Report of Seminar held at the India International Centre on 16 November 2007

Chair: Amb. Eric Gonsalves, President, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies
Speaker: Prof. Akihiko Tanaka, Professor of International Politics, Interfaculty Initiative in Information Studies, University of Tokyo
Discussants: Prof. K V Kesavan, formerly of Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi
                    Mr. Anjan Roy, Advisor, Economic Affairs, Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI)

Akihiko Tanaka

The India-Japan partnership is one of the most important subjects of Japanese foreign affairs. The recent progress in ties is quite remarkable and a number of high-level visits have taken place between both sides. However, this does not mean that the relationship is the most active one for either side. For example, the trade between Japan and China or that between China and India is far greater than that between India and Japan. Similarly, 5.6 million traveled between China and Japan in the last year while only 160,000 did so between India and Japan.

The upward swing in Indo-Japan ties are however, supported by certain structural trends. First among these is the expanding economic integration in Asia. The usual understanding of the economic growth of Asia is that of the flying geese pattern where Japan was the leader. However, the process needs to be understood more in terms of a movement where expansion took place in different directions and at different points of time.

The region was shaken by the Asian financial crisis in 1997 but recovered and economic links have further expanded within it. While India expanded its links with ASEAN over the last decade and more, Japan was slow to appreciate Indian growth. Japan continued to focus on China despite strained political ties between Tokyo and Beijing, India rapidly developed its economic relations with China and ASEAN. However, with the anti-Japanese riots in China in the spring of 2005, Japanese businessmen were chastened and decided that they had to expand their focus to beyond the China market. The decision was probably already in the works, but required a political trigger. The fact is that economies are increasingly interlinked; Japan ought to be connected with India and therefore, the Japanese integration with the Indian economy is destined to continue.

The second structural trend has been the rise of China. This is something that is destined to continue as well and the question in Japan has been of how to interpret this rise. Will China be a serious threat? Or will it be a responsible power that Japan can work with? The third structural trend is the rise of India. From the Japanese perspective, India being a democratic country cannot be a threat to Japan.

There are thus two views of China and one of India and combining these different patterns of thinking are evident. A threat-based view of China results in a realist balance of power approach by Japan. Alternatively, a combination of positive views on both countries leads to a liberal institutional approach. This is not the time to adopt a realist approach but to consolidate normal political relations in Asia.

The fourth structural trend in Asia is the emergence of multipolar networks based on normalized diplomatic relations between the countries in the region. The formation of groupings such as ASEAN, APEC, ARF and so on are indicative of an unprecedented trend in Asian history in contrast to the wars and conflicts of the 19th and 20th centuries. Today, Asia is at a historic moment and the idea of working together in cooperation must be encouraged. China's military modernization still has to be watched carefully but its greater multilateral engagement from the 1990s and its instrumental role in the Six-Party talks on the Korean nuclear crisis are positive signs.

Japan, India and China need to work together more. Meanwhile, whatever the Japanese approach to China, India is an important and an essential partner for Japan

It is important to ground this discussion of abstracts in the reality of Japanese domestic politics. Japanese Prime Minister, Yasuo Fukuda, needs the cooperation of the opposition in the Upper House of the Diet and will therefore not take a confrontational policy towards China. At the same time, he will also continue to maintain close relations with the US. Fukuda's approach to India is not likely to centre on a balance of power as much as on economic engagement and institution building.

K V Kesavan

From 2000 onwards, the India-Japan relationship has passed through a new phase. This partnership has diversified from an economic character into one addressing mutual concerns. These mutual areas of cooperation are in the field of anti-terrorism, maritime security and nuclear disarmament among others and are the result of new commonalities which have emerged in diplomatic and national interests

There are four reasons for this buoyancy:

1. India's consistent economic liberalization and impressive growth rate has attracted Japan. Japan tests its relations through economic performance, and it sees India as a country with which it can achieve economic convergence. India's economic growth has been impressive and has thus wooed Japanese business leaders.

2. During the Cold War, Japan was disenchanted with the Indian position of non-alignment. The transition from non-aligned to multi-dimensional foreign policy has helped the thaw in Indo-Japanese relations. India's ties with traditional Japanese ally, the United States, have improved; this has helped boost India-Japan ties as well. Technological collaboration would have pleased the Japanese. Many individual Japanese have welcomed the nuclear deal with the US despite the ambiguity shown by the Japanese government. However, both sections demand greater transparency in the entire process.

3. The most important factor in the improvement of ties between India and Japan is the growing Indian relationship with the East Asian countries. India's Look East policy has helped forge strong relations with the ASEAN countries. India is now a dialogue partner working with the ARF and is also connected to major projects in the region.

4. In the midst of the rapidly changing security scenario, Japan is looking for new diplomatic options, in which India becomes an attractive ally. India's alliances with the US, Japan and Australia are very helpful for Japan in countering the Chinese-North Korean threat. It is however, unknown if Fukuda is going to pursue the push towards military alliance with India which Abe had initiated.

The China factor is very important. China has a positive approach to Asia and as a result Indian integration with Asia will promote its own relations. It would create an environment of peace around its neighborhood. Promoting integration would help interactions with its neighbors. China's dependence on energy resources is well-known. Its dependence on West Asia and Southeast Asia is growing, as a result of which sea routes such as Malacca are growing more important to China.

China signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the ASEAN countries earlier than many other countries. Similarly, the Chinese attitude towards the South China Sea is to ensure the confidence of the countries in the region. It is trying to portray itself as a responsible state and not a belligerent country.

For Japan, Abe's views on China were evident from his attempts to create a quadrilateral agreement to contain China. Meanwhile, his successor Fukuda has remained largely silent on India and has not been as enthusiastic about the quadrilateral agreement. It is disappointing to note that there is no mention of India in Fukuda's first major foreign policy speech while China and ASEAN were both very prominent.

Still, Japan is a good friend of India, and this is reflected in the joint communiquÃ