Indo-Pak Relations after Kargil

13 Aug, 1999    ·   239

Bhashyam Kasturi points out that to find one's way through the nuclear minefield and make progress on bilateral issues, got India into the present impasse
B Rajeshwari
India has rightly said that trust has been betrayed by Pakistan at Lahore by indulging in armed intrusion across the Line of Control, even as the two Prime Ministers were hugging each other at Wagah.

 

 

Therefore, in the aftermath of Kargil, India laid down certain “conditions” for Pakistan to fulfill before the composite dialogue process could be renewed. Vacation of aggression in Kargil was the first which has now been achieved Next, reaffirmation by Pakistan of the sanctity and inviolability of the LoC. This has be followed by the stopping of cross border terrorism which reflects the dawning in India of the fact that Pakistan has violated the LoC ever since it began formenting insurgency in J&K in 1989.

 

 

That Pakistan has rejected these conditions is not surprising, but in terms of future bilateral relations the crucial factor will be the internal political scenario in Pakistan . If current trends are any indicators, Nawaz Sharif and the army are on the same track. But Sharif may seek to reduce his costs and remove Musharaff. The reverse might well happen, given Pakistan ’s long association with the military.

 

 

The extremist and terrorist forces, who are currently under check are a threat to Pakistan society. How the state contains and tries to eliminate these elements will determine the character of the state. Thus far, it has co-opted many of these elements, and the results are apparent in the Talibanisation of Pakistan.

 

 

The other factor impinging on Indo-Pak relations is the nuclear factor. Both countries have tested nuclear devices last year and are capable of manufacturing these weapons and delivering them. But the difference on the ground is that in Pakistan it is the military which controls the weapons, while in India it is the civil administration.

 

 

Therefore, India has to find answers to several questions.

 

 

·                     Talking to Pakistan requires talking to the civil bureaucratic authority or the military?

 

·                     Talking to Pakistan will have to be on the basis of implementing of time bound confidence building measures. This includes acceleration of CBMs already on the ground. As the DGMOs are already in contact, it makes sense for them to take steps right away.

 

·                     The nuclear factor has to be tackled by both sides and appropriate steps taken to prevent accidental use.

 

·                     Measures have to be instituted to assess Pakistan intentions. The NSC could do this job.

 

·                     Bilateral arrangements have to start on a clean slate. Past agreements are only principles since Pakistan has violated every arrangement; Kargil being a instance of the violation of the Shimla agreement of 1972.

 

·                     J&K lies within this matrix of Indo-Pak relations. The basis has to be less rigid stances on both sides. This means shedding pre-conceived notions.

 

·                     From an Indian perspective, all dialogue has to be bilateral. But as Kargil has demonstrated, a third party had to be utilized to persuade Pakistan to end its misadventure. The US involvement in Kargil was positive for India . Howsoever one sees it, post cold-war geo-politics calls for international opinion to put pressure on Pakistan , as all bilateral diplomatic initiatives failed to convince Islamabad .

 

 

 

To find one’s way through the nuclear minefield and make progress on bilateral issues, got India into the present impasse. In other words, the urge to demonstrate its good intentions to the world in Lahore made India blind to the reality of politics in Pakistan . The end result was Kargil.

 

 

 

 

 

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