Australia. These will also be useful in playing the balance of power game, where unfortunately, China enjoys an enduring edge over India.

Note: The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the Government of India.