Report of Seminar held at the IPCS Conference Room on 16 August 2007

Chair: Maj Gen (Retd) Dipankar Banerjee
Speaker: Dr Manpreet Sethi
Discussant: Dr Reshmi Kazi

Dr Manpreet Sethi

Pakistan regards its nuclear weapons as its most precious strategic asset which constitutes the ultimate guarantor of nation's existence. This is encapsulated in an article by Gen Mirza Aslam Beg titled 'Pakistan's Nuclear Imperatives' wherein he wrote "Oxygen is basic to life, and one does not debate its desirability, nuclear deterrence has assumed that life-saving property for Pakistan." Pakistan's nuclear weapons are wholly and solely India-centric and has two-fold objective - military and political. The military objectives of Pakistan's nuclear weapons include the following:

Strategic Equalizer of Power Asymmetry: Pakistan has always been agonized over the fact that it has inherited a geographically and structurally weak nation with a constant sense of insecurity. Hence, Pakistan has tried to explore options that would help them to equalize the power asymmetry with India. Nuclear weapons are seen as a means to balance India's conventional superiority. It is also aimed at matching India's science and technological prowess. Pakistan's development of nuclear weapons would serve to effectively demonstrate national technological capabilities.

Deterrent against Conventional War: This is very important for Pakistan. The reality of mutual assured destruction based on deterrence has been used by Pakistan to neutralize the possibility of an Indian conventional attack even while pursuing revisionist policies itself. Thus while pursuing a provocative strategy through the use of sub-conventional conflict; Pakistan has neutralized the possibility of an Indian conventional attack by holding out the threat of nuclear weapons.

Facilitator of Asymmetric Warfare: Pakistani nuclear weapons provide it immunity to conduct aggressive proxy war for political gains to keep the Indian Army embroiled within. This is what deterred India in extending the Kargil War.

Nuclear Deterrence: This is considered to be the most prosaic function of Pakistan's nuclear weapons because they regard it as more important than all other functions.

Pakistan's nuclear weapons also serve political objectives. These are as follows:

Security Guarantor in Absence of Ally Support: Pakistan tends to transcend its sense of insecurity by building alliances particularly with the USA from 1953 and later whenever an opportunity has presented itself and with China since as early as the Bandung Conference in 1955. However, even though Pakistan has translated its alliances with the US and China into military haul of hardware and economic assistance it has never reaped any support for military adventurism. In all its wars with India since 1971 and then in Kargil in 1999 or Parakram of 2002, China and the US have always advised them to drawback. Hence, in view of the withdrawal of alliance support and concerns about improving Indo-US and Sino-Indian relations, nuclear weapons are regarded as reliable guarantee of security and survival.

Tool for Nation Building and Prestige: After the 1971 defeat, Pakistan under Bhutto embarked upon the nuclear weapons programme with the aim of regaining its lost pride. This is evident from his call to Pakistan to "walk tall". President Musharraf has referred to Pakistan's nuclear achievements in the same vein and has referred to them "as a unique national success story." To this extent, Kahuta is seen as a symbol of national pride, scientific modernity and independence from foreign powers.

Instrument to Legitimize Military Power: In the initial stages, Pakistan started the nuclear programme as a civilian counterweight to military. However, from Zia ul Haq's period onwards, Pakistan's nuclear programme turned towards military control and direction. It was regarded, as stated by Ahsley Tellis, as the Army's "trump card" which was directed not only against civilian administrations but also against the Air Force and Navy.

Leadership of the Islamic World: Pakistan propagated the concept of Islamic Bomb which meant that its nuclear bomb belonged to the larger Muslim world. This view was propagated during the period of Zia ul Haq and Nawaz Sharif.

There is no official Pakistani nuclear doctrine. However, it is possible to draw out some contours of the Pakistani nuclear doctrine from statements of civilian and military leaders and from the writings on the subject by Pakistani strategic community.

Minimum Nuclear Deterrence: This is one of the basic tenets of Pakistan's nuclear doctrine. This is an undefined, dynamic concept. It is not based on numbers but it is a quantity which will be based on the threat of pre-emption and interception. Hence, as the threat perceptions in terms of pre-emption and interception from India changes, Pakistan will seek to reorient its minimum deterrence capability. Pakistan seeks to achieve parity which is seen as an assured destruction capability. Pakistani minimum nuclear deterrence is also seen as optimum use of limited resources.

First Use of nuclear weapons: Pakistan's main concern has always been to offset India's superior conventional military, given their own lack of strategic depth and having opted for first use of nuclear weapons, is an "Option enhancing policy" as described by Stephen Cohen.. Pakistan is unwilling to consider a NFU pact with India because in return they have made suggestions for a Non-Aggression pact. Pakistan has a national compulsion to project a low nuclear threshold and this has become more pronounced since India's declaration that a limited war under a nuclear shadow is possible. Gen Khalid Kidwai, head of Strategic Plans Division (SPD) that manages Pakistan's nuclear operations, spelt out four distinct thresholds for nuclear weapons use: loss of large parts of territory (space threshold); destruction of large part of land or air forces (military threshold); economic strangulation (economic threshold); and political destabilization or large scale internal subversion (domestic destabilization threshold). Pakistan will resort to the first use of nuclear weapons if these redlines are violated.

Use against Conventional Weapons: Pakistan will consider the use of nuclear weapons when its conventional defence is breached beyond repair by conventional means. This is an integral element of Pakistan's military strategy. According to Shireen Mazari, Pakistan's nuclear use is regarded as a "one rung escalation ladder knitted tightly with a highly cohesive, state of the art tactical conventional military."

Offensive Defence: Nuclear weapons are regarded as an instrument to allow offensive low intensity conflict. It is also used for defence against punitive action. Hence, Pakistan's nuclear weapons are meant for both offence and defence. It is a tool for total defence where it is used against conventional and nuclear weapons and it is also used as a counterforce and countervalue weapon.

What are the requirements of Pakistan's nuclear deterrence? Firstly, it should not be too small a nuclear force which is wiped out by a single Indian strike. Earlier Pakistan was satisfied with existential deterrence and they believed that it will not allow India to escalate. Pakistan at present aspires for a second strike capability despite having a first use policy. In that context, Pakistan has made rapid nuclear progress in the last three or four years. There is also keen interest in missile defences and countermeasures.

Secondly, Pakistan's nuclear forces must be capable of quick assembly. Though the nuclear forces are maintained in a disassembled form where the fissile core and delivery platform are separated there is a need for a rapid deployment in the context of a first use policy. However, the forces can be kept on a low alert status since India's "no first use" policy will provide Pakistan with sufficient time for a first use.

The third requirement is diversified weapon designs. The Plutonium route was blocked at a very early stage of Pakistan's nuclear programme. However, this was the time when A Q Khan returned to Pakistan with his stolen designs for uranium enrichment. Presently, Pakistan has mainly HEU weapons although Pakistan is seeking to increase its Pu production through the Khushab reactor.

Pakistan regards tactical nuclear weapons are vital as a "military doctrine of necessity" for their nuclear strategy, though there is a divided opinion in this regard within Pakistan.

Credible delivery systems - air, missiles, sea are yet another requirement of Pakistan's nuclear strategy. Pakistan's delivery systems are either imported or clandestinely acquired from North Korea and China.

On the issue of accumulation of fissile material, there are varying estimates of present stockpiles. Pakistan considers a quick accumulation of fissile material - a necessity, especially in the face of any change in the present position on FMCT. Pakistan is roughly estimated to possess 70 to 110 nuclear weapons.

Pakistan's nuclear strategy of an uncontrollable escalatory spiral would happen if India launched a conventional attack. Pakistan is thus using its nuclear weapons to reduce the risk of retaliation against proxy war. It also seeks to reduce risk of war by threatening any war would be all out, nuclear war. This "Risk maximizing approach" rests on brinkmanship, uncertainty and cultivated irrationality.

There are four possibilities of a breakdown of nuclear deterrence by Pakistan:

Premeditated Nuclear Attack by Pakistan: This will lead to a conscious, planned, decapitating strike on India by Pakistan. This is a dream scenario for Pakistan but they do not have any such capability at present. This possibility is also based on irrationality as it would invite deliberate nuclear invitation to India. However, this irrationality would no longer remain irrational unless a radical, Islamist leader is on a state suicide mission.

Accident or Miscalculation: This could occur in three ways. Firstly, as a result of a failure of Pakistani command and control system. Secondly, during a failure of Communication and Intelligence system especially when India may be exercising or during the course of a conventional attack. Thirdly, in case of army's propensity for ill -considered adventures. The possibility is actually feasible given the past record of Pakistani military in planning and authorizing offensive ventures. In an attempt to distract attention from domestic unrest, or genuinely believing that it could pull off a strategic success against Indian conventional forces.

In Desperation or Despair: If the conventional military might of India were to breach the four thresholds identified by Gen Kidwai, thereby jeopardizing Pakistan's survival as a nation, Pakistan may use its nuclear weapon in desperation. This is also possible in a moment of despair, if the Pakistani leadership finds itself in such a hopeless situation, domestically and internationally, that it finds greater sense in self-annihilation than life after war.

Nuclear Use by Terrorists with/without Government Complicity: Nuclear deterrence can also breakdown in the event of clandestine transfer by radical elements in power. It may also happen if any terrorist links exist with retired influential officials and in the event of a terrorist strike on Indian nuclear facilities.

Pakistan sees nuclear weapons as insurance of its survival and there is strong domestic public support for it. Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme will remain military dominated and driven. It is premised upon an intelligent, rational nuclear strategy - best suited to Pakistan's national interest. It also involves a deliberate projection of uncertain behaviour to heighten nuclear danger. Pakistan has an aspiration for First Use with second strike capability. There is an emphasis on improving survivability and penetrability. In Pakistan, conventional and nuclear modernization is proceeding simultaneously together.

Questions for India

Would Pak conventional modernization & growing nuclear capability affect its nuclear doctrine?

Would better matched conventional capability make Pak more/less prone to offensive adventures/nuclear bluster?

Would conventional modernization and improved nuclear survivability make NFU acceptable to Pak?

In a normal dyad, the answers to these questions would be yes, but until Pakistan gives up revisionism, conventional modernization will not translate into nuclear restraint. Nuclear weapons will remain central to Pakistan's national security. They will retain first use doctrine and will project easy/early use of nuclear weapons.

Indian Response

India need not be self deterred by Pakistan's nuclear strategy. What India can do is to explore and explain concept of limited war to define space between sub conventional and all out conventional war. But, there is a need to calibrate use of force for punitive effect and explore non destabilizing options. At the same time India must be aware of/ prepared for dangers of escalation. India must strengthen its own nuclear deterrence - survivability, reliability, accuracy of missile and define responses against nuclear use by non-state actors.

Dr Reshmi Kazi

The rationale of Pakistan's nuclear programme is rooted in the idea of restoring equality in the power asymmetry with India. Pakistan's nuclear capability is primarily meant to check-mate India's conventional superiority. Nuclear weapons are the sole guarantor of Pakistan's national survival which Islamabad has intelligently used in two ways against India. First, to neutralize India's conventional superiority and second, to seek parity with India in terms of power - both in terms of political as well as military.

The question that arises at this point is whether this parity is possible? There is no doubt that nuclear weapons constitute the new face of security in the 21st century. Though India considers its nuclear capability as a vital element in safeguarding and securing its value assets, nowhere in India's strategic thought has it regarded nuclear weapons as so basic for India as "oxygen is to life" made out by Gen Mirza Aslam Beg in his article titled 'Pakistan's Nuclear Imperatives', wherein he outlined the necessity for nuclear weapons as a life-saving property for Pakistan.

It must also be acknowledged that Pakistan unlike India was born little short of being stillborn. It started off as a weak nation that had neither government nor the financial resources to lay the foundations of its administrative, economic and military institutions in the new state. Hence its idea was to make maximum utility of its minimum utilities in order to make the best choice for its country. And this Pakistan has done with extreme dexterity by exploiting India's psychological imperatives. Pakistan has very intelligently drawn its strategy whereby it has avoided a full-scale conventional conflict with India, with the desire of altering the status of Kashmir through the possession of nuclear weapons in its quiver. Pakistan was absolutely certain that any proxy war could have impinged on the limits of India's tolerance and led to a conventional war.

However, this can be open to debate whether India has really been cornered to a no way out situation and has given into Pakistan's strategy of limited war under the nuclear shadow. In the Kargil war of 1999 and the crisis period of 2001-2002, Pakistan used the nuclear weapons factor intensely in terms of threatened use and intense nuclear signaling. However, it can be debated whether India played into Pakistan's ploy or it chose not to respond with nuclear weapons primarily because of its commitment to a policy of no first use, a view that has been generated by senior defence analysts.

Another crucial point is unlike India, Pakistan's nuclear doctrine not only serve to deter a nuclear attack but also seeks to thwart an Indian conventional onslaught. On the other hand, India's nuclear weapons are primarily meant to deter a nuclear attack by the enemy. There is a huge difference in the nuclear strategy of India and Pakistan . Hence, no parity can be drawn between the two nuclear powers which Pakistan is desperate to achieve.

On the operational aspect, Pakistan regards nuclear weapons as militarily usable which is fundamentally opposite to India's perception on the issue. India regards nuclear weapons as basically political instruments that are to be used solely for the purpose of deterring a nuclear attack. They are to be used only in the last resort only when the specified redlines as mentioned in the policy report of the Cabinet Committee of Security of January 2003 are breached.

Pakistan believes that only its own nuclear weapons capability could guarantee its security and survival and from here emerges its desire to achieve nuclear parity with India. In fact, its desire was so strong that it sought assurance from the US and China to support its cause for a nuclear capability against perceived threats from India. The consequent result was not satisfactory. Washington has time and again issued warnings to Pakistan for a restrained military policy and has strongly advised Islamabad to refrain from any misadventures in South Asia. Again, China a very old friend of Pakistan has let it down as evident during the Kargil war. India on the other hand, has been wiser. It has sought to improve its relations with its neighbouring countries as well as with other nations in the international community of nations. It has projected the need to reduce the salience on nuclear weapons for giving peace a chance in South Asia. Pakistan, instead of investing its political capital in developing amicable and more trustworthy relationship with India, it has further increased its dependence on nuclear weapons.

Another area where Pakistan's attempt to achieve nuclear parity with India has been thwarted is the aspect of the sole custody of nuclear weapons. Unlike India, where the political power centre has the sole authority to sanction the use of nuclear weapons for deterring any nuclear attack, in Pakistan the army is in full charge of the nuclear weapons and cordoned it off from the influence of the civilian politicians in nuclear decision-making. The Army has manipulated the public opinion in Pakistan and instilled imaginative fear psychosis in their minds about possible threats from India thereby retaining sole authority over the country's nuclear arsenal. How far this strategy is rational can be debated. It can pose a problematic situation since army will tend to do a cost benefit analysis on military terms and will neglect other political and economic imperatives. India's nuclear strategy and weapons have, since their conception, been controlled by the political leadership along with scientists from the AEC and to an extent by the scientists of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). Here again, we can see that there exists no parity.

At the doctrinal level significant differences remain. While India undertook the unique task of publication of a proposed nuclear doctrine and then again revising it based on the cardinal principles of "no first use" (NFU) and minimum credible nuclear deterrence, there is no official Pakistani nuclear doctrine. In other words, Pakistan is yet to enunciate a nuclear doctrine in the manner that India has. Pakistan's nuclear doctrine is based on various statements made by political and military leaders which constitutes the thrust of its doctrine. In the absence of a published nuclear doctrine there remains a lot of ambiguity about Pakistan's specific purpose for attaining nuclear weapons and what is the desired goal for its nuclear weapons policy.

As regards, NFU again there is disparity between India and Pakistan. Pakistan retains the option of first use of nuclear weapons whereas for India it is NFU implying that it would resort to a nuclear attack only for purpose of punitive retaliation. Pakistan has also declared that it would resort to nuclear weapons only as a last resort when it is pushed too far back against the wall. But, how far back would be too far back has obviously not been clearly identified and hence it can said that such a position fails the test of any rationality.

Pakistan assumes that even after being hit with a nuclear weapon, India would not necessarily undertake nuclear retaliation for three reasons: One, given the Indian strategic culture New Delhi would not have the will to undertake nuclear retaliation; secondly, the major powers would intervene to stop India, thirdly, with Pakistan's slow but steady acquisition of a second strike capability, India would be deterred from nuclear use. However, the classical meaning of 'credible' as enshrined in the doctrine of credible minimum deterrence implies:

• capability of a triad for launching a decapitating second strike;

• communicating the will to the adversary that India can and will retaliate and;

• resolve that is determination to use the nuclear option in case of any attrition attempts

Discussion

Pakistan's nuclear doctrine is primarily based on US nuclear doctrine - intended to neutralize conventional superiority, first use and willingness to have tactical use of nuclear weapons.

Limited War

Post 1998, India's military thinkers assumed that the possibility of war has become obsolete between India and Pakistan. But this proved wrong in the event of the Kargil War where they used nuclear weapons as a cover. These risks are still enduring.

Nuclear Deterrence

India's nuclear weapons are used to deter not only Pakistan but China as well. Hence, there is a need for a higher overall capability. If that be the case would Pakistan seek to match India, which would amount to an excess capacity that what it may actually require? India can on the other hand be deterred by the physical presence of US forces in Pakistan. This way Pakistan will not give India space to breathe and New Delhi will refrain from thinking of attacking that country with nuclear weapons because of the presence of the US. Its conventionally believed that India was deterred in Kargil since it was believed that Pakistan could bring nuclear weapons into play. There is another scenario that is possible. Once India came over to the LoC and decided not to cross it, Pakistan's intruders were totally isolated. They could not go back and found it hard to remain there because of enemy attack. At that time, Pakistan was itself deterred.

Cultivated irrationality

Pakistan can be irrational. This aspect of cultivated irrationality gives Pakistan an added advantage to be able to negotiate. Controlled irrationality itself acts as deterrence. Controlled irrationality is also the instrument of the weak against a stronger nation.

Ambiguity

Pakistan has refrained from publishing a nuclear doctrine primarily because the element of ambiguity works to its advantage.