The passage of the "Hasba" [Accountability] Bill in the NWFP by the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal [MMA] dominated provincial legislature on 13 November 2006 raising questions about electoral democracy in Pakistan. The bill found support among the MMA representatives, and other opposition parties like the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz), Pakistan Muslim League and the Tehreek-i-Insaf. The bill was passed by a majority of 66 to 30 and, under current parliamentary procedure; the governor of the province is obliged to ratify the bill to legalize its provisions. The bill envisages the establishment of a department within the provincial government resembling the "Ministry of the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice" of the former Taliban regime that governed Afghanistan till 2001. While several provisions of the bill were found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in 2005, the current version reflects a compromise which would tone down the coercive authority of the new department. For example, the department would not have an independent police force but would rely on the provincial police to enforce its mandate. Nor will it enforce regulations of marriage expenses or enforce a compulsory dress code.

The rise of the MMA in the NWFP and Balochistan highlights an important gap in the study of international relations and security studies. Increasingly, the institutionalization of electoral rules is not a guarantee for true electoral democracy. They can allow strategic behavior by political formations that do not conform to the conventional norms of a political party i.e., pursue an explicit religious agenda. The MMA is a significant source of political opposition to the incumbent military regime. It is simultaneously in power in the regions most critical to the foreign and security policy of Pakistan, the NWFP and Balochistan. Yet, the use of the rhetoric of electoral democracy by the military has limited its own maneuverability. The military cannot, however, stall the party-program of the MMA, since that risks the danger of adverse voter-mobilization, which could impact at both the provincial and federal levels.

Statistics from Pakistan's Election Commission reveals that the electorate in NWFP and Balochistan comprises about 11 million people, which is a sizable proportion of the Pakistani population. Moreover, because their political institutions are under-developed and the recourse to extra-legal violence is common, hence adverse voter-mobilization can further fuel the ongoing insurgencies within the region. The Pakistani military is thus navigating a very delicate domestic and foreign policy, without the institutional capacity to channel, mobilize or placate public opinion. One of the consequences of this concentration of powers in the military and executive institutions has been the polarization between mass opinion in the NWFP and Balochistan and the military establishment.

While mass-opinion demands increased autonomy and reflects the increasing assertion of religious values, the military establishment is forced to implement the secular values of law and order. The importance of the deployment of the Pakistani military in the NWFP along the Afghanistan border due to the exigencies of the US and NATO military campaign in Afghanistan cannot be further emphasized. Pacifying the NWFP and the contiguous territory of Afghanistan has been a daunting task for the Pakistani military; yet it is limited in its mandate by the electoral results of the General Elections of 2002. The result of this uncertainty is a mixed policy of both placation and intimidation that are inherently contradictory. On 5 November 2006 the military entered into a pact with pro-Taliban factions in North Waziristan which binds it to halt operations against the tribes in exchange for a pledge that they will not attack government troops or shelter foreign fighters. Yet, the attack on a religious school in the Bajaur Agency [in which 80 persons were killed] on 30 October 2006 resulted in widespread mass protests led by the MMA.

In conclusion, the implications of electoral politics and electoral institutions on security policy must be researched further. As the ongoing conflict in Bangladesh over the electoral system indicates, the choice of electoral institutions can play a critical role in the stability of both foreign and domestic security policy. Although the General Elections of 2007 are a landmark event in Pakistan's political development, there is considerable uncertainty about the nature of voter-mobilization in the NWFP, Balochistan and other provinces. As the examples of Lebanon [Hezbollah], Iraq [Al-Dawa, SICRI] and Palestine [Hamas] inform, religious parties adjust to electoral institutions and can use them to further their own ideological programs.