Panelists:
Mr Dhirendra Singh, Former Home Secretary, Government of India
Prof Nandini Sunder, Delhi School of Economics
Dr P V Ramana, Research Fellow, Observer Research Foundation

Introductory Remarks: P R Chari

In the coming years, Naxalism will become the most important internal security threat to India. Poverty and lack of education were the traditional causes of this extremism but the recent attacks in Glasgow and London highlight ideological commitment as an equally important cause. In Naxalism, there is also a sense of deprivation and injustice. There is also a sense that the lowest sections of society are not empowered and need to agitate for their rights. There is a great need to improve the standards of governance in Naxal-affected tribal areas. Terrorism associated with Islamic fundamentalism is growing; hence the government has to become more vigilant. At the same time, the right to freedom of speech and expression should not be misused.

Naxalites and Internal Security: Dhirendra Singh

State action in the context of internal security has to be based on the constitutional framework, conventions of governance on relations between the Center and states, the rule of law and justice, and free discourse. According to classical theory, the state needs to preserve life and provide for a good life. The Indian freedom struggle with its emphasis on non-violence provides the foundation for governance in India. No government can afford to abandon these values.

As the system has developed in the country, the police need to follow the rule of law and take recourse to the criminal justice system as long as citizens are not armed, and there is no direct conflict with the police. However, in cases of abnormal situations, the citizenry get armed, sometimes more than the police. Violence backed by ideology tends to legitimize these abnormal situations and leads to a total disrespect for the legal system. Terrorism and violence are not concerned only related to Islamic extremism. Naxal extremism should be included in the category of terrorism. It is taking place in the heart of the country and needs to be checked. In the areas severely affected by Naxal violence there are a minimum of five violent incidents per day primarily involving the killing of civilians.

On policing, it is essential to assess the psychology of the local people. A reverse case scenario exists as the police are trained to deal with criminals and not civilians. A different method of training is necessary in this scenario. A special police force, trained to deal with armed civilians, is required and the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) has been raised to meet precisely this demand.

The role of economic development cannot be ignored in the areas affected by Naxal extremism. Lack of economic growth often leads to violence. Building roads, railways and telecom infrastructure are significant signs of development. However, this infrastructure has been attacked by the Naxals causing hindrance to all development. Simultaneous attacks on the symbols of governance like the block development offices are another cause of concern.

The lessons learnt from this case of extremism are several. First, the political leadership needs to become stronger to tackle the situation in the affected areas. Second, the people mobilized by the Naxals have imbibed their ideology and the Naxal chain of command has been firmly established. Moreover, civilian organizations like the People's Democratic Front support this movement. Third, there should be improved coordination between central and state authorities to control the situation. Finally, a proper analysis of the Naxal threat is very important given that while some of them are mercenaries and others are ideologues, a vast majority enter the movement because they have no other choice. Respect for human rights should not be sidelined by the state.

Contextualising Naxalism: Nandini Sunder

Is Naxalism the most important threat to security? How is this security measured? Even an economic issue can become a security threat. Academics and politicians in the government understand truth differently. By sending 37,000 armed personnel to Dantewada, the Naxal movement is becoming a security issue, rather than being visualized as a holistic issue. The state has a monopoly over the legitimate use of force. However, it also allows certain kinds of private violence and rejects others. For example, the government allowed the 1984 anti-Sikh riots, the Gujarat riots and the Salwa Judum (SJ) campaign in Bastar. If the government's responsibility is to uphold the rule of law, it should not allow any private violence. Moreover, the people's economic needs should be acknowledged. If the government treats the Naxal movement callously the problem is only bound to worsen. The government cannot be indifferent to both peace and war.

Dantewada is the most backward area in Chhattisgarh. This is one reason why the Maoists have found an easy foothold here and they coexist with the government at all levels. The way to capture an area is not by military means but by ensuring good health services and better governance. The civilians in the campaign suffer innumerable cases of police harassment. The coercion by Maoists for an alternative state structure has brought a large number of people into the movement. The result of the Naxal movement and government's counter-action has been a militarization of the tribal areas.

According to official claims, the Salwa Judum campaign is a Gandhian, voluntary and spontaneous movement that began in June 2005. However, the civilians claim that they were threatened to join it, else their houses were burnt down. The government-sponsored campaign against the Naxals works against the right to life. The Salwa Judum is different from Village Defence Committees in J&K that have been set up in villages to defend them from external enemies, not for them to parade to other villages and then burn them. The term 'collateral damage' is unacceptable in a democratic country. It has led to 'strategic hamlet-ing,' the same kind as was seen in the northeastern state of Mizoram, several decades ago. It is also against the Geneva Conventions. The choice given by the government is limited to making people join the Salwa Judum or be labeled as Maoists.

Special Police Officers (SPOs) are sent to the villages to ask people to join the campaign. In the process of burning villages, this campaign has caused innumerable casualties and large numbers of civilians are killed by the Salwa Judum and the security forces. The Salwa Judum kill with impunity, and cases of looting and arson have been reported against its members. The government has abdicated its responsibilities and the region is no less than a war zone. People have been displaced, with many people escaping to Andhra Pradesh while life in the camps is extremely bad. Schooling has collapsed and villages have been shattered. There is a complete collapse of the rule of law with the root cause of violence in the area being the Salwa Judum and Naxal counterattacks.

If the situation has to improve, both sides need to engage in dialogue. The issue of land acquisition should be taken up. Steel plants set up in the region have displaced many civilians. The breakdown of law and order, cases of murder, rape and arson have crushed local society and culture. This area is governed by the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution; hence the Executive power of the Union should be used to give directions to the state on its administration. Based on an assessment of the present situation of civil war, the Salwa Judum should be disbanded immediately and an independent enquiry conducted into atrocities committed. The state should undertake measures to enable the adivasis to return home. The government and the Maoists should engage in a national dialogue and the Chhattisgarh Special Powers Act should be repealed.

Countering Naxalites: P V Ramana

In order to expand the information available on the Salwa Judum campaign and facilitate a more holistic understanding of the same, three developments are worth noting: one, in its Politbureau meeting held somewhere near Varanasi in April 2006, the CPI (Maoists) decided to team up with well-meaning people like Medha Patkar to build a national opposition against the Salwa Judum campaign; second, in the light of complaints about the Naga Battalion brutalising the civil society, the Party also resolved to visit Nagaland and put pressure on its civil society to withdraw the Naga Battalion from Dantewada; and third, the party decided to pursue all available legal measures to get the campaign suspended.

Extreme clarity and unanimity of thought exists within the CPI (M). On the other hand, in the Government of India, everyone has their own idea of what is the nature of the problem. There is no understanding in the central government regarding the extent of the problem and nor is there any unanimity of opinion between the central government and the state governments. For instance, despite the fact that both Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh are affected by Naxalism, and both are governed by the Congress, only Andhra Pradesh has imposed a ban on the Naxals.

On the issue of countering the Naxals, the Government of India has conceded time and again that the problem cannot be dealt with militarily. The states meanwhile, have barely managed to finalize an Action Plan that was introduced almost five years ago. The surrender and rehabilitation policy of the states is abysmal. For instance, in Madhya Pradesh, there have only been 16 surrenders between 1990 and 2006.

Another crucial problem is an active Naxal-politician nexus in the country. In the three states of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar and Jharkhand political parties have been hand in glove with the Naxalites and politicians have paid large amounts to them to get elected. Unless this nexus is broken, the government will not be able to find a solution to the problem and continue to simply rely on a military solution to root out the problem. But if the military option were effective, then the problem should not have resurfaced after the initial Naxalbari uprising was suppressed.

DISCUSSION

Naxal Operations

• The Naxal movement is coordinated by the apex body of the CPI (M), that is, its Central Committee, which is a 32-35 member body. Out of the Central Committee, a 13-member Politbureau is formed. Like any national political party, the state committee secretary of every state and the secretary of a special guerrilla zone is automatically a member of the Central Committee.

• Of the total money collected by the State Committees and the Special Zones, 30 per cent goes to the Central Committee. The rest is retained for local expenses incurred by the State Committees.

• The procurement of arms is done at the central level and then distributed to states as per their needs. The main source of weapons continues to be by means of looting them from the security forces. They have however achieved technological superiority over the years and have been found using AK-47s, pushing the government forces also to upgrade their weapons.

• The CPI (M) identifies closely with the Maoists in Nepal as demonstrated by their recent tactics, including coordinated economic blockades and swarming mass attacks. Even in terms of the method of procurement of weapons, as in the case of the Nepali Maoists, almost 80 per cent of the weapons come from looting.

Counter-Naxal Operations

• A lot of grey areas mark the Naxal problem in India. There is no coordination between the Centre and the states as evident from the fact that SPOs have been appointed only in Chhattisgarh, and not in other states. Besides, they are armed with .303 rifles which are no match for the weapons of the Naxals. Most of the time these SPOs are found drunk and are, therefore, incapable of protecting their camps; the SPOs are not a professional force. The larger issue is that there is no approach to finding any permanent answers. While the military approach can be used temporarily, it has to be supplemented by developmental work. Media interest in the problem also needs to be increased.

• On paper, several measures to tackle the problem have been taken such as setting up of task forces, organisational bodies, commissions, coordination teams, a 14-point action plan and so on. However, the implementation of these measures is seriously flawed. It is important to determine whether this is a national problem or a state problem.

• While the Naxalites operate only within geographical boundaries, the government has to operate within both geographical and political boundaries. This explains the divergence of approach between different states - while in some states, it is possible for the government to hold talks with the Naxals, in others, it is not. Moreover, the Central government is bound by the constitutional framework whereby law and order is a state subject. Therefore, a consensus on policing between the Centre and the states is viable only at certain levels - when it comes to modernizing the police forces, fortification of police stations and so on. Apart from these, policing has its own limitations based on terrain and the target areas to be protected.

• On the issue of surrenders, the government has adopted a new system of recruitment in Naxal areas whereby 40 per cent of recruitment in all central paramilitary forces is reserved for people from such areas.

• It has to be noted that in Mizoram, the grouping of villages in the late 1960s and their fencing with barbed wire to prevent insurgents from seeking shelter in them was greatly successful in fighting the insurgency.

• The idea of collateral damage in an operation must be properly understood as unavoidable and unintended damage. Also, security force personnel do not deliberately wish to kill civilians or set villages on fire.

• While a military option is clearly undesirable in dealing with the problem, a non-violent role for the army can be envisaged, such as using army doctors and medical facilities. The army can also play a role in training the police force.

Economic Development

• The Naxal problem is essentially an agrarian problem. It is not terrorism or insurgency, but a socioeconomic problem, and hence cannot be solved by any military solution. Exploitation of the people by the landed class must be stopped.

• In a situation of civil war, there cannot be any economic development. Unless law and order is maintained, nobody will be willing to go to the villages. To that extent, some semblance of order and security needs to be brought about before development can take off.

• The whole debate on economic development tends to revolve around options of hard economics, that is, construction of roads and rails. Development of hospitals and schools continues to be neglected, as is the case in the relief camps set up in Chhattisgarh. The government has no excuse for not providing at least basic facilities in these camps. Posting of good government officials in Naxal-affected areas is very important. Greater responsibility must be given to sociologists for setting up NGOs owing to their in-depth understanding of human nature and society.

Salwa Judum

• A school of thought strongly defends Salwa Judum as a spontaneous people's movement. This suggests that the extent and depth of the Maoists problem has to be seriously reinvestigated.

• Unlike the Naxalites who have openly justified their unconstitutional methods, such as the use of minors in conflict, the government has not been open or transparent about its policies. It continues to claim to uphold and defend the rule of law, while, at the same time, employing unconstitutional methods such as arming untrained adivasis and displacing tribals as part of the strategic hamlet-ing plan, which are completely against the Geneva Conventions. Salwa Judum has nothing to do with countering Naxalites. It is a cult of violence let loose.

• The government is not interested in making peace because a lot of people like Mahendra Karma are making money out of the Salwa Judum campaign. For instance, the government has not responded to any of the initiatives taken by activists. Following a PIL registered against the campaign in the Supreme Court, a notice was issued to the Chhattisgarh government, but it has not responded yet. The campaign is destroying the culture of tribal society. Violence unleashed by the Salwa Judum campaign is not collateral damage because the government is purposely burning villages. This is deliberate damage.

Concluding Remarks: Dipankar Banerjee

Naxalism is certainly a serious security threat to the nation. The fundamental question is to understand the nature of the threat before deciding upon the approach to deal with it. The intellectuals of the country can and should play a greater role in defining the threat. It is important to spread the government's reach to large parts of untouched territories. Unless this is done, no amount of force can provide a solution. The biggest danger today is that of militarizing the problem. Fortunately, within the armed forces, there is great clarity that the army should not get involved in this problem. The police force, however, is still not capable of providing security. While better training and arming of the police forces is important, it is necessary to strategize various responses. This presents a difficult intellectual challenge and the national effort needs to be directed towards addressing it.