On 25 November 2007, the Hindu Rights Action Front (HINDRAF) led a demonstration of more than ten thousand people in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia against the poor economic condition, religious discrimination, political marginalization, and lack of education of Malaysian Indians. The Malaysian government reacted strongly against the protest, designated protest leaders as terrorists and invoked punitive legal measures such as the Internal Security Act. A large number of protesters came from the Indian Tamil community, which constitutes the largest section of ethnic Indians in Malaysia. As a few Tamil HINDRAF leaders including its head P Waythamoorthy escaped the state persecution and came to the Indian province of Tamil Nadu, the reverberations of the political tension in Malaysia began to be felt in India. Tamil Nadu's Chief Minister, M. Karunanidhi called upon the Indian Prime Minister to take note of the poor and discriminated ethnic Indians in Malaysia. The Malaysian government reacted strongly and asked Karunanidhi not to interfere in the internal affairs of the country.

These developments posed an important question before the Indian government. How can the central government raise the issue of the Indian diaspora in Malaysia and meet the demands of Dravida Munnettra Kazhagam (DMK), its coalition partner, without jeopardizing its bilateral relations with Malaysia? The nature and demand of the question has forced the Indian government to enter into a tightrope walk, balancing two different sets of equations.

The first set of equations involves two external players - minority Malaysian Indians and the Malaysian government - locked into an increasingly inimical relationship. Supporting one side can distance the other player away from the Indian government. Interestingly, both players have emerged as stakeholders in the Indian foreign policy almost simultaneously during the early 1990s, augmenting the shift from an inward-looking and state-regulated economy to an outward-looking, liberalized and globalized India. Since then, they have played a catalytic role in India's efforts towards greater integration with the global economy. While the Indian diaspora have been identified as an important instrument in developing Indian constituencies outside India, Malaysia, an ASEAN member and the coordinating country for India's FTA negotiations with ASEAN, factors prominently in India's Look East Policy.

The second set of equations involves two domestic players - the central government and a provincial coalition partner. The increasing influence of provincial stakeholders in national politics has resulted in greater provincial interference into the foreign policymaking process, which is a monopoly of the central government. The central government's response to the HINDRAF protest and subsequent wrangling between M Karunanidhi and the Malaysian government indicates that New Delhi has to incorporate the concerns of Tamil Nadu.

The central Indian government's initial response came in the form of a 'balancing act' extending support to Karunanidhi and the cause of Indian diaspora, distancing itself from the HINDRAF and cajoling the Malaysian government by highlighting its strong political, economic and security ties. While India's external affairs minister, Pranab Mukherjee expressed concern in the Indian Parliament on 30 November 2007 over the use of force against the peaceful demonstrators, he refused to meet the HINDRAF leader, P Waythamurthy and denied any support by India to the HINDRAF on the ground that it pertains to Malaysia's domestic matters. Approximately a month later, Mukherjee, during his visit in January 2008, described Malaysia as 'the cornerstone of India's LEP' and discussed about enhancing defence and security ties with the Malaysian government.

India's response to these equations also highlights the government's emphasis on a nuanced 'case-by-case approach' regarding issues of Indian diaspora in different parts of the world. In contrast to its somewhat aggressive approach to the issue of the Fiji Indians in 1987 or in 2000, the Indian approach to the Tamil unrest in Malaysia has remained confined to the diplomatic deliberations and political consultations. The government seems to have understood the fact that much of the blame for large-scale illiteracy and poverty among ethnic Indians in Malaysia lies with the inefficient and divided Malaysian Indian Congress. There is a growing recognition among the policy makers that their claims and responsibilities in the case of People of Indian Origin (PIO) will differ from that of in the context of Non-Resident Indians, who are also Indian citizens. The Indian response in the HINDRAF case remained much more moderate compared to its response to the arrests of Indian IT professionals in Malaysia in 2003.

However, the HINDRAF episode has raised various issues which India will have to grapple with as it gets globally more and more connected with the Indians living outside India. This episode has also brought to the light the predicament of ethnic Indians as they struggle to survive under difficult political and economic conditions prevailing in different countries. Can the Indian government shirk away from its responsibilities towards people of Indian origin, who share ethnic bonds with mainland Indians? What long-term policy can or should Indian government adopt to ameliorate the conditions of ethnic Indians without being misunderstood as interfering in the domestic affairs of the host country? The Indian government needs to address these issues if it wants to add meaning to the annual celebration of Pravasi Bharatiya Divas.