Prime Minister Manmohan Singh undertook a four-day official visit to Japan from 13-16 December. The implications of the visit may be assessed across bilateral, regional and global issues - all of which necessarily overlap.

On the bilateral front, Manmohan's visit marked a step-up from the cordial relations fostered by Junichiro Koizumi to a new warmth in ties. Shinzo Abe with his emphasis on Asia and a particular interest in India - a legacy of Nobosuke Kishi's Prime Ministership - is a partner committed to consolidating Japan's ties with Asia, in which India has a major role to play.

Japanese investment in India through 2004-2005 was estimated at $170 million which amounts to barely three percent of Japanese investment in China. Singh called for a utilization of the trade potential between the two countries in his address to the Diet contrasting the current state of bilateral trade between India and Japan to Indian trade with China and South Korea. As a consequence of the visit, India and Japan are expected to begin negotiating for an FTA early this year. A broad Economic Partnership Agreement is under discussion to facilitate expanded Japanese investment in India. Japanese investors have often cited the lack of adequate infrastructure as a reason for low investment in India. These issues are being discussed. Japanese finance is sought for a proposed 2800km high-speed freight railway as a step towards improving Indian infrastructure. The two countries also hope to substantially increase the number of weekly passenger flights from the current 11 to 42 starting next year, marking the first revision of the aviation pact between the two in 13 years.

At the same time, India-Japan ties have been elevated to the status of a 'Global and Strategic Partnership'. Global and strategic in terms of both, economics and politics. The proposed economic engagement will be buffered by the closer defence ties as explicated in the Joint Statement at the conclusion of Singh's visit. Not only are the naval forces of the two states to participate in the first ever joint exercises, but also cooperate in anti-piracy measures and maritime security.

Discussions on 'energy security' exemplify the two-fold nature of bilateral ties - economic as well as strategic. Singh emphasised the role that nuclear energy can play in ameliorating the rising demand for energy resources and called for greater cooperation between Japan and India in the development of nuclear energy while reiterating India's commitment to the abolishment of nuclear weapons globally. Such a declaration placates Japanese fears about India's nuclear ambitions and paves the way for substantial Japanese investment in conventional and non-conventional energy resources within India. This may also be read as an attempt to elicit Japanese support in the NSG when the Indo-US Nuclear Deal comes up for voting and to establish dialogue to facilitate the utilisation of Japanese expertise in nuclear energy. Japan is already the world's third largest producer of nuclear power and Japan's New National Energy Strategy calls for nuclear production to rise from the current 30 per cent to at least 40 per cent or more by 2030. As nuclear energy becomes a prominent part of India's long term energy strategy, cooperation with Japan in the manufacturing and operation of nuclear power stations would be prudent.

It is important to realise that the bilateral relationship is no longer lop-sided. India and Japan are interacting as equals. Japanese investment is a boon for India but for Japan it also represents an alternative to investment in China - good economic sense dictates against putting all eggs in one basket. Politically, for India Japanese support will open the doors to greater involvement in East Asia while for Japan, it provides an Asian ally that is a "natural partner" with whom ties are "unencumbered by any historical differences."

The regional fallout of Manmohan's visit could be immense. The PM's visit to Japan comes at a time when India is attempting to substantiate its 'Look East' policy through active engagement with ASEAN and East Asia. Indian presence in East Asia is enabled to a large extent by Japan's support. India's participation in the East Asia Summit was facilitated by Japan and the East Asian Community proposed by Japan to counter China's proposal of an East Asian FTA also includes India. On the other hand, Japan's participation in the SAARC was facilitated by Indian support and has provided for Japanese presence in South Asia. For a Japan somewhat threatened by China's rising influence in the region, support for India could translate into renewed activism within the region, essentially undercutting prospects of Chinese pre-eminence.

On the global front, better ties with Japan indicate that India has truly 'arrived' on the international scene. Abe has described India as a "new partner in Asia" and proposed a four-way "strategic dialogue" among Japan, USA, Australia and India. Japan and the US have called for greater Indian involvement in the Malacca Straits. In the future, closer military ties with Japan in conjunction with Indian participation in strategic dialogues that include Japan and US, could pave the way for Indian commitment to protection of sea lanes. Closer ties with the US along with Japanese emphasis on Asia enabled warmer India-Japan ties. These could lead to further Indian engagement with America's allies. At this juncture it is important to remember that closer ties with Japan and the US do not translate into an anti-China grouping. Neither Japan nor the US nor indeed India would seek to alienate China. Strategic and global partnerships and three- or four-way cooperation must therefore be seen as highlighting the maturity of Indian foreign policy.