The recent denial of a Chinese visa to an Indian IAS officer of the Arunachal Pradesh cadre has been portrayed in India as evidence of continued Chinese intransigence on resolving the border dispute. That the training programme for IAS officers was being pushed by the Indian Prime Minister has caused greater embarrassment. However, if Gegong Apang, former Chief Minister of Arunachal, was denied a Chinese visa several years ago on the same grounds - that being a citizen of China he required no visa to enter his own country - the Indian establishment should have been aware that an IAS officer from Arunachal would be similarly treated. If this was forgotten or ignored, or the Indian government had decided to dare the Chinese, then the embarrassment was well deserved, and there is cause for reprimands being issued.

It might be recollected that India had withdrawn four members from Arunachal in a team sent to a science and technology fair held in China from 19-24 April. Therefore, the question arises did the Arunachal officer's application have anything to do with the last round of talks on the border dispute which took place in India from 20-22 April? Did India perceive that it had won any concessions during the talks that emboldened it to take this step of making the visa application? Or did it simply misinterpret the Chinese position at these talks? If this was so, then several other questions arise. Does India's negotiating team on the border dispute with China have the expertise to deal with the Chinese or a sufficient understanding of the situation within China? Negotiations are, after all, not conducted on an understanding of one's own strengths and weaknesses, of where one's own red lines are, but also with a fair assessment of what are obtaining on the other side as well. While such information is perhaps readily available in terms of military capabilities, it is anyone's guess whether Indian negotiators go armed with any degree of understanding of the political and economic compulsions that inform the Chinese position on the border dispute, and which can differ at the central, provincial and sub-provincial levels.

Also, if misconstruing Chinese intentions is what eventually resulted despite the "high level" of these meetings, then the complete secrecy surrounding them can only be interpreted as a desire by the Indian government (including previous ones) to cover up plain ignorance and incompetence. While the Chinese Ambassador to India, Sun Yuxi seems to have learned his lessons from the contretemps on the eve of Chinese President Hu Jintao's visit to India in November 2006, when he said, "if you introduce [the] dispute to the public, you try to take a step before we reach an agreement…" (The Indian Express, 27 May 2007), the public in both countries cannot be left in the dark especially as their interactions grow. Further, broadening the constituencies and interests involved in the talks could induce both sides to break out of the security-driven framework of the talks and push towards a faster solution.

Alternatively, what if the Chinese at the talks did provide signals that might have been interpreted positively by India? It is difficult to make a pronouncement on this likelihood for obvious reasons, but the possibility of one section of the Chinese establishment working at cross-purposes with another by denying the visa to the Indian officer is not an unlikely one. In recent years, the Chinese government has turned its attention to development of the interior provinces after decades of preferential policies for the coastal region. While a business-minded and externally-oriented political elite from coastal China might favour a settlement of the border dispute with India, provinces like Sichuan have expressed the opinion that Arunachal was too valuable to give up on account of its mineral resources and huge hydroelectric power potential - resources that will be vital to their development in the face of declining central government support. It is, thus, quite possible that these provinces have or will seek a say in the final resolution of the dispute.

Another important factor to consider is that a fair number of Hu Jintao loyalists are likely to take up important top-level leadership positions following the 17th Party Congress later this year. One common characteristic of these leaders is that they have all spent a large part of their careers in the inner and less developed parts of China, and are likely to be more sensitive to their needs and have their own views on any settlement of the dispute with India.

Indian negotiators will thus have to keep themselves abreast of the political developments at various levels within China if they are to make or predict any progress on the border dispute and avoid missteps and misinterpretation.