Report of the Panel Discussion held at the IPCS on 25 June 2007

Chair:
Dhirendra Singh, Former Home Secretary
Speakers:
Amb G Parthasarathy, Former Indian High Commissioner in Pakistan
Mr A K Doval, Former Director, Intelligence Bureau
Dr Suba Chandran, Assistant Director, IPCS

The Military and Musharraf: G Parthasarathy

           The background to the present crisis in Pakistan is related to Gen. Musharraf's accession to power and the phenomenon of the mutually reinforcing link between the Pakistan Army and the groups promoting Islamist jihad. The Pakistan Amy had confined Islamist jihadi groups to acting in its interest in Afghanistan. The mutually reinforcing links between the Pakistan Army and the Muslim jihadi groups primarily meant for Afghanistan and India has led to a mutually reinforcing link between Muslim jihadi groups worldwide.

This did not end with Musharraf coming to power. In 2002, he in fact, rigged the elections in a way that the Islamic parties came to power in Balochistan and NWFP. When the Northern Alliance took Kabul, elements of the Taliban under the leadership of Mullah Dadullah escaped into the NWFP. The mostly Kandahar-based Taliban leadership largely crossed from Chaman into Pakistan. Pakistani cooperation with the Americans in their fight against the Al Qaeda was selectively confined to providing second string leadership to the Americans and until the end of 2006, not a single Taliban leader was killed or captured.

The Pashtun element figured for the first time in the history of the Pakistan Army when Pashtun officers refusal to fight in the NWFP and eventually faced court martial. Musharraf also lost the support of the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA). The duality of Musharraf's policy is that when the Army refused to fight he was forced to strike a deal with the Taliban. And today in the NWFP, at least 6 districts are totally Talibanized. This has spread across from Naoshera to Islamabad resulting in the Lal Masjid phenomenon. Under the constitution, Musharraf has to go in for elections this year. The deadline of the Assembly Elections and his term as Army Chief both expire in December.

On 9 March 2007, the Chief Justice was removed from his post. He was proving an embarrassment to the Army for accepting hundreds of human rights cases for consideration. But, the result of sacking the Chief Justice was the worm on which the judiciary turned. The doctrine of necessity by which every coup was justified was pushed aside. This unnerved the armed forces establishment and Musharraf himself. Rather than allowing it to go through, he clamped down from the top. There was total rage when the Army sat aside when Pashtuns were killed by the Mohajirs in Karachi. For the first time, Musharraf's Mohajir identity became a factor and the Chief Justice became a hero in the Punjab. On 1 June 2007, a Corps Commanders Meeting was held that issued a statement that spoke of - "the malicious campaigns launched against the mechanism of the state by vested interests". The last time such a meeting had issued such a statement was in 1977 prior to Gen. Zia-ul-Haq's coup.

What are the options for the General? Can he go for elections and get elected by the current assembly? He cannot go to elections without a deal with Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and without the support of the Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam) (PML-Q). Can he crack down militarily with martial law? Things in the Punjab have gone too far and public opinion has risen making it hard for the Army to be called in. While the Army will stand by Musharraf in Sindh and Balochistan, in Punjab, the Mohajir image will stick and the Army will not be a part of this.

Gen. Musharraf's credibility has come into question and even if Bhutto and the others come to power in a coalition with him, it will be an uneasy alliance. In this scenario, when it comes to nuclear policy, the India policy and the Afghanistan policy, the Army is going to call the shots. There is increasing American and NATO frustration in dealing with the revived Taliban and this is going to result in more and more attacks by the Americans across the Durand Line, thus complicating the Pak-Afghan relationship.

The Iran factor is an imponderable. The Iranians allege that Afghanistan is also being used against them. Pakistan's diplomatic options are narrowing. For India, this means that "the best bet" theories do not work. Our relations with Pakistan will be determined by objective realities within Pakistan and Pakistan's geopolitical situation. If Gen. Musharraf has come forward with new proposals on Kashmir, India must keep talking, so that we are not dragged into the internal politics of Pakistan. We must avoid "the best bet" syndrome and deal with them as we deal with any other neighbor because the military buildup of Pakistan is continuing with Chinese help.

Judicial Crisis: A K Doval

            The question is will the judicial crisis blow over? My answer is no. President Musharraf has given the political parties supporting him three options.

Option 1 - Musharraf gets elected in July-August. After that, the Assembly is dissolved and he remains the President and Army Chief. General elections will be held later next year. Elections have to be postponed because the parties supporting Musharraf are saying that if they continue to support him then nobody is going to vote for them. Therefore, their political future is in danger.

Option 2 - Musharraf is elected. Term of Assembly is extended by one year which is possible under Article 257 of the Pakistani Constitution. In one year, whatever erosion has taken place will wither away. New power equations will be generated and therefore it will not be difficult for the political parties supporting him to win. This option means he is thinking of imposing an emergency as Article 257 can only be invoked when an emergency is in place.

Option 3 - The assembly is dissolved and elections are held in October. Presidential elections will be held thereafter. This option will come into force in case the political parties are confident of winning if they go to the people to get their mandate. It is possible that there are good chances of them coming back into power. This is a formulation acceptable to Bhutto.

How are these issues related? These very steps are indicators that there is not going to be a withering away of these problems that are only getting bigger. It is not a passing phenomenon. The judicial crisis is only a trigger; the problem that lies deeper is more complex.

The common masses are unhappy with Musharraf and with the American policy although they are happy with his economic policy. There is restiveness in the youth and heavy unemployment, particularly in Punjab. Religious political parties are afraid of their political marginalization because of their association with Musharraf. It is not a question of Islam but of political survival. They are thus, increasingly taking their own positions and finding it hard to continue supporting Musharraf.

Among the non-political religious groupings, only two or three continue to give him any support but this too is rather ceremonial and they too are increasingly alienated. Musharraf's allegation that political parties are not doing enough to support him in this election is an indicator of his level of frustration. The PPP is ambiguous but will also find it difficult to go beyond a point in accommodating Musharraf, because in Sindh especially after the 12 May firing, there has been increased sentiment against the Mohajirs. The Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) will stand by him, but are more a liability than an asset.

The anti-Indian lobby is unhappy with Musharraf for his non-deliverance of Kashmir. They had thought he would be able to deliver Kashmir either through his military initiative or his peace initiatives. He has failed on both counts. There was an elite, middle class liberal democratic view that took a more balanced view and in favour of Musharraf, saying that he was the one who could provide stability and economic progress. This class also had very intimate links with the armed forces. Loyalties have shifted, however, in recent months. Earlier, the Army as an institution was highly respected in Pakistan. However, there are now slogans like "Pakistan Army Murdabad" in addition to "Musharraf Go".

Just as India is an imperfect democracy, Pakistan is an imperfect dictatorship. Musharraf's panic reactions mean that the media will be suppressed. This erosion of his support base and authority is bad for Musharraf. Immediately after state level assembly elections, he will most likely be charged with large-scale rigging. He is heading for danger and there is no point discussing what is best for India -all three scenarios will create problems.

Pakistan Election 2007- Four Scenarios: Suba Chandran

           The four scenarios are based on certain assumptions such as the possibility of Musharraf getting reelected as President in uniform by the present Electoral College, rigging and pre-election manipulation, an agreement between Musharraf and Benazir Bhutto and the likelihood of Bhutto giving up the Charter of Democracy. However, it is unlikely that political parties like the PPP, PML-Q, MQM and MMA will boycott the election. Moreover, it is doubtful that the judicial crisis will turn into a violent political movement demanding democracy.

In the first scenario, there are two alliances. One is between PPP, PML-Q and MQM; and the other between MMA and PML-N. In this case the military will reach an understanding with Bhutto and reject the Charter of Democracy. With intelligence agencies geared to support the PPP and PML-Q, the alliance gets adequate seats to form the Parliament. The MMA and PML-N alliance gets wiped out. Consequently, the government formed by the PPP and PML-Q with support from the MQM will get a Prime Minister from the PPP. PML-Q will form the government in Punjab, whereas the PPP and MMA will form it in Sind and NWFP respectively. This scenario suggests relative political stability with the return of Bhutto. However, Nawaz Sharif will talk of back- stabbing and democracy will be sidelined.

In the second scenario, there are three alliances. The first is between the PML-Q, MQM and others, the second, between PML-N, PPP, and moderate regional parties and the third is a united MMA. In this case, the military fails to reach an understanding with Bhutto. Musharraf openly calls for supporting the 'moderate forces like PML-Q and neither Bhutto nor Sharif is allowed to return. Consequently, the PML-Q does not get adequate seats to form the government on its own. The MMA gets more seats in NWFP but its share in the Parliament is reduced. PML-N and PPP get more sets than other alliances. This scenario suggests an unstable Parliament led by the PPP or PML-Q. PPP and PML-N is split further followed by the MMA. The Fazlur faction of Jamaat-e-Ullema Islam (JUI) supports the PML-Q with an understanding that the JUI would form the government in NWFP. Provincial Assembles will remain hung in Punjab and Sind. Political instability and anarchy will be the result and there could be a popular violent movement in the streets denouncing election results or if the PPP is not allowed to form the government. Democracy will get strengthened in the long run.

In the third scenario, there will be two alliances. First is between the PML-Q, MQM and MMA (Fazlur), and the second between the PPP, PML-N and MMA (Qazi). The military fails to reach an agreement with Bhutto but Bhutto and Sharif are allowed to return. The results are similar to the second scenario with democracy strengthening in the long run.

In the final scenario, emergency is imposed and elections are cancelled or postponed. There is manageable external pressure but the combined internal Opposition and the success of mass movements on the streets will depend on Bhutto's PPP.

In the final assessment, Musharraf may get weaker but is unlikely to be removed. The judicial crisis is a beginning towards a long term movement for popular justice and the rule of law. However, Pakistan is a country where predictions are difficult. Much will depend on actions and political will of Bhutto and Sharif .

DISCUSSION

Pakistan's Nuclear Programme

           What are the implications for Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and doctrine in this period of increased political uncertainty? Is it possible to proliferate fissile material to non-state actors with Islamists in the Army? Is the presence of Islamists increasing or decreasing in the Army? What is the bearing on plutonium enrichment in Pakistan?

Pakistan has a superb nuclear command and control structure that is better than that of India. First, the separation of fissile material in the arsenal takes place under tight control of the Army and it is unlikely that it will proliferate. Second, the Americans have knowledge of where the arsenal is stored and have ensured its safety mechanisms and security. If proliferation takes place it will be limited to dirty bombs because of the presence of Islamists within the nuclear establishment. It will, however, be very difficult to proliferate complete nukes. Command and control is very strong in the Army. It is unlikely for example, that an army colonel will be able to get a warhead and core together. The Pakistan Army's chain of command is strict and effective.

In Pakistan's nuclear development, it is clear that it is China's nuclear and weapons programme that is in operation. It is Chinese policy to supply enough nuclear weapons to Pakistan to keep India on its toes. China supplied the M-11 to Pakistan as a means to counter India's Prithvi missile. One center is Kahuta. The other is a strategic triangle that lies between Chashma, Fatehgunj and Khushab. Research activity funded by China functions in this triangle. In Chashma, China provided the power plants and an un-safeguarded nuclear reprocessing plant. So what was the need to go to the plutonium route? Pakistan has had a problem with miniaturizing its weapons as late as the 1990s. Samar Mubarakmand is the guiding light behind Pakistan's nuclear programme. Shaheen-I is Chinese DF-15 while the Shaheen-II, the counter to India's Agni-II is a version of the Chinese DF-21 that was supplied in the late nineties. China has continued to provide nuclear know-how despite signing many treaties. Hence, both Pakistan and China aim at producing miniaturized plutonium warheads. All engineering designs were provided by China but fabricated by Pakistan. Given Chinese technology, Pakistan has a more reliable missile strike force than India.

The Pakistan Army is slightly less Islamist than before as Musharraf has done internal cleansing of the Army in consultation with the US.

Composite Dialogue

            What will be the impact on the Composite Dialogue between India and Pakistan given the politically turbulent times in Pakistan?

In the case of the Composite Dialogue, diplomatic adventurism is unacceptable. The PM can go to Islamabad provided there is something concrete emerging. Talks on Kashmir are on but differences are still very substantial. Hence, a deal on Kashmir is not possible in the near future. The Pakistani leaders have strongly pointed out that India should stay out of the elections in Pakistan. However, since the ceasefire of 2003, the extent of cooperation between the two countries has improved. This process continues but India should stay out of Pakistan's internal troubles.

The Northern Reserve of Pakistan's Army is deployed in Balochistan and Waziristan. They are worried about air power. Hence, Pakistan is unlikely to engage in any adventure including the conflict in Kashmir. Why did Musharraf and Kasuri exaggerate about the success of dialogue on Kashmir? Why has the political establishment in India not able to get a statement from the government on where India stands on the dialogue?

If no significant development takes place in the next five to six months, the current proposals on Kashmir will become unacceptable. India is going through a politically critical period as the elections are approaching. If Pakistan gets internally destabilized, Musharraf will try to patronize different groups that oppose India including the terrorist groups targeting India. Meanwhile, the Pakistan Army continues to acquire significant military capabilities.

Early Elections

           Why talk of elections in July and August? Does Musharraf feel things will worsen and that he will not be able to manage?

Musharraf has given three options to the PML-Q and wants a response within a week. One of them was an early election. He may be calculating that the PML-Q and PPP could hold an alliance together. The situation could get worse in the future. Moreover, the stance of the people supporting the suspended Chief Justice cannot be ignored in the context of upcoming elections.

The Fallout on Afghanistan

            The policy on the Taliban is institutionalized. Can civilian rule in Pakistan guarantee a crackdown on the Taliban?

The Taliban is reviving and regrouping in FATA and NWFP. The US policy of using excessive force has alienated them further. A united front is being formed as an alternative to the Karzai government. However, such a development may not be against India. The US claims that Pakistan concerns need more importance in the region because India has a very high profile in Afghanistan. For that reason, it called for the closure of two Indian consulates in the country. India has no military presence in Afghanistan except for the ITBP personnel and has responded positively to US suggestions. Thus Indian assistance is purely economic and humanitarian.

The Pakistan Army dictates the country's policy in Afghanistan. There is a consensus that Pakistan should keep Afghanistan as a satellite state and a change of government will not result in a change in this policy. The US is unlikely to leave Afghanistan in a hurry even though it has a tendency of using countries or groups and then dumping them. For example, the Northern Alliance was used to capture Kabul and fight against the Taliban. The recent outburst of Karzai against the US shows his disinclination to remain a puppet of the US. Thus, there will be fluidity in the political situation with the presence of NATO forces.

Developments in Pakistan have a significant impact on Afghanistan. The Army will continue to dictate policy whether or not Musharraf stays in power. Also, even if Bhutto takes over as head of a democratic government, Talibanization would continue under her rule. The Pakistan Army cannot become a non-player. Eventually, if the situation deteriorates, the US could consider an exit policy and hand over the lead to Pakistan. This, however, is a bad scenario for India.

Punjab is the most crucial province for Pakistan. But the situation has, however, not eased for Talibanisation and until the situation actually worsens a lot more in Punjab, its spread is unlikely. There is disaffection both with the elite and the US and the judicial crisis is likely to lead to a movement for restoration of democracy in the long run. Will Musharraf continue to hold power if he gives up his uniform? The US could opt for the present vice chief of army to replace him

The ISI

           What is the role of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) if the Army cooperates with Musharraf in Sind and Balochistan but not in the Punjab? Will the ISI prevent such a situation? Secondly, what is the role of the economy in this matrix?

Many ISI actions are not even approved by Musharraf for the head of the ISI has enormous leeway in decision making. The growth of the ISI can be traced to Zia's regime when he allowed the organization to establish its own linkages and build its own funds. This networking all over the world has proved costly. Drug trafficking and the gun trade are part of these clandestine linkages of the ISI and it is difficult to run these down.

The Pakistan Economy

            The economy is doing well in Pakistan despite the political turmoil but if it begins to weaken how will it impact the situation?

Pakistan's economy is growing at above seven per cent per annum. However, the fruits of development have not percolated to the masses. Some of the major projects in agriculture, water management, and irrigation have not received attention. This is likely to cause problems.

Germany and Japan are the major donors and the US itself provides US$2 billion a year. Foreign exchange in Pakistan is increasing especially in terms of aid. Rates of saving have grown and have been sustained by inflow of this aid. The balance of payments remains comfortable and Shaukat Aziz has done well to maintain economic growth rate. Foreign aid has increased money flow but this has not resulted in the development or upliftment of Pakistan. Moreover, FDI has come down after 2005.

Popular Sentiment

           Why have political parties not capitalized on the anti-Musharraf sentiments of the people? Genuine democracy is possible only when the military and people come into collision. Will the situation be resolved before such a collision?

Without mainstream political support, Musharraf cannot deal with the dangerous phenomenon of rising Talibanization and the military-mullah-madrasa alliance in NWFP. NWFP is a tribal society so Talibanization spreads more easily here than in the Punjab. Still, it has to be checked by political action. If the PPP and the Awami National Party (ANP) strike a deal, it will be a suitable political check on the spread of Talibanization. A pre-election deal between PPP and PML-N is , however, unlikely.

A sullen mood prevails in Pakistan. The mainstream political parties like the PPP lack the cadre to launch a popular movement and so they can only latch on to issues like the judicial crisis. The reception that the suspended Chief Justice of Pakistan, Iftikhar Chaudhary, received in Lahore and Punjab was massive. He is Punjabi and the anti-Musharraf sentiment is very evident. Political parties, nevertheless, lack the capability and will to use this opportunity to unite against military rule.