As winter sets in, incidences of suicide bombings in Afghanistan have declined to an average of one a day compared to over one a day in the previous two months. Taliban forces are firming up for a consolidation phase before they embark on a renewed offensive in the coming spring, which promises to be even bloodier than in 2006. American and NATO fatalities climbed to about 200 in 2006. Since the beginning of the year, over 4000 people, mostly of the Taliban, have been killed in violent incidents in Afghanistan.

The Taliban has been on the comeback path in southern and eastern Afghanistan, and the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) of Pakistan has become a mini-Taliban state with Pakistan almost losing its control over it. The Pakistan Army has stopped all its operations in the FATA, virtually handing over the area to the Taliban where they are now training, rearming and preparing for cross-border attacks. Peace deals with the Taliban have also resulted in a threefold rise in attacks against NATO troops. Summary justice and other abhorrent Taliban practices have been enforced by Taliban leaders.

Pakistan's military establishment, in concert with the Taliban, is planning for a major offensive in the summer of 2007 to undermine NATO and American efforts, and impose a regime in Kabul which is dominated by the Taliban. Pakistan believes that this would deliver the coup de grace and achieve its long cherished goal of obtaining strategic depth in Afghanistan. Musharraf seems to believe that he is already winning in Afghanistan. Pakistan's Foreign Minister Mahmood Kasuri has been privately advising NATO interlocutors that the war is bound to fail and that it was futile to send more NATO troops to support beleaguered forces in Afghanistan. Further, he has stated that sense lies in reaching an accommodation with the Taliban. Lt. Gen. Jan Mohammed Orakzai Governor of NWFP has publicly declared that the US, UK and NATO have failed.

However, the Taliban has now become an instrument in the hands of Pakistan's military rulers to suppress nationalistic tendencies and supplant it with religious fervour that lays emphasis on the Muslim Ummah and helps Pakistan in achieving its strategic objectives in Afghanistan.

Further, inside Pakistan there is a full-blown insurgency underway in Balochistan which shows no signs of abating. The elimination of the Baloch leader Nawab Bugti by Pakistan's military has given a fillip to the insurgency. Pakistan's internal problems are also compounded by ongoing sectarian conflict and the suppression of popular sentiments in the Northern Areas. Recently, a European Union report reflecting on conditions in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir castigated Pakistan's military regime for its repressive policies in the territory.

Therefore, centrifugal forces at work in Pakistan have given rise to the concept of a shrinking core of Pakistan, which is limited to the east of the Indus, and to the Punjabi heartland as even the province of Sindh does not have much love lost for the Punjabi elite. However, the Pakistani elite continues to entertain visions of Greater Pakistan with a resurgent Taliban and the possibility of installing a Taliban dominated regime in Kabul.

With the Taliban resurgence on both sides of the Durand Line, and Pakistan having signed peace deals in North and South Waziristan, as well Pakistan's eroding sovereignty in these areas, the contours of a de facto independent Pashtoonistan are emerging. Is Pakistan, therefore, in the process of achieving its notion of 'strategic depth' or is it falling into a 'strategic ditch'?

Pakistan's efforts and resources are directed towards a Taliban resurgence which may not be bad from an Indian point of view. There is no need to get into a zero sum game with Pakistan. It is also being widely perceived that Pakistan is involved in a 'wasteful extravaganza' and its ambitions of controlling Afghanistan are unlikely to bear fruit because of the fiercely independent nature of the Afghans. In the long-run, the Taliban are likely to create more problems for Pakistan rather than solve any. Further, no Afghan government, including the Pashtoon-dominated Taliban regime that was recognized by Pakistan, has accepted the division of the Pashtoons along Durand Line.

Sending Indian troops to Afghanistan at the present juncture and opening a proxy front against Pakistan would be the most imprudent step. It is likely to cost us the goodwill of the common Afghan people who, in any case, resent any kind of foreign interference. And, as history bears witness, whether it were British during the Anglo-Afghan wars of 19th Century or Soviet Russia - both were routed by the proud and freedom-loving Afghan fighters over a period of time.

A better alternative would be to revert to the exclusive focus on people-to-people relations and strengthen our economic, cultural and historical bonds with the Afghan people. We need to extend additional aid and promote reconstruction and development projects. Another question which arises is whether there is a need to seek political accommodation with Taliban. Taliban and its philosophy go against the grain of nature and ideology of the Indian state. India should instead strengthen its relations with nationalist elements amongst Pashtoons and other dominant ethnic groups in order to pursue its interests in Afghanistan.