Fukuda's Accession: Implications for India
10 Oct, 2007 · 2392
Rajesh Kapoor highlights the factors leading to Shinzo Abe's exit and assesses its impact on India-Japan relations
The recent accession of Yasuo Fukuda to the Prime Minister's post following Shinzo Abe's resignation shows that seniority won over popularity for the post of Prime Minister. Taro Aso, Secretary General of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), who had powerful support and a popular image among the youth, but led only a marginal faction in the LDP, had to yield place to Fukuda. The latter rose to this position as a result of infighting and cross-voting by the different factions of the LDP. However, Taro Aso is probably the next and only choice left with the LDP and its coalition partners before the next elections, should Fukuda also fail. The party leaders in the LDP are not novices, but second- or third-generation politicians, who know all the intricacies of Japanese politics. Fukuda, a dovish leader, with no particular political achievements is now burdened with the Herculean task of carrying out the reforms initiated by the hawkish Junichiro Koizumi and restore confidence and faith in the Japanese people's minds. The biggest challenge before him is to get the Diet's approval to extend the Japan Self-Defence Forces (JSDF) mission in Iraq.
The popularity graph of Abe as Prime Minister nosedived in a much shorter time than that of his predecessor. Abe had a magnificent beginning with official visits to China and South Korea, which led to the breaking of much ice between the neighbours on several historical contentious issues. They were not only addressed but a mechanism to resolve them was also devised and implemented. Abe's government, however, failed on the domestic front, particularly to deal with the repercussions of the reforms initiated by Koizumi. The pension issue and several corruption charges against cabinet ministers, leading to suicide by one and the resignation of others, caused an uproar in the Diet and the country. The vigilant and united opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) under the leadership of Ichiro Ozawa upset the LDP's applecart in the Upper House elections held in late July 2007, indicating the changing popular sentiments in the Japanese public. The Upper House results only aggravated the woes of the already reeling LDP. Domestic problems will claim Japan's attention more largely than international events. Much of the officials' and politicians' energy will be spent on manipulating and maneuvering through such problems as pension issues and how to sustain the government.
If instability persists in Japanese politics then Japan's foreign relations with countries like India will suffer. Bilateral ties between India and Japan have been improving since Prime Minister Yoshihiro Mori's visit in 2000, but Abe was the greatest admirer and advocate of strong bilateral relations. Abe's plans for knitting a network of four major democratic countries - India, Japan, Australia and the US - into a democratic quadrilateral, was an ambitious one, based on a realization of the growing importance of India. India-Japan relations will hopefully survive this litmus test even if the political situation in Japan worsens. The key to the bilateral relationship lies with the bureaucracy, which is a permanent institution in democratic Japan.
The five-nation joint military exercises, ostensibly for improving interoperability to fight terrorism and war-like situations in the Indian Ocean, has already invited attention around the globe. China is apprehensive and so is an emerging Russia. Although China and Russia are having high level military exchanges on a regular basis and have also carried out joint military exercises in the recent past, their suspicions cannot be dismissed. This was evident from the clarifications provided by the leaders of all these countries, informing that the joint exercises were not designed to intimidate any country. It remains to be seen if Fukuda will be as enthusiastic about these exercises with India as Abe was.
Speculation that Japan will reconsider its multi-billion dollar investment plans for India is unnecessary. More than anything else, Japan realizes its need to explore and enhance its stakes in a fast emerging economy like India, which may be difficult for the Japanese to understand. But a beginning has been made, and the best of their strategic partnership is still to come.