The 11th round of the Sino-Indian border talks concluded in Beijing recently. The Sino-Indian political and economic ties have been on a growth path and in their meeting in the Philippines in January 2007, the Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, and the Chinese Premier, Wen Jiabao, urged the negotiators to show "greater vigour and innovativeness" to resolve the boundary issue.

Interestingly, Article IV of the 2005 Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question stipulates that both sides will give due consideration to each other's strategic interests and security objectives while discussing the boundary issue. The 21 November 2006 Sino-Indian Joint Statement issued during the visit of Chinese President, Hu Jintao to India, emphasized that the boundary settlement must be final, covering all sectors of the India-China boundary and should be pursued as a strategic objective.

While the proceedings of the border meetings are in the realm of conjecture, it nonetheless throws up pertinent questions regarding the possible progress and solutions to the boundary dispute and raises concerns in India about Chinese strategies and future moves on the border. This issue gets magnified as eight rounds of border talks and an additional fourteen Joint Working Group (JWG) meetings since the 1980s have been inconclusive. While not denying the significance of the diplomatic adage that "it is better to talk than to fight", an amicable solution to this dispute once and for all is the wish of the people in both countries.

The first step in confidence building was to agree on a set of parameters for negotiations. Since the 1990s, a series of agreements have been inked as part of border confidence and security building measures. In 1993, both sides signed the Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and in 1996 followed it up with the Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the LAC. The second step aimed at evolving a framework for boundary delimitation through the JWG on the India-China Boundary Question.

China has taken a positive measure by accepting Sikkim as an integral part of India. However, in November 2006, just before Hu Jintao's visit to New Delhi, the Chinese Ambassador to India, Sun Yuxi, claimed Arunachal Pradesh as Chinese territory. The Chinese claims on Arunachal Pradesh, denial of visa to an official from the state on grounds that he is a Chinese citizen and reports of People's Liberation Army's incursions into the state's territory have raised concerns in India. Although India has showed great diplomatic finesse by not overreacting to these events, China should realize that such moves are in contradiction to the mutually accepted principle that both sides shall maintain peace and status quo along the border and that differences will not be allowed to affect development in bilateral relations.

India has, all along, maintained that China return more than 40,000 square kilometers of Indian territory, including Aksai Chin and the Shaksgam Valley in Jammu and Kashmir, the former annexed during the 1962 war. The Indian Parliament has passed a resolution that Shaksgam Valley, which Pakistan transferred to China as part of the 1963 Sino-Pakistan boundary agreement, be transferred back to India. The middle sector is the least disputed sector and resolution of the same might be a good breakthrough in the Sino-Indian border talks.

The third step in confidence building can be achieved only when both India and China translate the letter of various Agreements into its true spirit. It appears that at present China is happy with the status quo as it gives it huge tracts of territory at strategic heights in Jammu and Kashmir and a foothold in South Asia. In case, the Chinese decision makers misperceive India's growing stature as intended to contain China either independently or in alliance with countries like the US and Japan then they might rake up the boundary issue to pressurize and contain India. The Chinese might also change their current stand of diplomatic neutrality as far as the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir is concerned and seek a say in the dispute settlement to "teach India a lesson." Chinese incursions into India in the late 1950s were inter alia influenced by their displeasure over Indo-Soviet proximity and Sino-Soviet tensions.

During the visit of Hu Jintao to India in 2006, both countries decided to promote trans-border connectivity and cooperation with the objective of transforming their border from being a dividing line into a bridge that unites them in cooperative pursuits. Such measures along the border, coupled with greater trade and economic interdependence as well as joint military exercises and cooperation in areas like energy security and counterterrorism will enhance confidence building for amicably carrying ahead boundary talks in the future.

Note: The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent those of the Indian Government.