LTTE Air Raid: Raising the Stakes
29 Mar, 2007 · 2243
R R Vinod states that the LTTE's recent air strikes demonstrates its ability to strike back even when the chips are down
The assault mounted by the Black Tigers on the Katunayake Airbase on 24 July 2001 had convinced the government of the day that the only way to peace was through talks with the Tigers. Earlier, in the mid-nineties, the SLFP government of Chandrika Kumaratunge had tried to talk peace, and failing in that had gone to war with the LTTE. Even though the government's Operation Jayasikuru had initially netted a few successes, the LTTE had hit back effectively through its Operation Unceasing Waves. Thereafter, the Sri Lankan state took recourse to air power, with the Tigers getting hit and only a few successful counter hits. It was in this background, and after warnings that they would hit back if the state did not put a stop to indiscriminate bombings of civilian areas, that the LTTE mounted a major operation against the Katunayake airbase, destroying a sizeable number of military and civilian aircrafts, and delivering a stunning blow to the morale of the security forces.
There are yet no clear indications as to whether the state has been able to work out as to how the LTTE was able to mount such a precise, but devastating operation in the Sri Lankan capital, by land. The detailed planning of the operation, and the logistics involved, showed that the Tigers supremo had lost none of his penchant for taking the fight to the enemy, when appearing to be in a lost position.
The split in the LTTE in early 2004 appeared to have sapped the Tigers' fighting abilities and the state, under a new, aggressive president appeared to be on the ascendant. Once again, the LTTE was on the back foot, fighting for survival in the north. The air force had become potent and was inflicting heavy losses on the LTTE, both in human and material terms. Prabhakaran's image had taken a beating even among his supporters. He had to show that his movement was very much alive and kicking as much for the morale of his troops as to retain hold over the Tamils, especially those abroad who have been great sources of support for the LTTE, financially and politically.
The Tigers have surprised friends and foes alike with their organizing and fighting capabilities. Their Black Tiger operations have all been carefully planned in great secrecy, and after several dry runs. Each such operation is planned for strategic gains, short term losses notwithstanding.
The attack from air on the Sri Lankan airbase during the night hours is one such carefully crafted operation of the Tigers. In one stroke, the Tigers have made several telling points. They have demonstrated their air capability, howsoever minor it may be, and that too in night operations with night landing facility, wherever they operate from. They have given notice of future strikes, raising security concerns, but most importantly, they have also demonstrated the intelligence failure of the foe. Their pilots would have conducted sorties in the Vanni for practice and their intelligence would have gathered inputs about the weak points of the Sri Lankan Air Force. They have also demonstrated their abilities to use such light aircraft for bombing operations by developing the requisite delivery systems.
It is not clear how many such aircrafts are available with the LTTE (even though reports suggest that they have two), or how many combat pilots they have trained, and where they received such training. The LTTE released photographs of Prabhakaran with a few pilots. And a light aircraft in which two pilots were seated. Whether they are actually pilots, or whether this was to put the Sri Lankans off their trail is not clear. Whether they have only one runway at Iranamadu (there are reports of two) or more than one, though effectively camouflaged from prying eyes, is also not clear. What is however clear, is that the LTTE has made a bold statement in the fight against the government forces in order to achieve their goals. They have carefully chosen to hit military installations, and avoided civilian casualties unlike what they allege the Sri Lankan government has been doing. Even though the government and security pundits were aware of the air wing of the LTTE, they would nevertheless be compelled to take note of this new development. Prabhakaran has once again given notice that he can raise the stakes in this unfortunate fratricidal war, and that the final dialogue, whenever that takes place, will not have him cowering and pleading for peace.