Major catastrophes - earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, and plagues - have brought several early civilizations to their knees. Today, these natural forces are being supplemented by terrorism. Especially after 9/11, tackling terrorism has become part of the main agenda of several nation-states. Unfortunately, they are still unprepared to handle the situation arising out of unconventional attacks such as by terrorist organizations using dirty (radiological) weapons, chemical weapons or biological weapons.

Countries like India, which have been tackling the menace of terrorism for many years fall into the same category. In the Indian context threats like bio-terrorism have become stronger in the last few years. This is mainly because of the changing nature of terrorism. Today, terrorists are on the lookout for adopting new tools and tactics for spreading terror. On the other hand, India has made significant progress in biotechnology over the last few years and this has increased the 'easy availability' of material and knowledge to undertake acts of bio-terror.

Regrettably, most of the safety initiatives undertaken by the government, academic and private biological research communities within the country concentrate mainly only on 'laboratory bio-safety and security', leaving open opportunities for theft, sabotage and/or transfer of knowledge/technology that could help a terrorist organization to launch such an attack. Also, there is a lack of adequate mechanisms to deal with the post-attack scenario, particularly in respect of maintaining a command and control center.

Against this backdrop, the recent initiative by the government to deal with bio-terrorism by formulating standard operating procedures (SOPs) to handle the post-attack scenario is a welcome step. According to newspaper reports (Financial Express, 28 March 2007), the Government of India has finally approved a model SOP to handle any eventuality arising out of a bio-terror attack. It has been mentioned that this SOP contains the processes to deal with terrorist attacks using biological agents to cause diseases like anthrax, plague, botulism and cholera.

The overall responsibility for addressing these threats lies with the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), which is tasked to lay down the command, control and preparedness measures. The Ministry of Health would play a pivotal role in this initiative identifying suitable laboratories and devising a policy for procuring, manufacturing and stockpiling relevant vaccines and drugs. Appropriate protocol for their validation/certification, contamination testing at source of water supply would also be developed as and effective Rapid Response Teams (RRTs) established at the district level.

This initiative is likely to be financed by the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) while a separate team would be constituted to do the groundwork. The agencies involved would be the National Security Coordination Secretariat (NSCS) in consultation with the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO), MHA and Ministry of Health. The 'model' developed by this team would be tested in the national capital and subsequently passed on to other states in the country.

This initiative appears to have brought together various other ad hoc schemes undertaken till date. During January 2004 it was reported that the MHA had started a process of deploying an elite force - comprising four battalions of central paramilitary forces - to counter biological, chemical and radioactive attacks. These four battalions are expected to function as a national disaster response force. It has also been mentioned that the primary responsibility for dealing with such situations will lie with the state governments.

However, some questions remain unanswered. During 2001, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) had created a cell to tackle bio-terrorism. This core group was expected to review and assess the information available on the activities of various terrorist groups. This group, which is essentially 'proactive' in nature, had also a 'reactive element', to carry out bio-disaster management. It is not known what role this group would now play in this new initiative.
Another interesting aspect of this report is that even though the involvement of the Health Ministry is mentioned there is no specific reference to role of Indian Council for Medical Research (ICMR) which till date was known to be the disaster nodal organization for biological disasters in the overall disaster management plan of the country.

It needs to be understood that the biological disasters require a holistic response. This is because 'germs-spread' knows no geographical boundaries. Bio-disasters demand different responses and cannot be treated only as a 'medical' or 'policing' activity. Any confusion or lack of clarity within SOPs will have disastrous impact on the overall health of the country, both physical and economic. It is hoped that these SOPs remove all obscurities and rise above the usual gimmicks of center-state relationships and the turf-wars played out amongst various intelligence agencies.