Report of IPCS Seminar held on 10 January 2008

Speaker:
Alan J. Kuperman
Assistant Professor of Public Affairs
University of Texas at Austin

The attempt here is not only to analyze the causes of the present situation in Kososvo, but also to present constructive solutions to avoid repeating historical mistakes. The West appears to be on a course that will lead to repeating past failures. The US, and now also the EU, are following the course of recognizing a unilateral secessionist decision by the Kosovo province of Serbia, and that is a very bad idea. Further, since the US has been promising independence to secessionist Kosovars for nearly a decade, it has raised hopes and refusing independence would now spark a war.

The risks at stake are the following: war, contagion, demonstration effect for the rest of the world (rewarding militant secessionists with independence), and exacerbation of Cold War-like tensions between Russia and the US.

Apart from granting independence, the other propositions are: splitting Kosovo, which is even worse; and according a greater autonomy to Kosovo within Serbia, but which is an unrealistic solution because of the repeated promises given to the people of Kosovo by the West of supporting independence.

To solve the situation, a proposal, albeit an imperfect one, that has perhaps the best chance to minimize all risks is that the Kosovars be granted independence only if the Serb enclaves within Kosovo are given great autonomy (with their own police force). That this plan is opposed by everyone is perhaps proof that it is a real compromise.

The wars in Croatia and Bosnia were the consequence of a well-designed Western strategy of recognition of secessionists' independence and of ignoring Serb interests. In the former Yugoslavia, Slovenia and Croatia were richer and wanted independence. The central government at Belgrade, preferred to keep the country together, but realized it was impossible, and thus opted for an ethnic solution: Belgrade agreed to Slovenia's secession along the existing border because the region was populated by a majority of Slovenians. But for the rest of the country where Serbs, Croatians, and Bosnians were intermingled, Belgrade said borders should be renegotiated. On the other hand, Croatia and Bosnia wanted to transform internal borders into international borders. Consequently, Belgrade threatened to use force, which it did in 1991 to take control over the Serb-majority areas of Croatia, in the process of which they also 'cleansed' these areas of their minorities. Several months later, the same situation would be repeated in Bosnia.

In 1992, the EU's representative Jose Cutileiro proposed a map of ethnic borders within Bosnia, which was initially accepted by all three ethnic groups. Muslims and Croats, however, later called for a unitary Bosnia, a plan encouraged by the US which had opposed the European plan. Independence was declared along existing lines. The Serbs took control of Serb areas and started asking for contiguous territory (a claim that makes sense in a period of war), which led to the 1995 Dayton accords partitioning Bosnia with contiguous territory for the ethnic groups.

Today, it appears that the same mistakes are about to be repeated in Kosovo. Although the Serb population in Kosovo has diminished greatly, there are still many enclaves of Serbs among the Albanian majority. In the 1960s, there were 25 per cent Serbs in Kosovo. Prior to NATO bombing, there were 200,000 Serbs, or 10 per cent of the total population (2 million). Now, there are about 100,000 left (5 per cent). This decline can also be explained by economic migration and higher fertility rate among Kosovo Albanians, but the main reason remains the fact that Serbs were not welcome as Albanians ruled the area. Now as the US and the EU want to recognize Kosovo as a whole, and they are repeating almost the same mistakes as in Croatia and in Bosnia.

For example, there is the problem of the police force. It is Albanian in the Albanian regions of Kosovo, and Serb in Serb areas. After independence, Serb policemen will refuse to wear the Kosovo uniform, and will wear the Serbian one, which will create a situation in which a police force in an independent country wears the uniform of another independent country! As a result, there will be a call for a purge. While difficult in north Kosovo where 40,000 Serbs live in a consolidated territory bordering Serbia, a purge would easy in the small enclaves scattered around Kosovo, which hold in total about 60,000 Serbs. In 2004, there were pogroms of Serbs despite the presence of the UNPKF! In the case of a declaration of independence, Serbs will flee north for shelter and possibly a small war to cleanse Serbian enclaves, throwing tens of thousands of refugees on the roads.

What about the risk of contagion? There are also Albanians in Serbia and Macedonia. How will they react if Kosovo becomes independent? That may be termed the "moral hazard of humanitarian intervention," in which the protection of the oppressed by granting independence opens a new path to get independence: you need to get your state to retaliate against you in order to gain international sympathy. This may in turn be called "strategic victimhood."

The UN Security Council Resolution 1244 guarantees the sovereignty of Yugoslavia, and the US wants to bypass it. Russia is not happy because Serbia is its ally . In addition, Russia has its own secessionists. China does as well. Even within the EU, Greece, Cyprus, Spain should be concerned about the consequences of the independence of Kosovo. The past few months have witnessed the re-emergence of Cold War-like tensions: Russia has resumed air patrols, NATO is now extended up to the Russian border and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has emerged as a counter to the NATO in central Asia. None of these developments are favorable to the US.

To avoid further tensions, the creation of a Serb Republic of Kosovo within an independent Kosovo might be the way forward. Kosovo's independence has to be recognized because of the promises made. The Albanians could accept a Serb Republic of Kosovo and The Serbs could accept it as well if they get their own police force and the recognition of who they are (both sine qua non for the Serbs). A similar solution worked in Bosnia-Herzegovina and although there is still no strong central government, it has prevented war in the past twelve years.

Why does the West not support the project? Because for fifteen years, the US has been saying that it wants an undivided Bosnia, and it says denying independence to Kosovo would "reward a genocidal policy." The EU meanwhile, is trying to integrate Bosnia, and has found a divided Bosnia difficult to deal with.

DISCUSSION

• Russia has basically two options. Russia could accept that the US has set a precedent, and that it too will follow this new rule in the region in areas with Russian majorities (in Georgia for example). On the other hand, Russia may declare that the recognition of Kosovo's independence is a clear violation of international law, that Russia will not repeat it but will condemn it and ally with those who condemn it. Russia would probably not do much more and bide its time in the assurance that the US itself would eventually pay for the consequences of its actions.

• The idea of contagion is valid because the plan to involve the international community in supporting Bosnian independence was formed in 1991 by secessionists who had drawn their inspiration from the US intervention on behalf of Kuwait against Saddam Hussein's invasion.

• Does the logic of this US strategy lie in consolidating Europe and isolating Russia? American policymakers are more focused on Serbia and in part this has to do with the personalities involved. Nicholas Burns who is now the number three in the State Department was involved in the Dayton accords and has always tended to be anti-Serbia. It is only after his induction into the Bush administration that things have speeded up on Kosovo.

• The Serbs have for their part, just passed a resolution stating that in case Kosovo's independence is recognized, Serbia will not aspire to enter the EU or take interest in the international community.

• The 60,000 Serbs living in the small enclaves in Kosovo would not be attacked at least in the early period of an independent Kosovo as the new entity would only get international largesse as long as it did not do so. As the Serbs living in enclaves are already an ageing population, it is also likely that their numbers would simply dwindle until they became insignificant.

• There is very little danger of a greater Albania as Kosovo has agreed not to call for it if granted independence.