The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is a voluntary association of countries which share the goals of non-proliferation of unmanned delivery systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, and which seek to coordinate national export licensing efforts aimed at preventing their proliferation. It is the only international regime to control missile proliferation. Today many countries are capable of developing missile delivery vehicles thereby indicating the new challenges faced by the MTCR with regard to controlling the proliferation of such missiles. The MTCR is based on supply-side constraints, ignoring demand-side pulls, which increases incentives for non-MTCR countries to enter the suppliers market.

There are currently 34 countries in the MTCR. But not all the missile producing countries are members to it, like China, North Korea, Ukraine, India and Pakistan. China has trained missile experts from Iran and provided it with cruise missiles like the HY-2 Seersucker. It has also supplied M-11 missiles to Pakistan. Even while Russia is a MTCR member, it has supplied liquid fueled missiles and provided technological assistance for Iran's missile program. George Tenet, former Director CIA has stated that the, "three major suppliers of missiles or WMD related technology continue to be Russia, China and North Korea." The reason for violating the provisions of MTCR is that, it only achieves policy coordination but has no real verification and compliance system. This is evident because there are no multilateral mechanisms to identify non-compliance and punish members responsible for the missile proliferations. Moreover, there are different interpretations to implement the guidelines. Agreements are made at the international level, but exports laws are implemented at the national level. Every nation has different regulations and with no uniformity on this matter, it only benefits the proliferators.

National security threat is the major motivation for building missiles and the MTCR fails to address this problem. It discriminates between the countries that are developing ballistic missiles and countries that already possess them. Hence the former consider the latter as threats and therefore believe that it is necessary to build longer range ballistic missiles to protect their country from any such threats. This reveals the two main problems in the MTCR. First, it provides no security initiative to countries party to it; hence, states are unwilling to join the MTCR due to their security concerns. Second, the MTCR does nothing about existing missiles, which adds to the insecurity in other states.

Besides these institutional problems, the MTCR is facing new challenges. The control of dual use technology is one such problem. Today, technologies are being developed for civilian use and then transferred for military use. Countries can develop ballistic missiles from space launchers, since every country has a right to explore the space for peaceful purposes. But there are no technological differences between space launchers and intercontinental ballistic missiles. Thus, there are difficulties in determining what constitutes strategic technologies and what should be listed as controlled items. Also, it is difficult to control technological changes. The revolution in global manufacturing and the shift from mechanics to electronics has created missile technologies that are much simpler, cheaper, and better.

Globalization has added to this problem as economic interdependence and industrial cooperation enable easy transfer of dual-use technology, but make non-proliferation controls difficult. Multinational companies (MNC) transcend national boarders and establish firms where markets, capital and labor are used to further their economic interests. As a result, they can transfer dual-use technologies to other countries. Globalization provides for transshipment, re-export or diversion of items and technology under controls while resale can lead to the transfer of sensitive technology.

As can be inferred from the above, presently there are no adequate procedures to address the threat of missile proliferation and therefore it is necessary to move beyond this system and explore other alternatives. The world has witnessed the North Korean Taepodong missile test, Iran's efforts to develop the Shahab range of missiles, and the spread of cruise missiles. The US is building its missile defenses to counter them. But missile defence is not the solution to the missile proliferation. The other possible alternatives could be expanding the MTCR to include all states or to seek confidence building measures (CBMs) to solve this problem by addressing the demand side of the problem. CBMs could start with modalities like launch pre-notification, no-first use principle with the participants then moving from de-alerting, de-targeting and other similar measures. This would reduce the motivations of states to acquire missiles. Therefore, the MTCR should be coupled with CBMs to ensure the non-proliferation of missiles.