In the last five years, the security of the Malacca Strait, as a matter of official and non-official deliberations among major powers and the littoral countries (Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia), has assumed strategic importance both in terms of the threat of maritime terrorism and safety of the sea-lane itself. In June 2006, India and Japan decided to work together in enhancing maritime security and tackling sea-borne crimes in and around the Strait of Malacca. While participating in the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2006 in Singapore, Indian Defence Minister, Pranab Mukherjee offered his country's logistical and operational support to the trilateral operation of 'Compulsory Pilotage,' a joint air-patrol operation in the Malacca Strait involving the littoral countries. Military chiefs from the three countries agreed in April 2006 to a term of reference and standard operating procedures of the joint patrolling, codenamed "Eyes in the Sky," with the main focus on coordinating maritime and air patrolling and the sharing of intelligence information. Both India and the US had already agreed on escorting the US ships in the Andaman Sea in 2002. The same year, India had also agreed to escort Indonesian ships in the Andaman Sea. Both the US and Japan, therefore, expect India to play an increasingly pro-active role in securing the Strait along with the littoral countries.

These deliberations and negotiations reflect two distinct trends - recognition of India's central role in any security arrangement in policing the Strait, and the insistence of Malaysia and Indonesia on no external military presence in the Strait. This stand of the littoral countries is not new. In fact, they have maintained this position since 1970 when the three littoral countries - Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore agreed on not allowing any military presence of outside powers in the Strait. What is new, however, is that the 'user states' (i.e. countries whose ships pass through the Strait), cum outside powers minus China, have accepted and underscored the importance and efficacy of Indian policing in the region. The growing international recognition has resulted from: the shifting strategic alignment in the region; the lack of effective maritime capacity of the littoral countries in contrast to India's own effective naval maneuverability, as evident from India's quick emergency relief operations in the aftermath of Tsunami; and India's successful high-seas chase of the Allondra Rainbow and its subsequent escort back return to Japan. There has now thus developed an understanding in the US about the pivotal role of India in securing the Strait, leading to the American call for trilateral cooperation involving India, Japan and the US.

India has responded to the heightened activism in securing the Strait by augmenting a shift in its policy of stand-alone operations to multilateral activism in policing the Strait. India and Japan agreed in June 2006 to conduct joint search and rescue operations, annual coast guard talks, joint anti-piracy exercises and so on. India is already involved in joint naval exercises such as anti-submarine warfare and search and rescue operations with the littoral countries in the Strait since 1996. During his Malaysia visit, Mukherjee not only supported the trilateral Compulsory Pilotage but also expressed India's willingness to share its expertise in maritime security with nations of the region.

The central element of India's response is its continued emphasis on India's benign intentions in the region, and the avoidance of any image projection of India as a regional hegemon. India has made it clear that any strategic role and maritime policy in and around the Malacca Strait would need prior approval from the littoral countries and their interests and security would not be ignored, even while forging cooperation with other major powers. India has also tried to allay any apprehension, whatsoever, of Malaysia and Indonesia, that might emanate from the force projection of the Andaman and Nicobar naval command.

India has also successfully developed an understanding with the littoral countries about its stakes and its role in the Strait. India's geographical proximity further justifies its important role in the area, given the distance of only 80 kilometers between the Nicobar Islands and Aceh in Indonesia. Both India and the littoral ASEAN countries, face a set of common problems such as piracy, trafficking in arms and drugs and maritime terrorism. Despite being commercially and strategically so important, the Strait of Malacca form is one of the worst most piracy-infested areas in the world. According to an International Maritime Bureau release, between October and December 2006, more than five cases of piracy were reported in the Strait between October and December 2006. It has also been reported that the waterways of Malacca and the Andaman Sea are being used as safe conduits for the movement of weapons and men by various terrorist organizations operating in the region. Any cooperative effort to mitigate this problem thus becomes vital.

While the littoral countries have paid full attention to India's concerns in the Strait and somewhat mellowed down their insistence on no external military presence, India has to take into account the concerns of these countries, their logistical and operational needs, and their strategic stakes in the Strait.