Indo-Japan Relations and the Asian Security System
25 Jul, 2007 · 2340
Satyajit Mohanty underscores the various facets of the bourgeoning relations between India and Japan
With the year 2007 being declared as the Indo-Japan Friendship Year, bilateral security and economic relations in particular between the two countries are set for a major boost. The Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, is scheduled to visit India to reciprocate the Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh's, visit to Tokyo in December 2006. A broad swathe of issues related to terrorism and maritime security as well as the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) negotiations and the implementation of the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC) project are expected to come up for discussion. Progress in bilateral relations after the uneasy stage of Japanese sanctions post-Pokhran-II is commendable. Increased engagement with the Northeast Asian nations symbolizes a new phase of of India's 'Look East' foreign policy.
In 2005, India and Japan envisioned an eight-fold Strategic and Global Partnership Initiative which built upon the Global Partnership Initiative of 2000. On the security front, both countries are already engaged in a strategic dialogue at the Foreign Ministers level. Shared security objectives include fighting sea piracy, terrorism, trafficking of drugs and weapons of mass destruction, particularly in the maritime waters around Southeast Asia. The Malacca straits, for instance, alone accounts for more than 25 per cent of the world's maritime trade, and terrorist groups like the Abu Sayyaf, the Jemaah Islamiya and the Laskar-e-Jihad have reportedly planned terrorist attacks to disrupt the global supply chain system. Japan has advocated a multinational 'Naval Ocean Peacekeeping Force,' while India has conducted joint maritime exercises with a number of Southeast Asian states to prepare for such an eventuality. Both countries have welcomed the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), and the Indian Navy and Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force are scheduled to commence goodwill exercises. The 'democratic quad' consisting of India, Japan, Australia and the US can put in place a maritime cooperative security structure to protect the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
To strengthen economic interdependence, the Japanese trade minister Akira Amari visited New Delhi in July this year for the first meeting of the Japan India Policy Dialogue (JIPD) and to oversee negotiations on the Indo-Japan CEPA covering trade in goods, services and investment. While Japan is pushing for relaxed Rules of Origin (ROO) and increased trade coverage, India on its part is asking for greater market access and relaxation of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade. Both countries share a common vision of an East Asian Economic Community and are in the process of finalizing economic partnership agreements with the ASEAN.
Pending completion of the CEPA, India and Japan have launched the 'Special Economic Partnership Agreement' (SEPI) to increase their commercial ties. The bilateral trade between the two countries increased from US$3.6 billion in 2001-02 to US$6.5 billion in 2005-06, marking a year-on-year growth of around 20 per cent. Although Japan is one of India's largest trading partners, India accounts for less than one per cent of Japan's total trade. Indo-Japan trade is a third of Sino-Indian trade and Japan's Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), at about US$3.5 billion till 2004, is miniscule when compared to Japanese investments in the ASEAN. However, on the positive side, India is the largest recipient of Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA). The number of Japanese companies increased by 50 per cent in the past three years and Japan is assisting India in the development of the 1,483km-long DMIC that includes building of air and sea ports and mega power projects along the freight corridor.
Japan has supported India in the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) project, and India would expect the same kind of support on the civil nuclear cooperation issue in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) of which Japan is a prominent member. Cooperation between the Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) and Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) to promote peaceful use of outer space has been satisfactory. Based on the Cebu Declaration on Energy Security in East Asia, Japan and India are also involved in an energy dialogue to explore renewable energy sources and increase energy efficiency.
Shared bilateral, regional and global concerns hint at the fact that India and Japan are "natural partners in progress." As part of the G-4 nations bidding for a permanent membership in the UN Security Council, the two countries have adopted a common approach. However, their relations will strengthen the Asian security system only when China does not perceive the same as being aimed at forming a cordon sanitaire around it. Cooperation between India and Japan and countries like the US might be seen in Beijing as Washington's "neo-Kennanian" containment strategy. Feelings of real or perceived insecurity have promoted Chinese belligerence in past. Indian foreign policy, however, does not envisage a defence pact with Japan similar to that spelled out in the 13 March 2007 Australia-Japan Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation. India has, in fact, enhanced bilateral and trilateral cooperation with Russia and China in recent years and has tried to assuage fears that growing Indo-Japan ties, or Indo-US ties for that matter, are directed against any third country. The increasing warmth in India-China, Indo-Russian, Indo-Japan and Indo-US ties, indicate that Indian foreign policy is fanning out in an omni-directional manner in order to assert its role as a rising power.
Note: The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent those of the Indian Government.