(Excerpts of Interview with Ambassador CV Ranganathan by D Suba Chandran and Urvashi Aneja)

I. POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC ISSUES

It is important to realize that the ASEAN group of countries would like to leverage the growth of India-China relations, as well as their economic growth, for its benefit. There are great expectations as India and China no longer share adversarial relations; both countries together could adopt a more inclusive approach towards regional cooperation, thereby promoting peace and prosperity in East Asia. This important qualitative change in terms of cooperation could also be extended to Central and South Asia.

China's involvement in South Asia: Is it against Indian interests?

In spite of all reservations, the fact remains that on all major issues between India and Pakistan, China's position is to promote bilateral dialogue and avoid any exacerbation of tensions. In this respect, China has veered around to the view of all the major powers and members of the Security Council. The same can be said in the case of Nepal and Sri Lanka, where there is no evidence that China is working as a disruptive force. Essentially, India and China both share a common interest in peace and prosperity in South Asia.

China needs to realize that problems in South Asia go beyond tensions between India and its neighbors. China also needs to pay attention to the kind of societies that are emerging in the region. China must understand that these developments have international consequences. If the India-China dialogue can bring about this maturity, a sensitive dialogue on these issues can initiated. The idea is to see how the India-China dialogue can help not only regime building but also the strengthening of societies. Polices need to be more people oriented to improve the welfare and development of societies in the region.

'String of Pearls'

The so-called 'string of pearls' strategy supposedly employed by China is an exaggeration. Only India can encircle itself, and only India is to blame for this threat perception of China. India needs vigor in pursuing smaller infrastructure projects in neighboring countries. It should be remembered that the Chinese are responding to requests by local governments and not forcing their presence in these countries. The reason these nations seek cooperation from China is that they are sure of Chinese assistance without any strings attached, unlike relations with other countries. Moreover, it would be shortsighted to say that China has a global plan.

Not every China-Pakistan action can be viewed as targeted against India. Yet, China will not weaken its relationship with Pakistan for India. Arms aid to Pakistan will continue. These are not zero sum games. Ultimately, India must reconcile differences with Pakistan, and China will not stand in the way of such an initiative.

'Cooperative Strategic Partnership'

While an improvement in India-China relations has not only bilateral implications, what is the content of this 'cooperative strategic partnership? The two countries should use their strength to bring about physical connectivity to the West, East and North of India. Recent talks at the ESCAP meeting of an intercontinental railway are a pertinent example. India so far has not gone on board, probably because of transit problems with Bangladesh.

India, however, should extend connectivity to the Chinese and Russian railway system so that trans-border land connectivity can be extended all the way to Europe. Ultimately, such advancements are instruments for removing feelings of great isolation felt by large sections of the Indian people. Countries like China and Russia have used their geography as an economic asset and India could learn from this example. True, security issues will need to be overcome but such initiatives are necessary if our policies are to become more people oriented. Having entered the 21st century, India would need to change its ancient mindset.

India's Foreign Policy

The Ministry of External Affairs has not been slow in rising to the occasion. Rather, it has been alert. India's relations vis-a-vis the US, EU, Russia, China, Japan and ASEAN are mutually enforcing. The better relations India enjoys with the USA, the better its relations with China. The biggest challenge for Indian foreign policy, in this context, is to ensure autonomy of judgment so that no one set of relations affects another set.

Indo-US relations should not affect India-China relations and in this regard, the rhetoric of the academic community and media should be kept strictly apart. The exchange of visits is important in this context. The changing international scenario needs greater understanding between India and China. For example, the Middle East including Iran, Iraq, Palestine, Israel and Afghanistan are issues of concern to both China and India, and both countries need to coordinate their efforts on these issues.

II. BOUNDARY DISPUTE

Both India and China have a complete understanding of each other's position- or bottom line- in terms of territorial concessions. The document signed during Wen Jibao's visit was the finest summation of this understanding between the two countries. Mutual adjustments, pertaining to the extent of territorial concessions, need to be made though this has always been a difficult problem.

The touchstone of India's China policy need not be resolution of the boundary question. The relationship is bound to face difficulties. A better understanding of systems both in China and India is required. Hu Jintao's visit may not result in a breakthrough though one should not be impatient for results. In the last two decades, there were no untoward incidents, firings, or border crossings. What is essential at this moment is the need for greater and denser relations between the two, in terms of involvement of the broader sections of the general population.

III. CHINESE MILITARY MODERNIZATION: ANTI-INDIA?

China's military modernization should be seen in the context of how India perceives China. If India believes that bilateral relations are adversarial, the conclusions may be different. On the other hand, if India believes that the relationship has changed from an adversarial stand to cooperation, in which both want to work together in their larger interests, then one may come to a different conclusion altogether on China as a military threat.

The relations received a setback in 1998 when the former Defence Minister expressed comments about China (in George Fernandes statements about China) followed by Vajpayee's letter to Clinton after the nuclear tests. If that perception of China as a threat has changed, then China's military threat should be seen in a different perspective. This includes the Chinese rail road to Lhasa. It has been well known for years that China was undertaking projects to expand links to its peripheral regions. To believe these links are India centric is a gross exaggeration.

India should rather make an effort to maximize China's connectivity with its border regions. This rail link may even come up to Yatong, close to Chumbi valley. This could be used as a short cut to the Russian rail network.

India should also understand that China faces a far more threatening military situation in its immediate neighborhood in East Asia than what India faces in its immediate regional environment. With North Korea's nuclear tests, the unresolved Taiwan issue and strong American pressure in Japan, Chinese threat perceptions are serious and should be taken into account while analyzing any Chinese military build up. Recent developments elsewhere, for example during the Gulf War, made countries recognize the need for revamping their traditional military systems and improve coordination between the Army, Navy and Air Force. Given China's tremendous economic growth, even a small percentage increase in military expenditure will be substantial. Perceiving China as a military threat is a narrow way of understanding Chinese intentions.

IV. ECONOMIC AND ENERGY CONCERNS

Even though Sino-Indian trade is fast approaching the $20 billion mark, India's base exports are rather narrow and mostly concentrated in commodity trade. India would consequently need to diversify and improve the quality of its exports. With a gradual revival of Indian industries, the prospects for economic relations are improving. Hu Jintao's visit should also result in a few more agreements. Moreover, the upsurge in private entrepreneurship in China could be capitalized upon by India.

The recent proposals for Chinese investments in India were poorly handled. Tendering policies should have been made clearer and if the tender was supposed to be open to the public, complete bidding should have been allowed. In this regard, India should not have a country specific policy nor should it exaggerate the security threat at the expense of economic cooperation. India should not prevent firms connected with China from investing in India as backward and forward cooperation across countries exists in a number of international firms. The new guidelines should, hopefully, make it easier for Chinese investments and business prospects in India. The present ambiguity fails to credit the understanding built up in China-India relations in recent years.

Hard market driven policies prevail in the energy sector. While both India and China seek to diversify their energy sources, competition is inevitable. The challenge, however, is to ensure that the competition does not lead to divisiveness. While there have been instances of cooperation in Syria and Sudan, China has the distinct advantage. It has employed non-conventional methods and approached the subject holistically. It has developed all-round relationships with countries with which it seeks energy cooperation. Keeping in mind its long-term national interests, China has been willing to invest far more in such relationships than most other countries. The recent China- Africa summit is testimony to China's novel and holistic approach.

There are also prospects for Russia-China-India cooperation. It need not be anything grandiose like building pipeline and gas lines across the three countries but rather something practical like developing swapping strategies. An initiative of the sort would also serve as a good political message.

V. TIBET

Tibet is not a stumbling block in Sino-Indian relations. Tibet was never considered an independent country. The entire British exercise was to shore up Chinese control over Tibet; the motive was to prevent Tsarist expansion. Consequently, Tibet was never an independent actor in the international stage. The Dalai Lama is here in India and China is not happy about this situation. The Chinese have realized that it is not India's fault that the Dalai Lama has an international personality, or that he has the won Nobel prize for peace and that Lama Buddhism is the fastest growing religion in the US. India will most certainly not put him in prison or disallow him from traveling abroad. China however fails to recognize that the Dalai Lama is indeed a religious leader. India would like to see reconciliation between the Dalai Lama and China so that the Dalai Lama can return to Tibet with dignity and honour.